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

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

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ORIGINAL ARTICLES

About the Journal

The International Journal of Political Theory is a Canadian-originated open access journal looking to expand the scope of political theory, discover, and comment on current discourse in the fields of political science, international law, philosophy, sociology, and economics. The scope of the journal tackles the key problems the new world faces, and offers a unique perspective: global political phenomena through the lens of how all of the recurring observations fit into theoretical constructions, and what implications they have on moral, economic, societal, and physical terms. It welcomes unorthodox and provocative new arguments. The team is especially inclined towards the introduction of new theoretical compositions and observations, groundbreaking arguments combining the several fields the journal overviews.

The nature of the journal is multi-disciplinary; in fact, multi-disciplinary studies are highly encouraged, and the journal hopes to—as opposed to mainstream journals in political theory—fix the major methodological and cognitive ills of the field that are diagnosable through experience and study in multiple disciplines. As the reader is well aware of, economics, politics, law, and all other fields of social study inevitably overlap, especially in the globalized world we face today. Political theories are rarely isolated from their "non-political" sciences. For this reason, instead of the IJPT being a specialized journal with a single ideological stream, it hopes to be a database of a wide range of foundational, interdisciplinary theories revolving around the subject of the numerous sciences listed above. What is important for the editorial team is the uniqueness and provocativeness of the contribution: the IJPT is meant to be a journal for provocative, ground-breaking discoveries and theories.

All in all, the editorial board of the *International Journal of Political Theory* is proud to present this multi-disciplinary theory journal to all seekers of knowledge. All papers are guaranteed to offer new and interesting perspectives on the fields in question.

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Knowledge as a fictitious commodity: a Polanyian reading of the 'digital economy'

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ABSTRACT

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the attempts to use Karl Polanyi's framework to make sense of current developments have multiplied, producing a noticeable and lively debate. This debate centres on the notion of double movement put forward by the Hungarian thinker in his masterpiece – The Great Transformation. The paper is a contribution to this debate. The first part addresses a series of questions that make the interpretations of the double movement advanced so far not very compelling. To this end, a close reading of Polanyi's text, with the aim of dismantling and rearticulating its analytical structure, is carried out. The upshot is a dynamic and multistage picture of the double process as a recurrent and vortex-like attempt to progressively commodify natural and social resources against growing opposition. The second part employs this revised reading of the double movement to explain the collapse of the postwar consensus politics, the success of the neoliberal counterrevolution and the development of the knowledge economy. The claim put forward here is that, in addition to sustained efforts to deepen previous forms of commodification (land, labour and money), we are witnessing a fullblown attempt to turn knowledge into a new fictitious commodity. Building on the idea of digital Taylorism, the paper tries to show that information and computer technologies are being used to standardise and routinise a growing number of intellectual, professional and managerial activities which were able to escape previous attempts in this direction. Once again, at the forefront of this process there are powerful state actors, who are using New Public Management policies strategically to: support the enclosure of intangible cultural resources through the creation of intellectual property rights regimes, and undermine the counter-reaction of negatively affected societal actors by rising the collective action problems they face.

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> We are the witnesses of a barely perceptible transformation in ordinary language: verbs which formerly expressed satisfying actions have been replaced by nouns which name packages designed for passive consumption only - 'to learn' becomes 'to accumulate credits'
> Ivan Illich 1978: 8

> Today, white-collar job insecurity is no longer a function of the business cycle [...] Nor is it confined to a few volatile sectors like telecommunications or technology, or a few regions of the country [...] The economy may be looking up, the company may be raking in cash, and still the layoffs continue, like a perverse form of natural selection, weeding out the talented and successful as well as the mediocre.
> Barbara Ehrenreich 2006: 4

1 Introduction

The aim of this paper is to re-evaluate the heuristic role of Polanyi's double movement by suggesting an alternative reading that could answer several criticisms expressed in the past about it. Moreover, this reading of the double movement can give us a better insight into both the nature of the current crisis and its failure to unravel the neoliberal consensus.[1] According to this reading of the double movement, since the Speenhamland measures introduced in 1795 Britain, faulty welfarist solutions have had the effect of undermining the political force of countermovements calling for protective measures, while helping pro-market coalitions to periodically regenerate themselves. This means that the future resolution of the current crisis is likely to restart a new cycle in what looks uncannily like modernity's 'Groundhog Day'.[2] As a result, we should expect not only the deepening of previous drives to commodify land, labour and money, but also a full-blown attempt at commodifying novel fields of activity and social resources. Knowledge is, in the context of the information age, the most likely candidate to be turned into another (the fourth) fictitious commodity. This, it will be argued, explains the tensions arising in those sectors engaged in the managerial and intellectual activities which in the last four decades have been the target of the New Public Management (NPM).[3]

2 Market society as a dynamic, multistage process

According to Polanyi ([1944] 2001), any attempt to engender market society is doomed to cause disruptions that could endanger the ability of collectivities to reproduce themselves. For him, the self-regulating market mechanism requires treating all natural and social resources needed for production, consumption and distribution as 'commodities'; that is, goods produced for the market at a price determined by other interlocking markets. Polanyi believes this to be an impossibility and endeavours to show what the consequences of pursuing such a goal would be for society at large. Following the teaching of classical social theory, he starts by identifying a set of elements he thinks to be indispensable for any economic activity but that escape the market

logic and cannot be, therefore, reconciled with it. Land, labour and money are thus described as 'fictitious' commodities. Polanyi advances two interrelated arguments in support of the claim that they are fictitious. On the one hand, he states that land, labour and money are not like other commodities because none of them was originally produced for sale. On the other hand, he maintains that they cannot be subjected to the instrumental logic underpinning market relations without generating harmful side-effects.

Land stands for the natural ecologies supporting life on planet Earth, something that from time immemorial has been perceived and treated as pre-conditions for human existence as such. Re-conceiving those ecologies in instrumental terms as exploitable natural resources would, in Polanyi's view, yield intractable environmental problems. Labour is the human ability to create artefacts that support and give meaning to human life. To treat it instrumentally as a way to generate income would mean to degrade it to mere toil and undermine its motivational power above the material survival threshold. Finally, money is a means needed to accumulate, preserve and transmit value across time, generations and localities. Employing it instrumentally as an accounting device only would affect its social relevance, producing unwanted fluctuations in the money supply that will disrupt other aspects of the real economy.

Polanyi uses those arguments to: (i) deny the naturalness of markets, (ii) underscore the conceptual differences between ancient and modern markets, and (iii) castigate political attempts to engender self-regulating markets through state action.[4] Far from being the outcome of a "natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing with another", as suggested by Smith (1776, ch. II, par. I) and proselytised by his followers ever since (Sugden 1992), Polanyi conceives the market economy as an act of statecraft – a political creation that needs continuous external support to keep it up and running. Against intellectual attempts to naturalise markets by showing their continuity across ages, Polanyi insists on the disembedded nature of modern markets and their reliance on acquisitive motives condemned throughout history. Last but not least, Polanyi attempts to unmask the liberal justification of market economy by stressing the strains and dislocations undergone by the communities beset by pro-market policies, and the resistance those communities mounted, against all odds, to oppose these attempts. The notion of double movement is an abstract rationalisation of this process of social opposition that allows Polanyi to recast the political and economic history of the ninetieth century. Reconsidering this notion nowadays, at the end of a long period of crisis very much like the one experienced by Polanyi personally, will give us the opportunity to not only appreciate the originality of his account *vis-a-vis* those supplied by liberal and Marxist political economists, but also test its validity over time in relation to forms of social change affecting us at present.

The 'double movement' thesis represents an enduring aspect of Polanyi's account of the rise and fall of earlier attempts to realise a self-regulating market economy. And, obviously, this also is the feature of his work that has attracted the critical attention of successive generations of social and political theorists who have shared his concerns. Polanyi's thesis concerning the double movement is introduced in the final paragraphs of Chapter 6 of *The Great Transformation* (TGT), in a passage that is worth quoting at length, even if in abridged form:

> To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. […] Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. […] But no society could stand the effects of such a system of crude fictions even for the shortest stretch of time unless its human and natural substance as well as its business organization was protected against the ravages of this satanic mill. (2001: 76-77)

From this he concludes:

> Indeed, human society would have been annihilated but for protective countermoves which blunted the action of this self-destructive mechanism. Social history in the nineteenth century was thus the result of a double movement: the extension of the market organization in respect to genuine commodities was accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones. […] Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system—this was the one comprehensive feature in the history of the age. (ibid: 79-80)

Concerning Polanyi's remarks, the first thing to stress is that the countermovement he refers to in these passages should not be viewed as a single unitary phenomenon (see e.g. Levitt and Seccareccia (2016) figure 1), but as a process composed of many interlinked phases.[5] These are characterised by their own distinctive double movement which, in turn, set the ground for the restarting of the market experiment on an even larger scale. Each phase is kick-started by specific events and has at its 'core' distinct social actors and rationales. The stages discussed by Polanyi are related to: (i) the social reaction against the attempt to turn land into a fictitious commodity that resulted in the Speenhamland system (1795-1834); (ii) the full blown attempt to commodify labour after that system was dismantled, 'until in the 1870's the recognition of the trade unions offered sufficient protection'; (iii) the transformation of money into another fictitious commodity at the turn of the century, and the eventual collapse of the liberal economic order following the 1929 financial crash. Of these events, the most extended analysis carried out by Polanyi in TGT pertains the ones related to the commodification of labour, which is used as paradigmatic of the *modus operandi* of the market mechanism; the commodification of land and money are treated in a more cursory manner.[6] It is also worth noting that Polanyi's attempt to highlight the epistemic limitations of political economy is part of a more ambitious sociology of culture that he uses as general framework, but to which I cannot do justice here. Also beyond the remit of this paper is Polanyi's vision of socialism, which is tightly connected to his social epistemology.

2.1 The attempt to turn land into a fictitious commodity

Speenhamland, the historical case at the centre of TGT (chapters 7 and 8), deals with the agricultural revolution that preceded industrialization. Here the countermovement emerges as a decentralised and bottom up act of resistance against the commodification of land promoted by the enclosure of open fields and other types of commons.[7] Polanyi's discusses a set of related state interventions to deal with the displacement of the rural population brought about by the enclosures. Speenhamland refers to the allowance system established by local magistrates in Berkshire in 1795, but which, according to Polanyi, was copied by many other local authorities. Those protective measures will be followed by other pieces of legislation which will interact together, promoting what he calls disruptive strains. These are: (i) the partial repeal of the 1662 Act of Settlement, (ii) the abolition of the 1563 Statute of Artificers and (iii) the passing of the Anti-Combination Laws of 1799-1800.

At this early stage, the countermovement involves two main social actors: the local landlords, who were interested in the removal of feudal norms regulating the tradeability of estates and the appropriation of common land, but keen on retaining a steady workforce no longer tied to their villages; the commoners, who were deprived of the protection afforded them by both the cottage economy and the guilds system, but forbidden to establish concerted actions to boost their bargaining power. According to Polanyi, both actors held ambivalent attitudes towards those changes,

> the allowance system will appear as a device contrived by squirearchy to meet a situation in which physical mobility could no longer be denied to labor, while the squire wished to avoid such unsettlement of local conditions, including higher wages, as was involved in the acceptance of a free national labor market. (ibid: 93) [Thus,] the supremacy of squire and parson was even enhanced in consequence of Speenhamland, […]. (ibid: 100) Politically, the squire's pull with the village poor was strengthened by Speenhamland while that of the rural middle class was weakened. (ibid: 101)

On their part, the commoners were likewise concerned about the loss of protection assured by past arrangements, but keen on freeing themselves from the ties that bound them to their locality and lords. The Speenhamland system represents a political compromise reached by the magistrates who were called to act on these contrasting pressures coming from above, in support of extant social hierarchies, and below, intending to undermine them.[8]

At the same time, Polanyi develops a powerful analysis of the unintended consequences brought about by that compromise. First, as already noted, he considers the social role and attitude of the local aristocracy, who is able to influence the norms making process directly.

> The bulk of yeomanry had long vanished in the vicissitudes of the Agricultural Revolution, and the remaining lifeholders and occupying-proprietors tended to merge with the cottagers and scrap-holders into one social stratum in the eyes of the potentate of the countryside. (ibid: 100)

Second, Polanyi explains that the allowance system imposed as result of the squirearchy's wishes started a vicious dynamics that will undermine the work ethic of rural labourers.

> Under the Speenhamland Law a man was relieved even if he was in employment, as long as his wages amounted to less than the family income granted to him by the scale. Hence, no laborer had any material interest in satisfying his employer, his income being the same whatever wages he earned […]. Within a few years the productivity of labor began to sink to that of pauper labor, thus providing an added reason for employers not to raise wages above the scale. (ibid: 83)

Finally, Polanyi clarifies how the allowance system interacted with the other pieces of legislation mentioned above, creating an unstable blend that will undermine later on the rural social coalition supporting those protective measures.

> The paternalistic intervention of Speenhamland called forth the Anti-Combination Laws, […] In conjunction with the Anti-Combination Laws, which were not revoked for another quarter of a century, Speenhamland led to the ironical result that the financially implemented "right to live" eventually ruined the people to whom it was ostensibly design to succor (ibid: 85).

2.2 The attempt to turn labour into a fictitious commodity

In Polanyi's account a proper market economy takes shape only in the 1830s, as a result of a full blown attempt to commodify both rural and urban labour. Once again, the changes that brought about the Industrial Revolution are related to several legislative interventions: the abolition of the Poor Law in 1834, Peel's Bank Act of 1844 and the repeal of the Corn Laws of 1846. As a result of those reforms, rural workers were no longer receiving outdoor relief but being forced to choose between employment in the manufacturing industries at increasingly competitive rates, or committing themselves to the hellish regime of the workhouse. In turn, competitive wages were set by a developing system of international trade that was meant to provide cheap imports of corn from abroad; something requiring the abolition of the pre-existing system of duties, and of a newly emerging centralised monetary regime dedicated to foster free trade. In reaction, we have the starting of a new countermovement, that in Polanyi's account develops in two distinct steps, reflecting the fragmentation undergone by the previous rural coalition in the meantime. The first step represented the last act of resistance of a traditional rural order against a rising new industrial urban order, while the second was due to the mobilisation of the working classes under the banner of socialism.

Polanyi's writes that "The protection of society, in the first instance, falls to the rulers, who can directly enforce their will" (ibid.: 173), and then go on explaining that

> when, in 1834, the Reform Parliament abolished Speenhamland, the landlords shifted their resistance to the factory laws. The church and the manor were now rousing the people against the mill-owner whose predominance would make the cry for cheap

> food irresistible, and thus, indirectly, threaten to sap rents and tithes. […] the repeal of Speenhamland and the growth of the factories actually prepared the way for the success of the Anti-Corn Law agitation, in 1846. […] The Ten Hours Bill of 1847, which Karl Marx hailed as the first victory of socialism, was the work of enlightened reactionaries. (ibid.: 174)

Although the working classes up to the late 1840s had not yet acquired their own self-awareness as a distinctive social force, the events recalled by Polanyi are meant show that they are in the process of emancipating themselves from past loyalties. Thus, in one instance they sided with the urban middle classes and supported the repeal of the Corn Laws, while in another instance they sided with the rural elites and backed the passing of the Ten Hours Bill.

The events that mark the onset of the working classes emancipation from their past rulers were, according to Polanyi, traceable back to the changes which characterised British political life in the first half of the 1830s.

> Politically, the British working class was defined by the Parliamentary Reform Act of 1832, which refused them the vote; economically, by the Poor Law Reform Act of 1834, which excluded them from relief and distinguished them from the pauper. (ibid.)

The rise of the Owenite and Chartist movements epitomises the inception of the new era of autonomous working class struggle based on a radical political programme wishing to protect manual labourers from dislocation without necessarily preserving the past social order (Jones 1983, ch. 3). Socialism, on this view, is a forward-looking search for a novel form of habitation able to re-embed the market within a progressive social and political milieu. Polanyi, however, notes that, notwithstanding the success of the Ten Hours Bill, the implosion of the rural coalition allowed the entrenching of the market mechanism within British society. By the end of the 1840s, "the beginning of the Golden Age of capitalism obliterated the vision of the past" (ibid.: 175) and brought about the demise of the Chartist movement in the same year, 1848, that continental Europe was engulfed in the flames of a socialist revolution

> By that time the spirit of revolt roused by the Poor Law Reform Act as well as the sufferings of the Hungry Forties was waning; the wave of rising trade was boosting employment, and capitalism began to deliver the goods. The Chartists dispersed peacefully. (ibid: 181)

In the following decades, the diverging fragments of the anti-market coalition will manage to support a raft of legislative measures designed to ameliorate working conditions. A proper re-birth of the countermovement is going to happen only in the 1880s, after, that is, a decade-long crisis that will ravage the manufacturing industry and the countryside worldwide – what economic historians call the first great depression (Hobsbawm 1989, ch. 2). This second step was led by the trade union movements that were developing across the industrialised world. These movements used collective bargain and political mobilisation at the international level to engender both extensive forms of democratisation and means of social insurance. It was also a

historical phase in which conservative political forces succeeded in supporting widespread protective measures that aimed at accomplishing the market economy at national level; an attempt that was to obstruct international trade, creating a new set of tensions. As Polanyi (ibid.: 226 and 227) explains,

> Whether protection was justified or not, a debility of the world market system was brought to light by the effect of the interventions. The import tariffs of one country hampered the exports of another and forced it to seek for markets in politically unprotected regions. Economic imperialism was mainly a struggle between the Powers for the privilege of extending their trade into politically unprotected markets.
>
> A similar contradiction operated inside national boundaries. Protectionism helped to transform competitive markets into monopolistic ones. […] And whatever the market in question […] the strain would transcend the economic zone and balance would have to be restored by political means. Nevertheless, the institutional separation of the political from the economic sphere was constitutive to market society and had to be maintained whatever the tension involved. This was the other source of disruptive strain.

2.3 Financial drives to commodify money

This second phase overlapped with sustained attempts to commodify money and financialise the market economy. These changes set the ground for the emergence of a new type of financial capitalism that will cause the imperial drives responsible for the outbreak of the great war, and the subsequent collapse of the liberal order in the 1930s. Here Polanyi's discussion focuses on the reasons behind the development of free-trade and the adoption of the gold standard. Particularly engaging are, in relation to those topics: (i) the distinction between 'token' and 'commodity' money, (ii) the tensions between domestic and international policies, and (iii) the effects produced by the emancipation of the economic sphere from the political one. I shall discuss them in turn.

To the commodification of money Polanyi dedicates only a short chapter (ch. 16), in which he discusses the reasons behind the establishing of a double currency regime: one required by the domestic economy, which relies on token money; another needed for international trade, which uses gold as commodity money. The two regimes were interconnected and operated through the intermediation of two distinct institutional actors whose goals were not always overlapping, generating periodic tensions. They were national central banks and the *haut finance*: the first was concerned to assure a steady supply of token money to prevent monetary deflation and stimulate economic growth, while the other was preoccupied with exploiting the opportunities offered by free-trade and the imbalances in exchange rates. Chapter 16 deals exclusively with the operation of central banks and their monetary policies; *haut finance* and its *modus operandi* receives only few scattered observations in chapter 1.

Chapter 16 opens with an explanation of the economic reasons pushing for the commodification of money:

> if profits depend upon prices, then the monetary arrangements upon which prices depend must be vital to the functioning of any system motivated by profits. […] if the price level was falling for monetary reasons over a considerable time, business would be in danger of liquidation accompanied by the dissolution of productive organization and massive destruction of capital. Not low prices, but falling prices were the trouble. (ibid.: 201)

For Polanyi, the rationale for the evolution of token money and the institutions of central banking charged with its management is clear,

> the expansion of production and trade unaccompanied by an increase in the amount of money must cause a fall in the price level […]. Token money was developed at an early date to shelter trade from the enforced deflations that accompanied the use of specie when the volume of business swelled. No market economy was possible without the medium of artificial money. (ibid.: 202)
>
> Central banking mitigated this defect of credit money greatly. By centralizing the supply of credit in one country, it was possible to avoid the wholesale dislocation of business and employment involved in deflation in such a way as to absorb the shock and spread its burden over the whole country. The bank in its normal function was cushioning the immediate effects of gold withdrawals on the circulation of notes as well as of the diminished circulation of notes on business. (ibid.: 203)

Economic reasoning and the relevance acquired by token money, as opposed to currencies based on precious metals like gold (specie), show, according to Polanyi, the dependence of the market mechanism on non market elements that cannot be fully commodified and remain, therefore, fictitious commodities.

> This money was not a means of exchange, it was a means of payment; it was not a commodity, it was purchasing power; far from having utility in itself, it was merely a counter embodying a quantified claim to things that can be purchased. Clearly, a society in which distribution depended upon the possession of such tokens of purchasing power was a construction entirely different from market economy. (ibid.: 205)

Transactions between economic operators belonging to different countries could not be carried out by using the same type of currency, but required instead a proper commodity currency based on gold. Joining the gold standard became thus, for Polanyi, a necessary requirement to enjoy the benefits of free-trade at the global level. This however entailed maintaining the separation between the domestic and international spheres, and adopting two operating logics which could easily enter in contradiction with each other. Accomplishing a self-regulating market requires, in Polanyi's account, not only the building of national markets unhindered by internal obstacles, but

also the removal of duties and tariffs that set limits to imports and exports. To have competitive rates in the manufacturing industries meant repealing the system of corn laws duties erected in the past to protect domestic farming, he reminds us. To have a flourishing industrial apparatus also requires foreign markets to which the manufactures thus produced could be freely exported, and from which the factors of production sourced. In short, the viability of a domestic market economy depends on its connection with international trade routes and a system of free-trade that keeps those routes open across national borders. In an international order based on the nation states system, where each state claims an absolute and exclusive form of sovereignty, this could be achieved only through the nexus of the gold standard and the intermediation of a financial system independent from state power.

In Polanyi's view, this is highly problematic: if, at a theoretical level, the international order seemed to rely on an voluntaristic mode of compliance, in practice this order rested on an unequal distribution of powers and resources among states through which compliance was forcefully extracted each time.

> In liberal theory Great Britain was merely another atom in the universe of trade and ranked precisely on the same footing as Denmark or Guatemala. Actually, the world counted a limited number of countries, divided into lending countries and borrowing countries, exporting countries and practically self-sufficient ones, countries with varied exports and such as dependent for their imports an foreign borrowing on the sale of a single commodity like wheat or coffee. Such differences could be ignored by theory, but their consequences could not equally be disregarded in practice. (ibid.: 216)

For Polanyi this means that the anomic sets of changes effected at the national level to engender the market mechanism in the domestic sphere will have to be replicated at the international level as well; otherwise the whole economic edifice would collapse under its own weight. And once again, given the impossibility to effect those changes spontaneously, the international market building enterprise would have to be delegated to the state, whose intervention would be dictated by the logic of power politics; a rather different utilitarian calculus from the one advocated by liberal political economists.

> Of course, none of these difficulties was supposed to arise under an allegedly self-regulating system. But the more often repayments were made only under the threat of armed intervention, the more often trade routes were kept open only with the help of gun-boats, the more often trade follow the flag, while the flag followed the need of the invading governments, the more patent it became that political instruments had to be used in order to maintain equilibrium in world economy. (ibid.: 217)

Finally, Polanyi tries to clarify the problems brought about by these two competing logics by discussing another prerequisite of the liberal creed, the separation between the economic sphere and the political sphere. And in doing so, he draws a logical parallel between the domestic realm and the international setting.

> The strains emanating from the market were thus to shifting to and fro between the market and the other institutional zones, sometimes affecting the working field of government, sometimes that of the gold standard or that of the balance-of-power system, as the case might be. […] It was the relative autonomy of the spheres that caused the strain to accumulate and to generate tensions which eventually exploded in more or less stereotyped forms. (ibid.: 220)

> imperialism and half conscious preparation for autarchy were the bent of Powers which found themselves more and more dependent upon an increasingly unreliable system of world economy. And yet rigid maintenance of the integrity of the international gold standard was imperative. […] A similar contradiction operated inside the national boundaries. Protectionism helped to transform competitive markets into monopolistic ones. (ibid.: 227)

To sum up, in TGT Polanyi offers us a very dynamic account of social change at the core of which we have his notion of double movement. Struggling to arrive at a meaningful overview of social and political change in a world characterised by the fragmentation of knowledge, the book is structured and reads like the script for a film, with each chapter representing an edited sequence illustrating parts of the general thesis. Some of the sequences are longer and more detailed than others; some are only sketched and open to contrasting interpretations; some are missing altogether – but they can be figured out quite easily. Among the missing bits, the most notable is a discussion of the evolution of the joint-stock company and stock markets; two institutions that will drive the process of financialisation of the economy at the turn of the twentieth century, and again at the start of the twenty-first. This evolution can be reconstructed in a Polanyian spirit, even if I cannot do it here.[9] Two other interesting issues that are not fully developed by the author but that can be derived from the text, concern the role of the state, on the one hand, and the inner dynamics unfolding within both pro-market coalitions and countermovements, on the other. Polanyi seems too busy engaged in a full blown refutation of political economy (as both a research programme and a political project) to develop his remarks about state activism and society's counter-reaction into a proper theory. In light of the difficulties affecting Marxist attempts to elaborate a sound critical political economy ever since, this project would be amply justified even now (cf Palumbo and Scott 2019). Likewise, the inner dynamics affecting pro-market coalitions and countermovements is only hinted at best and riddle with linguistic ambiguities. However, the few observations contained in the text suggest that Polanyi's notion of double movement is less exposed to the critique of functionalism than his commentators have been willing to concede so far.[10]

3 Polanyi's double movement and modernity's Groundhog Day

In what way can the alternative reading of the double movement proposed above be employed? Palumbo and Scott (2018) suggest two ways in which Polanyi's analysis can be expanded. First, it helps explain the rise and fall of the post-war welfare state. To that end, a Polanyian reading of

Mills' trilogy on American power structure is carried out to show that the shortcomings of the welfare state were already evident at the outset. Those shortcomings will eventually be responsible for the implosion of the social and political coalitions supporting it at the end of the 1970s. I do not intend to repeat their argument here. Second, in the same work they suggest seeing the political and institutional changes brought about since the 1980s as an attempt to expand the self-regulating market mechanism by enclosing the common of the mind and commodifying knowledge. This is the topic I want to expand upon in the rest of the paper.[11] In a Polanyian spirit, it will be argued that in this context too the remaking of market society is, above all, an exercise of statecraft having a twofold objective: (i) to undermine the system of tangible and intangible commons from which societal agents and sub-state units derive their autonomy and legitimacy; (ii) to entice the corporate entities whose help is needed to achieve this goal. Unlike the stages discussed in the previous part, the main target of current reforms are not the working classes any longer, but the middle classes; and their goal is to undermine the economic and political relevance the latter managed to acquire during the postwar.

3.1 The information society and digital Taylorism

The advent of the information society has produced a vast scientific literature committed to explaining the reasons behind its rise, and the implications it will have for the world at large. Although this body of work is presented as mainly empirical, in reality it is often very speculative, and thus highly dependent on the personal orientation of the author. In general, progressive analysts have viewed the information revolution as an opportunity for human emancipation and inclusive forms of cyber-democracy (Kostakis and Bauwens 2014). Thus, empirical case studies having a controversial or limited scientific value were offered as evidence of an epochal trend implicit in the changes we are witnessing. The most relevant example is the development of post-fordism in the 1980s (Ash (ed.) 1994); a body of literature the aim of which was to show that the main tenets of the Fordist organisation of labour are no longer valid and that productive activities are being re-organised according to an alternative logic. The understanding of this alternative logic has rekindled the interest of social scientists in 'networks' as modes of organisation alternative to both hierarchy and markets (Dioguardi 2010). Often these rationalisations underplay both the differences between classic social thought and current social theory, and the profound influence political economy exercises on current accounts of change. In spite of the fact that the theorists engaged in this enterprise wish to re-evaluate sociological approaches *vis-à-vis* political economy, it is clear that, compared to classic social thought, contemporary approaches have adopted a problematic type of social determinism that: (i) neglects the political nature of social intercourse, stressed instead by Polanyi and (ii) proposes a sociological version of spontaneous order no less problematic (and Panglossian) than its economic counterparts, from which it is ultimately derived.

To counter these tendencies, Polanyi is presented as the last exponent of a classic tradition proposing a radical alternative to the conceptual framework supplied by political economy. My

aim is also to show that his perspective can still be employed to arrive at an alternative reading of the changes we are experiencing at present than the ones supplied by more fashionable post-modern approaches. Informatisation and digitisation are the main cases in point. Far from showing that ICTs have promoted a post-fordist organisation of labour (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014), or supplied the resources to overcome the traditional problems affecting social networks (Castells 2005),[12] my Polanyian inquiry arrives at a more dystopic conclusion: a renewed attempt to commodify labour, which has now among its main targets administrative, managerial and intellectual activities that had successfully resisted previous drives in that direction. This endeavour is dependent on scientific managerial principles the ultimate goal of which is to arrive at what has been labelled 'digital Taylorism' (Parenti 2001, also Head 2018), and supports the claim that "Wherever digital Taylorism has taken hold, people are again becoming appendixes of machine in certain areas of the world of work" (Staab and Nachtwey 2016: 469).

The case studies offered by Palumbo and Scott in their 2018 work are trying to link this body of literature with the one concerned with the development of the NPM, first in Britain and then all over Europe. Indeed, their thesis is that here the public sector is being used as a large scale laboratory to test as far the commodification of managerial and intellectual labour can reach. By using different and ever-changing combinations of privatisation, liberalisation and marketisation, managerial and intellectual labour is being systematically parcelled out in discrete sequences and then routinised. *Ex ante* and *ex post* form of assessments, carried out by a growing constellations of quangos and audit agencies, are subsequently employed to measure the degree of conformity of each individual located along the production line.

In this digital version of Taylorism, conformity is rewarded by allowing a tiny minority of those belonging to the professional-managerial class to move up the ranks, whereas non-conformity is strongly discouraged by the ease with which any individual could be replaced along the digital conveyor belt by a growing number of part-time and temporary white-collar workers seeking more secure positions. As Brown *et al* (2011: 81) explain,

> Digital Taylorism is not only deskilling many white-collar workers, but it also incites a power struggle within the middle classes, as corporate reengineering reduces the autonomy and discretion of some but not all managers and professionals. It encourages the segmentation of talent in ways that reserve permission to think to a small proportion of elite employees responsible for driving the business forward, functioning cheek by jowl with equally well-qualified workers in more Taylorised jobs.

The focus on these intellectual fields of activities is meant to update Polanyi's analysis by developing themes that he only touches briefly to differentiate his account of change from competing Marxist and superstructural explanations (Harland 1987): (i) the proactive role of the state, (ii) the secondary role played by technological innovations and (iii) the inner dynamics between the various components of the professional-managerial class affected by the process of commodification.

Following Polanyi, it is possible to conceptualise the welfare state (in both its Keynesian and neo-corporatist phases) as sets of rights-based measures that managed to protect a growing number of white-collar workers quite effectively, shielding them from the market competition still operating in the manufacturing industries.[13] By attributing to the state the role of good employer and making public bodies like the civil service and the universities largely self-regulating, the welfare state granted middle-level managers, technicians and salaried professionals significant forms of autonomy that often set them apart from those operating in the private-sector. This privileged position was taken by other white-collar workers as a benchmark for bettering their working conditions in the private sector as well; elements that in economic conditions of nearly full employment reduced the bargaining power of corporate businesses enormously. Such a position of strength was further reinforced by the fact that welfare policies generated new types of 'commons' that white-collar workers could exploit to insulate themselves from competition and retain an independent power base.

As explained by Barbara and John Ehreinreich (1979), those conditions allowed sectors of the professional-managerial class concerned about possible future developments to try to establish links with the traditional working classes and challenge the ideological basis underpinning the postwar settlement.[14] This explains the converging interests of state actors and private corporations that in the 1970s were affected by a deep legitimation crisis to join forces and reconstitute the pro-market coalition. Also, this explains why the restarting of the commodification process in the 1980s was carried out in parallel with repeated top-down attempts at undermining the viability of the commons upon which those white collar workers depended – using the spoils as side-payments for the corporate entities involved in the pro-market coalition. Finally, this shows that technological innovations are not the main determinants of change, but play only an ancillary role. In many spheres of work, ICTs have in effect promoted a remarkable redistribution of the means of production and brought about a flourishing gift economy (Elder-Vass 2016). Potentially, they supply us the means to overcome our obsolete Tayloristic managerial mentality. In practice however they are fully exploited by pro-market forces able to impose novel forms of commodification.[15]

3.2 Enclosing the common of the mind and commodifying knowledge

Polanyi attributes to successful countermovements the ability to regenerate tangible and intangible commons that help keep in check the commodification process. Within industrial society, the most tangible commons assumed the form of pension funds and other types of social insurance systems managed by labour organisations either directly or indirectly (Van Leeuwen 2016), and mutualist and cooperative activities making up the moral economy (Fassin 2009; Götz 2015; Sayer 2000). Less tangible commons were related to labour legislation, collective bargaining systems, practices of co-determination and other democratic activities which gave workers voice in managerial issues and let them control their working conditions. This explains the relevance trade unionists and progressive thinkers like Polanyi attributed to industrial

democracy (Burkitt and Hutchinson 2006). Despite the limitations noted by Palumbo and Scott (2018), the post-war settlement ended up producing new types of commons, having a growingly intangible nature, that enhanced the ability of civil servants and salaried professionals to determine the terms and conditions of their activities, and influence the determination of their salary levels (Mau 2003). The restart of the commodification process has, therefore, entailed not only undermining trade unions and repealing labour legislation offering legal protection to disruptive categories of white-collar workers. It also meant enclosing the commons from which those societal actors derived their autonomy, and rolling back the neo-corporatist arrangements which gave them political leverage.

The reforms affecting the public sectors of OECD countries through the NPM template exemplify the unfolding of this complex and multifaceted process, the means used to carry it forwards and the role played by collusive partnerships involving global corporations, state actors and international organisations. As in the previous historical experiences studied by Polanyi, the process is highly contradictory in that it is based on the defence of individual rights to legitimise economic forms of exploitation, and on efficientist explanations used to justify setting artificial barriers to information flows crucial for social networks to function properly. As Kapczynski (2014, ftn 1) writes,

> there are serious tensions between the conception of "free markets" and "free trade" and the muscular, transnational regime of exclusion rights in information that we have today. IP rights can be readily conceived of not as property, but as regulation, and their insertion into international law not as a move toward free trade, but instead as the result of protectionism and rent-seeking. The law as it is, and common defense of that law as serving economic interests, may thus be more the result of political ordering than of any purely economic logic.

In academia, sustained attempts to marketise research in order to generate new funding streams have pushed all those involved in the social division of intellectual labour into a struggle to affirm their intellectual ownership of parts of a common scientific enterprise. Individual researchers need to do that to demonstrate their productivity and meet the requirements imposed by multiple forms of assessment. Universities and other higher education institutions encourage this sort of behaviour for the overheads they can extract and are busy establishing start-ups and research parks dedicated to the commercialisation of any patentable product. Corporations are interested in associating themselves with prestigious universities and research centres because that allows them to reduce their in-house R&D activities while maximising the returns on those commercial ventures. Central governments, on their part, view all this as an opportunity to cut public budgets, promote economic growth indirectly and exploit, in the process, the systems of audit devised to measure the social impact of research to undermine the relevance of peer-review and, consequently, the autonomy of their own scientific communities. In Britain the shift from the RAE (Research Assessment Exercise) to the REF (Research Excellence Framework) epitomises the strategic logic driving state activism in the field of higher education; and it is this

logic of statecraft that underpins concerted efforts to establish a common European Research Area under the aegis of the Lisbon Strategy (and its later incarnations).[16]

In this context, IPRs sought to protect individual authors are inevitably hijacked by the corporate actors operating within a cultural industry that the digital revolution was supposed to unravel (Gillespie 2007). Instead, changing mechanisms of audit have had the power to reinforce the hold commercial publishers have on the dissemination of scientific knowledge. Thus, the agency of a growing number of scientists dependent on them has been weaken, while publishers have acquired absolute and exclusive entitlements for free. It is by now a common practice within the academic publishing industry to ask authors to relinquish their copyrights when they seek to publish in major journals or with prestigious publishers, even if the contribution the latter are giving to the scientific and editorial process is by now negligible. With the advent of digital technology, commercial publishers and journal repositories have been further given the opportunity to appropriate the already available stock of past articles and books, and charge exorbitant fees to the academic communities which produced that stock in the first place. This explains why the academic publishing industry is flourishing and assures returns sufficiently high to justify an ongoing process of consolidation in this sector worldwide (Larivière *et al* 2015).[17]

Competition leading to corporate consolidation is even fiercer in the bio- and life-science sector and in technological areas that can be commercially exploited more directly by using patent laws (Drahos with Braithwaite 2002; Gøtzsche 2013; McManis 2007). The latter is an ever expanding legal body encompassing new artefacts, genetic material, natural compounds, production techniques, trade secrets and, increasingly, collections of raw data (Biagioli *et al* 2011). Rather than protect authors and scientists, IPRs and patents are being used to establish barriers on information flows and empower institutional gatekeepers and oligopolistic market forces (Boyle 2008; Oleinik 2015). Rather than stimulate innovation and reward talent, they are supporting an expanding rent economy the feasibility of which depends entirely on the legal enforcement assured by national and international authorities (Baker 2016; Lambert 2009). As such, IPR and patent regimes turn out to be doubly parasitical: first, they legalise the *de facto* corporate appropriation of common pool resources; second, they rest on external forms of enforcement whose burden is entirely born out by the taxpayer (or other third actors).

The counter-reaction of all negatively affected interests is, once again, dealt with in the ways discussed by Polanyi. At a theoretical level, an increasing number of neoliberal think tanks, astroturfs and political economists are enrolled by pro-market forces to supply justifications appealing to any deontological and instrumental reason available interchangeably (Mayer 2017; Scheufen 2015). In doing so, past liberal arguments used to justify property rights and the enclosure of commons are freely recycled even when (a) rights are attributed to legal entities rather than physical persons and their enforcement requires the systematic violation of traditional civic liberties (Patry 2009), (b) enclosure pertains to intangible cultural objects and practices that digital technologies are making non-depleteable and are, therefore, reproducible at close to zero-cost (Rifkin 2014). The upshot is a humourless 'comedy of the commons' (Rose 1986) that is

replacing the melodramatic 'tragedy of the commons' staged in the past (McManis and Yagi 2013). At a more practical level, state authority is systematically deployed to criminalise entire communities involved in a flourishing gift economy producing cutting-edge innovation and interesting forms of democratic experimentation (Krikorian and Kapczynski 2010). Hence the commitment of central governments and inter-governmental organisations to 'collibration' strategies the goal of which is to raise the costs of collective action faced by antagonistic movements; the establishing of 'collusive' pro-market coalitions committed to eroding the public domain; the 'self-serving' efforts of national and transnational authorities wishing to turn educational institutions at all levels into assembly factories for the training of useful idiots (in the original Greek meaning of the word).

Given the individualist psychological make up of the professional-managerial class and the deep cleavages upon which its collective identity rests, countermovements face enormous difficulties. Those individuals who view their social role as linked to the realisation of some form of common good are perennially locked into struggles with those others who are easily enticed to serve the dominant corporate powers. This makes the professional-managerial class not only existentially uncertain about itself, but also politically unreliable in the eyes of other societal actors affected by the commodification process. Operating within pretty unresponsive political systems, the defensive coalitions that manage to overcame their collective action problems show consequently a lack of staying power and periodically dissolve into infighting factions. As in the case of the 1970s New Left related by the Ehrenreichs (1979), the implosion of defensive coalitions generate forms of disaffection which allow more conservative forces to rule the void and restart a new cycle of commodification having more far-reaching effects (cf Mair 2013; Streeck 2014). Modernity is therefore caught in the seemingly endless Groundhog Day mentioned earlier; and each new generation is led to repeat the same strategic errors of its predecessors, the contradictions generated by market-based reforms notwithstanding. Notice however that, unlike Marxist and superstructural thinkers, Polanyi views each new crisis as the opening of a genuine window of opportunity for transcending market society. Failure to accomplish such a transcendence is, in his view, always due to factors that can in principle be addressed and overcome politically. This amply justifies engaging with Polanyi's double movement and expanding its epistemic reach.

4 Conclusion: neoliberal change in a Polanyian perspective

This paper has carried out a twofold task. First, an alternative reading of Polanyi's double movement has been suggested. Second, this revised version of Polanyi's thesis was employed to explain current efforts to engender a knowledge economy. The revised notion of double movement tells us that faulty solutions to the dislocations caused by the market economy could end up generating vicious, vortex-like cycles. The failure of the Speenhamland system to stop the commodification of land brought about both an intensification of that process ever since (Christophers 2018), and a full-blown and persistent effort to commodify labour (Braverman 1998). The failure of nineteenth century socialist movements to reverse the commodification of

labour set the ground for the financialisation of the economy and the commodification of money, producing more vicious and large scale dislocations (Kindleberger and Aliber 2005). Finally, the failure of the welfare state to redress the problems generated by financial capitalism promoted a neoliberal form of globalisation that is extending the market mechanism in all directions and entrenching it by pushing for the commodification of knowledge in its many aspects (Boyle 2008).

If this Polanyian reading is at all plausible, failure to properly address the current set of interlinking economic, political, social and ecological crises this time around would restart the vicious cycle anew – something which seems already happening, with Britain leading the way once more. The results of the 2019 British general elections can be taken as an indication that a new political settlement is in the process of being established and that the window of opportunity open by the 2008 financial crisis will close very soon. All over Europe, progressive anti-austerity movements are fast loosing ground against more conservative forms of populism in ways that remind us the previous historical experiences related by Polanyi in TGT. From this perspective, the results of the next US presidential elections in 2020 could be the catalyst of a renewed attempt to bring about market society.

In suggesting a revised reading of the double movement, no attempt has been carried out to engage in a more normative inquiry concerned with the validity of the socialist solution envisaged by Polanyi, or any other similar alternative suggested to-date. Before advocating a normative solution to our neoliberal predicament, I believe necessary to set the problem right, and be fully aware of what our possibilities and limitations are. To avoid falling into some form of intellectual despair, the paper has, finally, tried to stress the differences that distinguish Polanyi's from other competing theoretical frameworks. Against those who put their trust in the ability of economic contradictions to unravel the capitalist system, Polanyi invites us to adopt a social perspective radically different from the one used by political economists (of any shade). Against those who are transfixed by the inescapable systemic logic imposed by total institutions able to reproduce themselves in spite of their dis-functionalities, Polanyi remains confident in the power of human agency to establish a new and more congenial form of habitation.

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Notes

[1] The crisis that started with the 2008 credit crunch has subsequently evolved into a set of interlocking economic, political, environmental and social crises. The 2008 credit crunch affected financial markets worldwide and, by extension, the international economy. The inability of political institutions to address it properly has shown all limitations of liberal democratic arrangements. Both the economic and political crises are contributing to the environmental and social crises that are now dominating public debates (cf Fraser 2014).

[2] The expression 'Groundhog Day' refers to the 1993 American movie starring Bill Murray and Andie MacDowell.

[3] Unveiling the structure, relevance and rationale of the NPM is the aim of Palumbo and Scott (2018) book, upon which this paper draws.

[4] Since his appointment as Visiting Professor at Columbia University in 1947, Polanyi's work increasingly shifted towards point (ii), to the detriment of points (i) and (iii). His research on this topic was first published in a volume collected and edited together with his students and collaborators (Polanyi-Arensberg-Pearson 1957), and then posthumously in Polanyi (1977).

[5] To this extent, it also avoids the charge of being 'a linear theory of the rise and fall of capitalism', as suggested by De Grauwe (2017: 111), or that of being 'inherently static', as claimed by Clark (2014: 75).

[6] The enclosure movement receives only few scattered references; the financialisation of the economy caused by the passing of the joint-stock company laws and the creation of national stock markets, occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century, is not even mentioned.

[7] For a work in which various types of commons are identified and their relevance highlighted see Palumbo and Scott (2005).

[8] Polanyi's partial reading of the 18th century agricultural revolution is supported by the more detailed historical account supplied by E. P. Thompson (1961, 1971), even if the latter never acknowledges the contribution of the former. On the problematic relationship between Polanyi and the British social historians see Rogan (2013).

[9] For attempts in this direction see Lazonick (1993, ch. 5) and Watkins (2017).

[10] For an exception see Baum (1996: 12): " […] Polanyi is not a functionalist thinker. The counter-movement is not the product of society as such acting according to its own inner logic; it is rather the work of specific groups in society which, relying on their cultural heritage and worried about their material well-being, elect to protect themselves and the society to which they belong. Their efforts is not 'necessary,' not written into the nature of things, but freely chosen and fallible".

[11] A further topical issue that would be interesting to analyse from a Polanyian perspective is the viability of unconditional basic income policies. The current debate on the topic replicates past discussions between defenders of a living wage and of a minimum wage, on the one side, and those who oppose them on feasibility grounds, on the other. Since Polanyi's interest in British social history was prompted by Mises and Hayek's objections to the welfare policies pursued in Red Vienna after WWI, it would be apt to understand whether the terms of that debate differ from the current one, and what contribution the former could bring to the latter. The 1980s neoliberal moral critique of the entitlement culture arched back to that earlier debate and used Polanyi's analysis of Speenhamland to rehash its opposition to unconditional welfare provisions (Palumbo 2015, §2.2.1).

[12] The most representative examples of the latest wave of postcapitalist works are the following: Adams and Oleksak (2010), Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014), Brynjolfsson and Saunders (2010), De Angelis (2017), Mason (2016), Owen (2015), Rifkin (2015), Sassower (2013), Srnicek and Williams (2015). For a critical overview of earlier waves of postcapitalist literature see Barbrook (2007).

[13] In the private sector, among the categories that came closer to achieve similar level of protection was the journalists' one. For a study of the commodification process in that sector in the UK see Davies (2004).

[14] The Ehrenreichs have come back on the theme of the professional-managerial class more recently in response to the 2008 crisis, see https://www.alternet.org/2013/02/barbara-and-john-ehrenreich-real-story-behind-crash-and-burn-americas-managerial-class/

[15] The American HBO comedy TV series Silicon Valley gives the most entertaining account of how this subjugation of ICTs to a corporate logic is accomplished. A more standard account is to be found in Unger (2019).

[16] See Palumbo and Scott (2018, chs. 5 and 6) for a detailed account of the reform process in higher education in Britain and the policy transfer that allowed such a process to spread across Europe. The changes affecting higher education are particularly relevant because they are indicative of the type of transformation unfolding all over the third sector. As for British universities, non-profit organisations involved in the delivery of welfare services and humanitarian actions are increasingly compelled to operate like their for-profit counterparts against their *raison d'être*. Cf Maier *et al* (2014).

[17] Unlike continental Europe's '*droit d'auteur*', the term 'copyright' betrays an inbuilt bias towards the publishers existing in the Anglo-American world, and turns them into the legitimate representative of the authors notwithstanding the fact that they often have divergent interests – especially in academia, where diffusion and recognition of one's ideas have more importance than commercial success.

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Radical Islamic Democracy

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ABSTRACT

Can democracy be at once radical and Islamic? In this paper I argue that it can. My argument is based on a comparison and contrast of certain aspects in the social-political thought of two contemporary authors: Axel Honneth who defends a particular conception of radical democracy, and Rached al-Ghannouchi who defends a particular conception of the Islamic state. I begin with Honneth's early articulation of his model of radical democracy as reflexive cooperation, which he presents as an alternative that reconciles Arendtian republicanism and Habermasian proceduralism while avoiding their weaknesses. I also refer to his more mature conception of democracy by way of highlighting his understanding of democracy as a process of constituting civil society. This is significant for the purposes of this paper since it forms the most important link between Honneth's radical democracy and Ghannouchi's Islamic model of political rule. I then introduce Ghannouchi's theoretical account of the Islamic state with a focus on his conception of shura (consultation) in order to bring to the fore both the similarities and dissimilarities with Honneth's theory of democracy. By this point I will have identified Islamic resources for a conception of democracy that, like Honneth's democracy as reflexive cooperation, shares with proceduralism an instrumental view of democratic procedures, and with republicanism a strong connection between the pre-political social level and politics. Next, I ask whether this conception of radical Islamic democracy can square its dual commitment to pluralism and Islamic unity. Again, I draw on Ghannouchi's thought to respond to the challenge, doing so in a way that brings out the agonistic dimension in radical Islamic democracy. I conclude by making explicit how radical Islamic democracy carves out a conceptual space in which proceduralist, republican and agonistic features are combined.

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1 Introduction

Can democracy be at once radical and Islamic? In the following I argue that it can. I use the term 'radical' in a broad sense to characterise a normative theoretical approach to democracy that seeks to extend citizen participation to many areas of public life not considered by democratic theories that focus on elections and the protection of individual rights. The kind of participation I envisage involves public reasoning. By a radical conception of democracy that is 'Islamic' I mean a conception founded and articulated on the basis of resources internal to the Islamic tradition.

My argument is based on a comparison and contrast of certain aspects in the social-political thought of two contemporary authors: Axel Honneth who defends a particular conception of radical democracy, and Rached al-Ghannouchi who defends a particular conception of the Islamic state. Axel Honneth is a prominent critical social theorist in the Frankfurt School tradition. Ghannouchi is a Tunisian Muslim thinker and activist, head of *Haraket Annahada* (The Renaissance Movement), and the main dissident voice in Tunisia for a couple of decades before the uprisings of 2011 (Esposito and Voll, 2001; Abu-Rabi' 2004; Tamimi 2001). Since the uprising, after winning the first democratic elections, *Annahda* under Ghannouchi's leadership has become a major political actor in the only Arab country where the hope of the uprisings has neither been crushed nor pre-empted. Ghannouchi's thought and politics have been well-respected and widely debated in Islamic and non-Islamic circles, both inside and outside the Arab world, and he is considered to be representative of a contemporary trend in Islamic revivalist thought and movements. In this discussion I engage with Ghannouchi as a social and political thinker who has something to say on the relationship between democracy and religion, rather than as a politician or an activist.

My aim is to open conceptual space for a radical Islamic democracy by identifying some investigative threads that connect radical democratic thought with an Islamic model of political rule. My motivation for doing so is twofold. On a theoretical level, I see radical Islamic democracy as a step towards developing a model of non-secular democracy. Such a model would rethink the place and role of religion in the democratic public realm in accordance with emancipatory ideals of freedom and equality. It would speak directly to the rise of religious influence in public life and mounting criticisms of the neutrality of secular politics. On a more practical level, I seek to contribute to the debate regarding the political future of the Arab world, a future that calls for a political vision that would be desirable by, or at least acceptable to, Islamists, secular Muslims, and non-Muslims.[1] For such a vision we need a political model that is both sufficiently democratic and sufficiently Islamic.

In Section 2 I introduce Honneth's early articulation of his model of radical democracy as reflexive cooperation (Honneth, 2007). Here Honneth presents his model as an alternative that reconciles Arendtian republicanism and Habermasian proceduralism while avoiding their weaknesses. I also refer to his more mature conception of democracy by way of highlighting his understanding of democracy as a process of constituting civil society (Honneth 2014). This is significant for our purposes since it forms the most important link between Honneth's radical democracy and Ghannouchi's Islamic model of political rule. In Section 3 I start by presenting Ghannouchi's theoretical account of the Islamic state. I then focus on his conception of *shura* (consultation) in order to bring to the fore both the similarities and dissimilarities with Honneth's theory of democracy. By the end of the third Section I will have identified Islamic resources[2] for a conception of democracy that, like Honneth's democracy as reflexive cooperation, shares with proceduralism an instrumental view of democratic procedures, and with republicanism a strong connection between the pre-political social level and politics. In Section 4 I ask whether this conception of radical Islamic democracy can square its dual commitment to pluralism and Islamic unity. Again, I draw on Ghannouchi's thought to respond to the challenge, doing so in a way that brings out the agonistic dimension in radical Islamic democracy. In Section 5 I conclude by making explicit how radical Islamic democracy carves out a conceptual space in which proceduralist, republican and agonistic features are combined.

2 Democracy as reflexive cooperation

In the earlier formulation of his conception of democracy Honneth locates his radical democracy between Arendtian republicanism and Habermasian proceduralism. While both models criticize liberal democracy for the same reasons and look for a solution in the same place (i.e. the democratic public sphere), they significantly differ in

> the ways in which they normatively justify the principle of a democratic public sphere. Whereas republicanism takes its orientation from antiquity's ideal of a citizenry for whose members the intersubjective negotiation of common affairs has become an essential part of their lives, proceduralism insists that citizens' virtues are not needed to reactivate the process of democratic will-formation, but simply morally justified procedures. Thus, for republicanism, the democratic public sphere is the medium of a self-governing political community, while for proceduralism, it is the procedure through which society attempts to solve political problems rationally and legitimately (Honneth 2007, 218-219)

On the republican view, the democratic public sphere is the medium for an already self-governing political community to express and preserve its self-understanding and identity, which are at the basis of social solidarity (the glue of the political community) and makes that community what it is. Here the state is the outgrowth of this self-expression, and the law is the reflection of that community's solidarity. On the procedural view, the state is a separate and independent entity from the political community. Here we do not have a self-governed political community unified in solidarity, and thus the public sphere does not function as a medium but as a procedure for solving political problems common to different social constituencies and

members with all their differences and disagreements. The state's role is to guarantee that no one individual or group is denied equal and fair participation in public deliberation and that common political problems are addressed rationally and legitimately, that is, free from domination. Honneth criticizes both views before he introduces his own alternative.

On the republican understanding of the public sphere certain political virtues are required in order for the political community in question to form its will democratically. With this requirement, democracy comes to depend on citizens possessing these virtues, "for it is only to the extent that political participation itself becomes a central part of the lives of all members of society that the democratic public sphere can maintain itself as an end for itself" (Honneth, 2007, 233). This establishes a strong connection between politics and ethics. Here Honneth locates the first weakness of the republican view, noting that it is "scarcely compatible with the actual value pluralism of modern societies" (Honneth 2007, 233). The second weakness results from putting all the emphasis on political participation and conceiving of the public sphere as an end in itself, hence leaving us with no adequate critical perspective for assessing the various institutional forms that the public sphere may take (Honneth 2007, 234). The worry is that some institutional forms are inimical to equality and freedom, not free from domination, authoritarian, discriminatory, etc. If all the emphasis is on political participation, we could have a political community that scores high in solidarity and political virtues but hold values and norms that are discriminatory and oppressive.

Proceduralism does not face these problems since it neither requires political virtues nor does it construe the public sphere as an end in itself. Nevertheless, Honneth points out two weaknesses of proceduralism, taking the Habermasian variant as his example. The first is its inability to account for social and economic inequalities as they take place on the pre-political social level. On the procedural view, social inequalities can only be addressed if they make their way to, and get articulated in, the political public sphere (Honneth 2007, 234). That is, "Habermas...cannot grant the demand for social equality conceptual priority over the principle of democratic will-formation; he has to make it dependent upon the contingent state of politically articulated goals" (Honneth 2007, 235). The second weakness is its inability to account for citizens' motivation to participate in the public sphere and contribute to democratic will-formation. Honneth writes, "Habermas...has to be able to assume more than just the establishment of democratic procedures for the success of democratic will-formation. For citizens to be motivated and interested in participating in public opinion and will-formation, they have to have made democratic procedures as such a normative element of their daily habits" (Honneth 2007, 235).

With these weaknesses in mind, Honneth draws on John Dewey's work to identify a third radical democratic alternative, democracy as reflexive cooperation, which, he claims, reconciles republicanism with proceduralism while avoiding their shortcomings. The central Deweyan contribution that Honneth draws upon by way of developing democracy as reflexive cooperation is that of connecting politics to the pre-political level of social life. As we shall see shortly, Honneth will rely on such connection to both, allow socio-economic inequalities to be directly addressed without having first to be articulated on the political level, and account for citizens'

motivation to participate in the public sphere. With that said, however, Honneth is aware that connecting politics to the pre-political social level threatens to bring ethics back in. The question, thus, is how to connect the political with the social level without assuming a political community in the strong sense, in which the self-governing of the community is tightly linked to that community's collective expression of its identity and conception of the good.[3] Honneth holds that Dewey can help in this regard:

> Dewey locates the prerequisite for a revitalization of democratic publics in the pre-political sphere of the social division of labor, which has to be regulated in a fair and just manner such that all members of society can understand themselves as active participants in a cooperative enterprise. Dewey correctly assumes that without this sense of shared responsibility and cooperation, individuals will never manage to see democratic procedures as a means for joint problem-solving […] [O]nly a kind of division of labor that grants each member of society a fair chance in accordance with his or her autonomously discovered abilities and talents to assume socially desirable occupations will allow this consciousness of communal cooperation to emerge. Only in this way will democratic procedures necessarily become the best instrument for rationally solving common problems (Honneth 2007, 233)

By replacing the republican demand for political virtues by "a sense of shared responsibility and cooperation," this approach can accommodate pluralism: "within networks of groups and associations that relate to one another on the basis of a division of labor, the factual pluralism of value orientations has a functional advantage because it ensures the development of an abundance of completely different interests and abilities" (Honneth 2007, 233). Furthermore, Dewey sees the democratic public sphere as constituting "the medium through which society attempts to process and solve its problems […]" (Honneth 2007, 234).

Thus, the public sphere is not an end in itself but a means for rational problem-solving which can be used to evaluate and assess the "institutional form of intersubjective opinion formation." Moreover, citizens' motivation to participate in the public sphere and contribute to democratic will-formation is accounted for by "a sense of shared responsibility and cooperation," hence allowing for a democratic ethical life without connecting politics to ethics.

By reading Dewey in this way, Honneth evidently understands democracy as a process of constituting civil society. Honneth has not abandoned this understanding of democracy in his more recent book *Freedom's Right*, where his normative justification of democratic legitimacy continues to emphasize the conditions for the organization of civil society (Zurn 2015, 182-183).[4] Consider the following quotation:

> This reversal of the logical relation of justification and dependency – according to which the state does not found and create the public, but the other way around – results in the claim that all constitutive elements of the modern constitutional state, especially with regard to its legal composition and the division of powers, must be understood in terms of the tasks accruing to the state by virtue of the fact that it must presuppose, protect and implement the will-formation of the citizens – all at the same time (Honneth 2014, 305)

This is the most significant link between Honneth's radical democracy model and Ghannouchi's theoretical model of the Islamic state. I turn to that now.

3 *Shuristic* democracy as reflexive cooperation

The fundamental core of Islamic political philosophy, according to Ghannouchi, is the vicegerency theory: the human being is held to be God's vicegerent on earth (Ghannouchi 1993, 97). Endowed by God with reason, will, freedom, and responsibility, the task of humans on earth is to establish justice, good, and freedom in accordance with God's revelation. On the basis of the vicegerency theory, Ghannouchi derives the two sources of authority in the Islamic state: *al-nass* (*qur'an* and *sunna*)[5] and *shura* (consultation) (Ghannouchi 1993, 322). *Al-nass* represents the absolute authority of God, and *shura* represents the authority of humans. It is because the Islamic state is the state of *al-nass* and *shura*, that Ghannouchi refers to it as the state of God and the people (Ghannouchi 1993, 148).

The distribution of authority is a particularly important political problem for Ghannouchi. Being the appointees of God on earth, humans have the legitimate authority to carry out the task of establishing justice in accordance with God's revelations as embodied in *al-nass*. Given, however, that it is practically impossible for *all* humans to directly manage that appointed authority, *some* will have to do so. As a result, political power gets concentrated and could be misused and turned into an oppressive tool, undermining the authority of "all." But to fully understand why the distribution of authority is so important for Ghannouchi, we must consider another feature of his thought: the priority of the social over the political.

In response to the Tunisian state's oppressive and exclusionist measures Ghannouchi called for a re-introduction of Islam in the public realm in the name of equality and justice rather than of the superiority or truth of Islam. He sought to do so by way of social activism. His methods for changing society can be characterized as bottom-up rather than top-down, and as based on persuasion rather than force. In sum, Ghannouchi advocates political change through social change, and social change through convincing and persuasion. His methods are the offshoot of his view that the social takes priority over the political. This priority is based on both pragmatic and intellectual grounds. For consideration of space, I will focus on the latter.[6] Ghannouchi argues that society is the foundation for legitimate political authority. Criticizing authoritarian and oppressive regimes he points out that in such regimes "[s]ociety is…not the source of authority but its field of action" (Ghannouchi 2000, 99), implying that society *should* be the source of legitimate political authority. More explicitly, he writes: "We, the Tunisian Islamists, value human dignity and civil liberties, accept that *popular will is the source of political legitimacy* and believe in pluralism and in the alteration of power through free elections" (Ghannouchi 2000, 100, emphasis added). On Ghannouchi's view, it is the role of politics – specifically, the government – to serve society to the point where the people become independent from it. Hence, even if Islamists achieve political power, social activism should not subside. "Government is a small part of the institutions of civil society. It is there to support and

strengthen society. There must be more institutions of civil society, enough so that the people don't need the state" (Ghannouchi 1999, 2; Ghannouchi 1993, 297 and 299-300). The government is an instrument in the service of society, rather than the other way around.

Ghannouchi crucially argues that management of divine authority must be carried out under the surveillance of the people via *shura*: "the spinal cord of the *umma*'s [community] authority in establishing political rule on the basis of participation, cooperation and responsibility" (Ghannouchi 1993, 109). According to Ghannouchi, *shura* is mandatory and its results are binding. He contends that although Islam did not specify the forms that *shura* can take, making it a matter of controversy and debate among Muslims, it did assert the importance and significance "that public affairs be managed through *shura*" (Ghannouchi 1993, 125). In the most general terms *shura* is supposed to guarantee that no one person, group, or institution can have a monopoly on human authority. Authority belongs to the vicegerent *'umma* and not to any one particular human or institution. This function of *shura* as the distributor of authority is clearest when Ghannouchi talks of Islamic rule. He writes: "Islamic rule is based on *shura*, and *shura* is the distribution of authority and prohibiting the latter's concentration in the state" (Ghannouchi 1993, 299). He also says: "The more distributed political decision is, the wider the base of participants in political decision making, the more the Islamic rule is achieved, and the same goes for the democratic rule" (Ghannouchi 1993, 62). The whole point of the Islamic state, its raison d'être, is "to realize *shari'a* [as embodied in *al-nass*], to instantiate the absolute in the course of history, and to connect the divine with the human…" (Ghannouchi 1993, 104). The mission of the jurists, the experts on the text, is to transform the "Book into an '*ummah*'" (Ghannouchi 1993, 297). They are to derive from the text specific rulings and interpretations, which are then picked up by the Muslim community. Crucially, for Ghannouchi, it is completely up to the people to decide which and whether to abide by this or that interpretation. So, while jurists determine the legitimacy of interpretations, the Muslim community determines the success of interpretations (Ghannouchi 1993, 123 and Ghannouchi 2000, 114).

Ghannouchi holds, further, that citizenship in the Islamic state is based on allegiance to the state and is open to people of all creeds (Ghannouchi 1993, 137); to accept someone's creed implies acknowledging their right to defend it and to show its advantages over, and the disadvantages of, what differs from it. Thus, citizens of all faiths, atheists included, are encouraged to engage in public debates, to defend their views, criticize others, etc. (Ghannouchi 1993, 292).

Ghannouchi urges different groups, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to organize themselves in the way they see fit in order to express and defend their identities. That is why groups do not need a license to form political parties or establish newspapers, magazines and other forms of expression (Ghannouchi 1993, 300). The organizing ability of political parties on Ghannouchi's model is fundamental because without it *shura*, and hence human authority, would remain a slogan lacking the mechanisms that allow society to become a power to check and control political authorities.

And when it comes to the limits on public debates, Ghannouchi's explicit requirement is that "all parties of the debate must abide by the general morals of dialogue" (Ghannouchi 1993, 293). Thus, no one is excluded on the basis of the content of her views but only on the basis of how she defends her views. The constraint is that debate contenders are to engage with one another respectfully and on the basis of arguments aiming at convincing and persuading others rather than shaming or coercing them.

There are important similarities between Honneth's conception of radical democracy and Ghannouchi's conception of the public sphere as *shura*. The key to these similarities is the dual dimension of *shura*: (a) *shura* as mechanisms, and (b) *shura* as habits and a way of life.

Ghannouchi's conception of *shura* applies to a broad swathe of the social and political spectrum. *Shura* is best understood as a principle rather than a particular system of governance – a principle that applies not only to formal mechanisms and procedures for decision-making and will-formation, but also to social norms and habits on a pre-political level. As a principle, therefore, the scope of *shura* has both a formal procedural dimension and a pre-political social practice dimension.

According to Ghannouchi, the procedural mechanisms of *shura* can take many forms. Elections are one of them. Members of parliament and other social and political representatives are chosen through *shura*, and elections are a suitable mechanism. Justifying his claim about the appropriateness of elections, Ghannouchi observes that although *al-nass* does not mention elections, it does specify that *shura* must be used. He continues to say that "any allowed path [not in contradiction with *al-nass*] that can indicate or show who gets the trust of the *'umma* is acceptable, and there is no doubt that elections in these times are among the acceptable ways that we can use under the condition that there be no tricks and deceptive means" (Ghannouchi 1993, 125).

The significance of Ghannouchi's position here is twofold and goes beyond the appropriateness of elections. First, it puts in relief the instrumentality of elections and the importance of gaining the trust of the people. Second, it makes it clear that various methods may be adopted. Elections are simply one means for forming and translating the authority of the people into political rule and, as such, an instrument for enhancing *shura*. Today elections are effective and so can be adopted. And if elections have defects we should correct them, and if elections are insufficient we should supplement them. Any procedural mechanism that enhances *shura* is in principle acceptable, and to say that x enhances *shura* is to say, not only that x is a good measuring rod for the trust of the people, but also that x enhances "participation, cooperation, and responsibility" – the basis on which the community is to establish political rule. Ghannouchi is in principle open to all *shura*-enhancing procedures in opinion-measuring, decision-making, problem-solving, representative-choosing, or will-formation, be they in formal or informal forums.

In addition to this proceduralist dimension of *shura*, Ghannouchi also appeals to *shura* as a basic principle that should underlie everyday social interaction – communicative interaction on a pre-

political level. He talks of the "habits of *shura*" and a *shuristic* "way of life", writing that "*shura* is not merely a style in managing political matters...but is a way of life that springs from the general vicegerency of humans, the primacy of the collective over the individual, and considering the individual to be weak on his own but strong with his brother, and mistaken on his own but enlightened towards his best with his brother" (Ghannouchi 1993, 190-191). Furthermore, because participation, cooperation and responsibility on a pre-political social level hinge, at least in part, on the economic and educational status of citizens, the social practice of *shura*, for Ghannouchi, has direct implications on economic and educational policies. The habits of *shura*, for example, would suffer in an uneducated, ignorant, unexposed, and economically impoverished social base. This is not to say that without education and wealth a citizen won't have a say in public affairs, but that education and income affect the flourishing of the habits of consultation. Without informed and independent thinking, the power of the people can be easily highjacked and manipulated. And without a minimum of economic independence and a decent standard of living, the people can be easily pressured and indirectly coerced to make choices and decisions not reflective of their own self-understanding and will. On the educational level, Ghannouchi argues for mandatory education "so that people won't remain the slaves of an authority that controls their minds" (Ghannouchi 1993, 326), and on the economic level he argues that "to the extent that the circle of ownership expands, so does the circle of *shura*, i.e. political participation and vice versa" (Ghannouchi 1993, 326).

Thus, like Honneth, especially in *Freedom's Right*, Ghannouchi is essentially concerned with the social conditions for the realization of democracy. I would like to argue that *shura*'s dual dimension corresponds in Honneth's work to the mutual dependence between democratic procedures of will-formation, on the one hand, and the just organization of division of labor, on the other hand. For Ghannouchi, political parties organize civil society and allow social members to exercise their right to self-determination by freely expressing, asserting and preserving themselves and their identities; thus, parties play a role similar to the one played by the social division of labor regulated in a fair and just manner in Honneth. Through the organization of civil society different group members can come to see themselves as active participants in the cooperative enterprise of strengthening civil society so that they can live under a political rule they have established on the basis of cooperation, participation and responsibility, while not losing their ability to resist it if need be. This in turn allows social members to see the procedural mechanisms of *shura* as the right method for addressing their disagreements and common problems.

Both Honneth and Ghannouchi see democratic procedures as instruments (here they agree with the Habermasian version of procedural politics), and they connect the political level with the pre-political level (here they agree with the Arendtian model of republican politics). There are significant differences between Honneth and Ghannouchi, however, primarily in the way they connect politics to society. In both models, shared responsibility and cooperation on the pre-political level feeds back into the political level by motivating citizens to participate in the public sphere and democratic will-formation. But Honneth relies on the social division of labor and the sense of shared responsibility and cooperation it creates in social members, while Ghannouchi

relies on the organization of civil society and the sense of belonging to a self-determining community. Put differently, Honneth's model revolves around individuals and their achievements and talents, while Ghannouchi's model revolves around groups, their identities and rights to self-determination. For Honneth, the fair and just social division of labor creates a sense of shared responsibility and cooperation among individuals. For Ghannouchi, the fair and just distribution of authority creates a sense of shared responsibility and cooperation among groups.

Put in this way, Ghannouchi can be seen to be closer to the republican conception of politics than Honneth. On Ghannouchi's model, politics on the level of political parties has a strong connection with ethics and political virtues, something that Honneth avoids in his reliance on the social division of labor. Ghannouchi's reliance on groups rather than individuals raises two main problems. The first concerns its ability to deal with modern value pluralism.

But let us consider this problem a bit more carefully. A great deal depends on how value pluralism is approached theoretically. There is a danger of imposing a ‘Western’ celebration of multiple lifestyles as a condition for the legitimacy of non-Western political arrangements; to do so would be paternalist, even imperialist. This is not to deny the fact of pluralism or to assume that Muslim societies are homogeneous. They are not. Nor is it to take a principled stand against pluralism with regard to individual conceptions of the good. However, it is important to make a distinction between a) pluralism-as-an-outcome of a certain political arrangement and b) pluralism-as-a-success-criterion for political arrangements. Different political arrangements produce different forms, degrees, and scopes of social diversity. This diversity captures pluralism-as-an-outcome of this or that political arrangement. Pluralism-as-a-success-criterion, however, refers to a particular understanding of social diversity (form, degree, and scope) that gets employed, implicitly or explicitly, as a condition for the legitimacy of political arrangements. Adopting this distinction, and favoring the pluralism-as-an-outcome criterion, we will be less concerned with whether a certain political arrangement meets this or that particular understanding of diversity, and, consequently, less prone to fall into the paternalism trap. Instead, we will be more concerned with the conditions and opportunities for social diversity that a certain political arrangement makes possible. Following that line of thought we get to the second problem raised by Ghannouchi’s reliance on groups rather than individuals. Given Islamic politics’ commitment to Islamic unity and solidarity, the question arises as to how Islamic solidarity may be preserved in a society organized around political parties as the preservers and defenders of different creeds and cultures? Wouldn’t a reliance on groups coupled with a commitment to Islamic solidarity, on the one hand, thwart a commitment to pluralism, on the other hand? I turn to this now.

4 The dual commitment to pluralism and solidarity

The Islamic state is committed to its Islamic character. Without such commitment there would be no robust sense that the state is Islamic. In the Islamic state, non-Muslim communities are encouraged to publicly express their identities and defend their existence and ways of life.

Ghannouchi, however, is not explicit on how broad the scope of his party pluralism is supposed to be. We saw that *shura* as a conception of public reasoning includes atheists, different religions and cultures, but what about anti-Islamic groups, sentiments, and expressions?

The Islamic state's commitment to *al-nass*, to preserving the Islamic identity and protecting the Islamic character of the state, puts restrictions on both equality and freedom. While Ghannouchi defends equal citizenship, this does not mean that citizens of the Islamic state can do and say what they want. In addition to the above mentioned "respecting the morals of dialogue", Ghannouchi calls for restrictions using formulations that include: "the requirements of the general system or social identity and the higher values that society abides by" (Ghannouchi 1993, 46); "general opinion…of the majority" (Ghannouchi 1993, 47); and "the feelings of the majority" (Ghannouchi 1993, 47). What all these have in common is that they refer in one way or another to Islam as the identity that characterizes the society that the Islamic state is to serve and protect.

These restrictions, however, neither imply a restriction on questioning juristic rulings, nor making Islam a taboo topic. Instead, these restrictions imply that political parties cannot set *as their goal* getting rid of the basis of society, in this case Islam (Ghannouchi 1993, 294). This sort of restrictions has to do more with the underlying *intention* behind one's reasoning – as opposed to the *content* and *way* of one's reasoning. In that sense, Islam as the basis of social solidarity is also a limit on parties and public reasoning. Targeting Islam as the social glue for the sake of undermining it is not to be allowed in the Islamic state.

While protecting social solidarity and unity might seem to provide a legitimate justification for limiting public reasoning, it is problematic. Consider Ghannouchi's position on apostasy where his intention-based limit on public reasoning is clearest. He takes the view that in the Islamic state apostasy is not a theological but a political crime. As a political crime apostasy is punished by political authorities only if it gathers significant momentum as part of an organized attempt to overthrow the Islamic regime; i.e. when it becomes part of a campaign to undermine the foundational basis of state and society. Ghannouchi explicitly maintains that from a theological point of view, and absent the political dimension, apostasy would not be punished by the authorities though it would be socially reprehensible, and thus indirectly controlled by the majority of social members in an Islamic society. Although apostasy is not officially punished, it is socially punished through the frowns of Muslim citizens. How damaging "social punishment" is depends on the context; Islamic societies differ in their degree of tolerance in that regard. In this vein, Ghannouchi flags the distinction between those who are born and raised Muslims and then abandon their faith, and those who join Islam for pragmatic considerations, say to marry a Muslim woman, and then abandon the faith after they separate or divorce. To each of these cases, and to each degree and sort of political mobilization against Islam, there would be a different kind and degree of state punishment or social reaction, which in turn would depend on the socio-cultural context and on those who have political power (Ghannouchi 1993, 50).

The most troubling feature of the intention-based limit concerns the criteria for determining when the public expression of apostasy reaches a momentum and organization that warrants punishment by political authorities. It is important to emphasize that under "organized attempt" we should not include the different attempts by non-Muslim groups to show where and how Islam is lacking. Doing so is, on Ghannouchi's view, part and parcel of those groups' struggle for self-determination and preservation. Thus, the intension-based limit hinges on the distinction between a critical engagement with Islam, on one hand, and an intentional hostile attack on Islam, on the other. Without such distinction, we would not be able to differentiate between a political crime against Islam and a constructive critical engagement with Islam – an engagement that is entailed by the Islamic state's acceptance of different creeds including atheists. If political authorities interfere under the pretext that "social punishment" is not enough, they would be determining for society the adequate degree and response to apostasy. In that way they would be running against popular will and to that extent acting illegitimately. Recall that for Ghannouchi the social takes priority over the political. Taking this idea seriously implies that when an Islamic society changes to the point of being no longer willing to support the state, the legitimacy of the state is called into question. To be sure, this does not mean that popular will is always right. Political authorities can interfere to stop society becoming increasingly discriminatory and violent, for example. The point is that by allowing political authorities to punish apostasy, we allow the political to take priority over the social. The Islamic state would be seeking its preservation irrespective of, indeed contrary to, its social base. This shows clearly the slipperiness of the distinction on which the intention-based limit hinges. Intentions are subject to varying interpretations and are resilient to measurement and verification. Any intention-based limit on public reasoning presents a serious threat to an all-inclusive public sphere. To prevent Ghannouchi's conception of public reasoning from turning into an exclusionist public sphere, it is not enough to design a list of clear, verifiable, and public criteria of what counts as an attack on the social glue of an Islamic society. The intention-based limit should be dropped altogether.[7]

Our discussion of the intention-based limits points to a deeper and more general difficulty, one that has to do with the tension between pluralism and solidarity in the Islamic state. To put it simply, letting go of the intention-based limit is not as easy as one might think. The Islamic state is much more committed to acknowledging the Islamic character of the state than is apparent. Although Ghannouchi supports pluralism he is explicit in maintaining that the Islamic state is fundamentally committed to unity and solidarity. Pluralism and solidarity, however, are typically considered to be in tension. While solidarity tends towards exclusion, pluralism tends towards inclusion. Acknowledging the Islamic character of the state is supposed to grant solidarity, and the intention-based limit aims at preserving it. Given group pluralism and the tension between solidarity and pluralism, letting go of the intention-based limit would effectively dilute the Islamic character of the state. Can the Islamic state preserve its commitment to pluralism given its commitment to solidarity?

By way of answering this question, consider Ghannouchi's rejection of Hassan al-Banna's one party Islamic state. Ghannouchi contrasts his defense of party pluralism with Banna's rejection of pluralism in favor of strict Islamic unity. Banna called for dissolving all parties and replacing

them with just one party that unifies the forces of the *'umma*, and rejects connecting *shura* with party pluralism (Ghannouchi 1993, 256). Ghannouchi's argument is based on a distinction between the particular and the universal, and on the importance of guarding against a tendency to take what applies under specific conditions, generalize it and apply it under all conditions. According to Ghannouchi, this mistake led many of those who were influenced by the works of Banna and Sayyid Qutb to reject political party pluralism and to understand pluralism as inimical to Islamic unity (Ghannouchi 1993, 256-257).[8] Ghannouchi argues that Banna's call for a single Islamic party results from the sort of oppression and repression the Egyptian state was exercising against the Islamists at that time. The mistake is due to a failure to distinguish the particular from the universal in Banna's defense of a one-party state. This type of mistake should be avoided in general, and not only in the case of party pluralism. Such avoidance requires a constant and rigorous awareness of what is universal and what is particular in rulings what has to do with our contingent sociopolitical, historical, and subjective situatedness, on the one hand, and what has to do with divine will and intention, on the other. This awareness is crucial in not allowing human imperfection to take over divine perfection and speak in its name to dominate and oppress in the name of God. Doing so would amount to authoritarianism from the Islamic perspective (Abou el-Fadl, 1997 and 2009).[9]

Thus, the tendency to be guarded against is that of confusing what is universal with what is particular in the different rulings and opinions in the Islamic tradition, starting with the Prophet, his companions, the great jurists of the jurisprudential tradition and other influential Islamic thinkers. Any human understanding of *al-nass* or juristic ruling, be it a ruling that has the consensus of the *'umma* or of a single jurist, will have some elements that pertain to *al-nass* and others that pertain to the particular context of interpretation which includes both the particularity of the interpreter and the particularity of the situation or object of application.

Being committed to avoiding that tendency and maintaining that humans are fallible, Ghannouchi cannot but hold on to pluralism. He acknowledges this when he refers to a conception of Islamic unity that "can only be achieved and established through acknowledging and respecting pluralism, and organizing the methods of dialogue and convincing and negotiation to resolve conflicts" (Ghannouchi 1993, 139), and when he speaks of rejecting all uses of force and coercion for "deleting or silencing the opinion of the other under the pretext of preserving unity" (Ghannouchi 1993, 139). Not surprisingly, the achievement of this construal of Islamic unity is crucially dependent on *shura*. This is so not only because *shura* aims at consensus, but also because *shura* is "the spinal cord of the *'umma'*s authority in establishing political rule on the basis of participation, coordination and responsibility" (Ghannouchi 1993, 109), and because all procedures for problem-solving and conflict-resolution fall under its jurisdiction. So, Ghannouchi's solution is to conceive of unity *in terms of* pluralism, and to achieve it through *shura.* That is an interesting and promising solution that is worth investigating. What Ghannouchi has to say about this solution, however, is rather hand-wavy. The most informative thing he says is: "it is better to understand Islamic unity not in terms of simple unity but in terms of unity that is produced by variety through *al-nass* and *shura*, or commitment and freedom" (Ghannouchi 1993, 256-257). This is suggestive but too vague. The basic idea is that

solidarity and pluralism do not have to be in tension, in fact they should complement one another. Further, solidarity should not be construed in terms of harmony and homogeneity where there are little or no differences in opinions, views, etc. That would be "simple unity." So, it is some sort of complex unity that Ghannouchi envisages and it is to be "produced by variety through *al-nass* and *shura*, or commitment and freedom." But how are we to understand this claim?

Conceiving of unity through pluralism relies on a distinction between two *kinds* of social disagreement and conflict, which in turn corresponds to a distinction between social division and social pluralism. Pluralism on Ghannouchi's model cannot imply social division or fragmentation. Yet his model acknowledges and welcomes social disagreement, and social disagreement can and in most cases does lead to social fragmentation. Ghannouchi's solution then depends on a distinction between two kinds of social disagreement: (a) disagreement that is conducive to social fragmentation (and inimical to Ghannouchi's pluralism), and (b) disagreement that is conducive to social unity and solidarity (conducive to Ghannouchi's pluralism). Disagreement of kind (b) lends itself to cooperative, participatory and responsible resolutions, while disagreement of kind (a) lends itself to competitive might-makes-right resolutions. But where exactly lies the difference in *kind* between disagreements (a) and (b)?

The difference is not captured in terms of the intensity of the disagreement. That would be a difference in degree, not in kind. The intensity of disagreement is neither something we can control nor something we should control. A married couple committed to their union could have intense disagreements on certain issues without affecting their commitment to their relation; in fact, it might even strengthen and give meaning to that commitment. Nor can the difference relate abstractly to the subject matter, or object, of the disagreement. Disagreements regarding particular subject matters are always attached to the attitudes of the parties involved. Parties must care about the object of their disagreement in order for that disagreement to be meaningful. A dispute on where to build a public garden, for instance, is meaningful to the extent that the parties in question care about public gardens. A disagreement about whether to put your cross under or over your shirt is meaningful to the extent we care about the public expression of religious symbols.

In attempting to answer the question of the difference in kind between disagreements (a) and (b), it is helpful to recall Ghannouchi's insistence on the need for constant and rigorous awareness of what is universal and what is particular in rulings: on what has to do with our contingent sociopolitical, historical, and subjective situatedness, on the one hand, and what has to do with divine will and intention, on the other. This awareness is crucial for preventing human imperfection from laying claim to divine perfection and speaking in its name to dominate and oppress others. Doing so, from the Islamic perspective, amounts to authoritarianism (Abou el-Fadl 1997 and 2009). It is not the acceptance of the authority of *al-nass* that leads to authoritarianism but the individual's taking her voice to be the authority of *al-nass*. Ghannouchi asks rhetorically: "does not the closing of prophecy means ruling with the guidance of man and the human ability for driving the boat of life on his own in light of the general rules of

driving?" (Ghannouchi 1993, 120). In addition to acknowledging human freedom and autonomy, this is a warning against losing one's compass in the midst of navigating concrete human situations, that is, losing one's grounding in *al-nass* and *shura* as one makes accommodations for, and is immersed in, human particularities. Drawing on the requirement of a constant and rigorous awareness of what is universal and what is particular, we can identify the loci of the difference between disagreements conducive to unity and those to fragmentation. Disagreements in the Islamic state should be conceived as disagreements between different interpretations of concerns and commitments that are held in common. To be sure, public debate contenders will have different and maybe incompatible specifications and concretizations of *al-nass* and *shura.* But, these differences and incompatibilities will be conducive to social solidarity so long as all participants are aware not only that they share common concerns and commitments, but also that their disagreements are the result of different specifications of the concerns and commitments. If we add to that the claim that human knowledge is always fallible, then debate contenders cannot dismiss others on the basis that they themselves have privileged access to truth. Instead, they will acknowledge that they must continue to cooperate responsibly in order to find the most suitable resolution to their disagreements. Thus, the kind of social disagreement that is conducive to social solidarity is that which occur against an overarching common background where no one has privileged access to truth. Disagreement is a means to sharpen, improve and revise our own particular way of specifying our concerns and commitments to the ideals we share with our contenders. On this view, the underlying conception of social conflict is one according to which conflict is an opportunity for growth and development, and is embedded in social dynamics and public debates, be they formal or informal. This fits with Ghannouchi's recommendation to Muslims that when they feel the openness of public debates is undermining their faith, they should try to develop and provide stronger and more cogent arguments (Ghannouchi 1993, 47-48). In this way, difference and pluralism can be conducive to solidarity.

In theory this looks neat. In practice, however, a "common commitment," be it to *al-nass* and *shura*, to a Habermasian constitutional patriotism, or to a Rawlsian political liberalism, can only go so far since type (b) disagreements are likely to turn into type (a) disagreements. Let me explain.[10]

To the extent that individual identities get constructed and are constituted by the set of communal norms and practices, individual identities find their safe haven within these norms and practices. By not closing ourselves to challenging arguments, being willing to reconsider our position, and taking debate contenders seriously and respectfully, we open the door for shaking and dislocating the safe haven of our individual identities. Realizing that these parts of communal norms and practices that have infiltrated our identities and inform our reasoning are contingent, historically situated, shaky and in need of revision and revamping, is not comfortable and might even feel threatening. Given the challenge to identity that disagreement with those who hold alternative and conflicting substantive instantiations of the ideals and principles we are committed to, public reasoners might opt for fixing rather than loosening their own particular substantive instantiations of ideals and principles – maybe because they want, consciously or not, to stick to the security of what they know and how they do things. In a nutshell, it requires existential

courage to actually face our contingency, reconsider our position, and step towards what is alien and unknown to us. On the other hand, taking refuge in our convictions is the easy way out of confrontations and disagreements, and exhibits existential cowardice.

Consider the following illustrative scenario: an American and a German citizen, both committed to freedom of speech, get into a disagreement as to whether neo-Nazi groups should be protected. If both are deeply committed to their respective society's *particular* way of concretizing freedom of speech, then their identities might be attached to that particular concretization. And since their disagreement poses a threat to who they take themselves to be, their disagreement might very well lead to division and not solidarity.[11] Over and above a common commitment, a conception of solidarity through pluralism requires an existentially courageous citizenry. With that said, I want to shed some light on the elements involved in the structure of existential courage by briefly going back and commenting on Ghannouchi's attempt to square pluralism with solidarity.

Let us consider again the gap between the universal general and concrete particular. On Ghannouchi's view, figuring out the meaning of the universal general is a human effort mediated through fallible human reason, and the application of the universal general is sensitive to the situation and the human context. As Muslims try to live out (concrete particular) *al-nass'* prescriptions (universal general), Muslims are to be diligently aware of the distinction between the voice of man and the voice of God. And whereas Muslims do not put in question the authoritativeness, universality and validity of God's law, Islamic law as a man-made law is the product of human effort and so cannot but be an approximation of God's law; in consequence, it can never achieve the status of certainty, validity, or truth. In everyday life, however, Muslims are to act *as if* juristic interpretations, man-made law, were epistemically certain; i.e. they act with *practical-certainty*. Nevertheless, they are to simultaneously keep their commitment to epistemic fallibilism on a more theoretical level; i.e. *theoretical-uncertainty*.

I suggest that what matters with regard to social and political interaction is one's awareness of, and attitude towards, practical-certainty in instances of conflict, challenge, and disagreement. This awareness and attitudinal dimension operates on the level of "being" and not merely on the level of words or beliefs; that is, the manner in which one embodies and lives out the relational space between practical-certainty and theoretical-uncertainty when interacting with others. Does one dogmatically hold on to practical-certainty when challenged? Or does one instead mindfully, gently and carefully loosen their hold on practical-certainty by recalling and leaning towards theoretical-uncertainty in order to soberly assess the situation before they react to the challenge at hand? Existential courage is best articulated in terms of a position between theoretical-uncertainty and practical-certainty. Only when we can occupy this space, will we be able to distance ourselves from our own convictions, from what is particular in our own reasoning, and from our community's substantive instantiation of ideals and principles, without feeling insecure or experiencing a threat to our identity in such a way that makes taking refuge in our already held convictions appear as the only way out.

We can distinguish here between the fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist attitudes. When the fundamentalist attitude is at work, one dogmatically holds on to their and/or their community's concretizations of ideals and principles by way of taking refuge from challenging conflicts and disagreements. With such an attitude, one exhibits existential cowardice. The non-fundamentalist attitude, on the other hand, does not entail that one ignores or has no attachment whatsoever to their or their community's substantiations of ideals and principles. When the non-fundamentalist attitude is at work, one is diligently aware or mindful of their reactions to challenges so that in their responses they are less prone to take refuge in particular substantiations of ideals and principles. The non-fundamentalist attitude is a dynamic state of being towards, or relating to, one's own identity and ways of reasoning that supports and facilitates the development and the exercise of democratic civility broadly construed. In this way it is best understood in terms of a meta-civic-virtue – an attitude towards oneself that underlines and plays a significant contributing role in a variety of civic virtues without itself having the status of civic virtue proper.

Thus, squaring a dual commitment to pluralism and solidarity by relying on an understanding of solidarity that is achieved through pluralism, requires that social disagreements and conflicts occur, and are engaged in, against an overarching common background where no one has privileged access to truth. On this view, social conflicts and disagreements as embedded in social dynamics and public debates turn into vehicles for social constituencies to improve and revise their substantive specifications of shared concerns, ideals and principles. In this way disagreements become opportunities for growth and development, and hence conducive to social solidarity rather than fragmentation. However, in order to realize this normative ideal, we need existentially courageous social constituencies that are not dogmatically attached to their own particular convictions, and do not take refuge in these convictions when faced with challenging and differing debate contenders. The overarching common background against which social disagreements are to take place should be complemented with a citizenry that shuns the adoption of a fundamentalist attitude and strives for exhibiting a non-fundamentalist attitude.[12]

To create and maintain the conditions that a citizenry must have in order for it to achieve solidarity through pluralism, we need to develop appropriate philosophies of education and put in place the right sort of educational policies, institutions, etc. The conception of Islamic radical democracy under construction, thus, constitutively depends on pedagogy. What form, structure, method, and content pedagogy takes in radical Islamic democracy will determine whether citizens and social constituencies will be able to engage in ongoing public contestation battles in a way that is conducive to their growth and development. Only then will Islamic radical democracy succeed in maintaining its commitment to both unity and diversity, to solidarity and pluralism.

Radical Islamic democracy's dependence on education generally, and civic education more specifically, should not be perceived as dodging the social and political challenges it faces. Rather, such dependence should be commended as a corrective measure to a derailment that political philosophy is suffering from. Such commandment would be supported by Honneth

given his recent attempt to put contemporary political philosophy back on track after having "lost the insight that a thriving democracy must continually reproduce the cultural and moral preconditions of its own existence by way of general educational processes" (Honneth 2015). The same can be said about Ghannouchi. Recall that Ghannouchi talks of an educational dimension of *shura* (Ghannouchi 1993, 195), and of the importance of education for bolstering the power of the people and protecting it from being highjacked and manipulated. And more recently he writes: "The legacy of dictatorship continues to weigh heavily on us—changing this culture of despotism to one of critical thinking and political engagement will require long-term educational reform" (Ghannouchi 2016). Dependency on a citizenry adept in reasoning with differing and challenging others publicly organically fits within the thought of both Ghannouchi and Honneth. With that said, and leaving the more specific implications of radical Islamic democracy on education to another paper, I would like to move to the last section of the paper to put in place the various pieces of the conception of radical Islamic democracy I am constructing.

5 Conclusion

I have compared and contrasted certain elements in Honneth's model of democracy and Ghannouchi's model of Islamic rule to open conceptual space for a radical Islamic democracy. This space is constituted of two integrated investigative threads that combine proceduralist, republican, and agonistic features.

The first thread concerns the normative justification of the principle of a democratic public sphere. The normative justification of the democratic public sphere in radical Islamic democracy combines republican and proceduralist features: It shares with a Habermasian version of procedural politics a rather instrumental understanding of democratic procedures, while simultaneously sharing with an Arendtian model of republican politics a connection between the political level with the pre-political social level. Democratic procedures are construed in terms of *shura*-enhancing procedures – i.e. procedures that function as good measuring rods for the trust of the people while being conducive to participation, cooperation and responsibility – and can include procedures in opinion-measuring, decision-making, problem-solving, representative-choosing, as well as will-formation in both formal and informal forums. *Shura*, however, has a dual dimension and includes, over and above democratic procedures, a dimension pertaining to everyday social interaction. *Shura* as habits and a way of life, calls for cooperation and responsibility on a pre-political social level, which in turn has economic and educational implications. *Shura*-enhancing procedures and *shuristic*-habits are mutually dependent on one another. It is through democratic procedures that different social constituencies get to exercise their right to self-determination by freely expressing, asserting and preserving themselves and their identities. And in doing so authority gets distributed among them as well as between political rulers and social powers. In turn, a fair and just distribution of authority on the pre-political social level creates a sense of shared responsibility and cooperation among social constituencies in strengthening civil society, which feeds back into the political level by motivating citizens to participate in democratic procedures. Radical Islamic democracy, like

Honneth's model of radical democracy, is concerned with the social conditions for the realization of democracy and construes democracy as a process of constituting civil society.

With this first investigative thread in view, radical Islamic democracy faces the challenge of squaring its dual commitment to pluralism and solidarity. By way of addressing that challenge I developed Ghannouchi's hand-wavy remarks regarding a conception of solidarity that is achieved through pluralism. In doing so I made explicit the agonistic feature of radical Islamic democracy, and thus identified a second investigative thread between radical democratic thought and an Islamic model of political rule.

How is radical Islamic democracy to maintain a robust sense of pluralism while simultaneously being committed to Islamic unity in a society organized around political parties as the preservers and defenders of different creeds and cultures? The answer I provided is in terms of an understanding of social conflicts and disagreements occurring against an overarching common background where no one has privileged access to truth, and where conflict and disagreement are embedded in both formal and informal social dynamics and public debates, and present an opportunity for growth and development. The successful realization of such an understanding of social conflicts and disagreements depends on having the right sort of citizenry, one that exhibits a non-fundamentalist attitude in processes of public reasoning. This, in turn, constitutively connects radical Islamic democracy to pedagogy and civic education, a connection that Honneth hopes to see spread and regain its central place in political philosophy.

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Notes

[1] Within these categories, there will be some who categorically and dogmatically refuse to entertain the possibility of a radical Islamic democracy (or any combination between Islam and democracy more generally) either because they reject democracy or because they reject Islam or political Islam in any shape or form. Against such refusal, I doubt that the argument in this paper will be effective.

[2] While the resources in Ghannouchi's work that I draw upon, and develop, are internal to the Islamic tradition, they are neither the only ones that the tradition provides, nor is the way Ghannouchi understands them, and how I capitalize on them, beyond debate or contestation. It would surely be interesting and important to look, in further work, at other Islamic thinkers as well as juristic, philosophical and political elements within the Islamic tradition to connect with, and further develop, radical Islamic democracy and the different investigative threads I identify in this paper.

[3] Jumping ahead, a central difference between the models of Honneth and Ghannouchi lies in the way in which they connect the political with the social level. Now given that Ghannouchi's model is for an Islamic society, an additional challenge arises which I articulate below in terms of squaring solidarity and pluralism.

[4] I thank Paul Giladi (Manchester Metropolitan University) for bringing this to my attention.

[5] *Al-nass* for Ghannouchi includes both the *qur'an* and *sunna*. The *qur'an* is believed by Muslims to be the word of God as revealed to Muhammad, the last of the prophets. And *sunna* refers to the life of Muhammad, taken to be exemplary and admirable by Muslims. *Hadith* refers to the sum of reports of what Muhammad had said or done, and so it is the sum of the specific accounts of the life of the prophet. The literature on what exactly constitutes *sunna*, and which *hadith* is authenticated is vast. The debate about such matters is old but the important thing to keep in mind for our present purposes is that such debates are internal to the Islamic tradition and do not affect my arguments here. For simplicity's sake I will then use "*al-nass*" to refer to the ultimate source of truth and validity in Islam, which is available to us in the form of a text.

[6] For the pragmatic grounds, which relates to his rejection of violence and endorsing peaceful means for social change, see Ghannouchi 1999.

[7] It is worth clarify here that rejecting intention-based limits on public reasoning is not a rejection of the importance of social solidarity and unity, but of a particular way of protecting and preserving social solidarity and unity. The challenge this raises, and which I now address, is that of squaring pluralism with solidarity; a challenge that is not particular to radical Islamic democracy, but to any conception of politics that is simultaneously committed to pluralism and to social solidarity.

[8] Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb are two central figures in recent history that have influenced and shaped modern Islamic revivalist movements. Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 and Qutb was among its most influential figures.

[9] While I will say more about this important distinction, it is worth noting here that it does not preclude one from maintaining a robust affirmation of *al-nass* and being firmly committed to it. What I say below about practical certainty, theoretical uncertainty, fundamentalist attitude, and non-fundamentalist attitude should bring further clarity to the connection between the two elements of this distinction.

[10] For more on this, please refer to Sadek 2019.

[11] Similar cases can be made for the wearing of the *hijab* (Islamic veil), the building of mosques, state funding of religious schools, etc.

[12] It is important to clarify here that by adopting a non-fundamentalist attitude one does not necessarily have to abandon or reject one's own particular convictions. The point of adopting such attitude is not to cling to particular convictions dogmatically or as a mere defensive strategy against the different other.

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Drug Policy, Paternalism and the Limits of Government Intervention

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ABSTRACT

Gerald Dworkin provides an insightful starting point for determining acceptable paternalism through his commitment to protecting our future autonomy and health from lasting damage. Dworkin grounds his argument in an appeal to inherent goods, which this paper argues is best considered as a commitment to human flourishing. However, social-connectedness is also fundamental to human flourishing and an important consideration when determining the just limits of paternalistic drug controls, a point missing from Dworkin' essay.

For British philosopher Thomas Hill Green, regulation of alcohol sales emerged from the social ideal. Green argued that policy interventions, including restricted opening hours and locations, improved the conditions for humans to flourish. Green offers a compelling political vision but fails to account for the fact pleasure is also an inherent good. He focused excessively on our social nature, excluding our more pleasure-seeking and egoistic characteristics. In contrast, a more realistic and complete vision of human flourishing can be found in an amended version of Gerald's Dworkin's arguments.

In conclusion, this paper argues drug policy makers should remain committed to the harm principle as applied to criminal law whereby a person should never be criminalized for self-harm. Such a limit on paternalistic interventions is deemed necessary when *eudaimonia* is the end of government action. In practical terms, this means that the criminalization of drug use, as opposed to drug production, is always unjust.

Keywords: liberalism, paternalism, *eudaimonia*, drugs

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1 Introduction

This essay establishes the theoretical framework against which policy makers can assess the benefits and harms of government interventions. To know if a policy causes harm, a harm reduction advocate must first define what harm is. It is my argument that harm in drug policy is best be defined as damage to essential human goods. Moreover, a commitment to the maximization of essential goods is best conceptualized as a political theory where human flourishing is the proper end of all political action.

Gerald Dworkin provides a compelling case for perceiving harm as a reduction in the amount of essential goods constituting human flourishing. Dworkin argues these goods are autonomy, life, health, and pleasure, and allows a narrow range of strong paternalism if it can be clearly shown doing so is necessary for the maximization of essential human goods across society, However, the one essential human good Dworkin fails to account for in his theory of acceptable paternalism is the social aspect of our nature. If we are to measure policies against a broad vision of human flourishing, then we must include all essential goods. Humans are embodied, social beings, and it is not illiberal for law makers to advance our essential goods, so long as they do so within the boundaries of what could be accepted across the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that form the cultural fabric of our society.

In addition to Dworkin, I examine the writing of Thomas Hill Green, as I argue Dworkin's theory of the limits of government is best understood as building on Green's theory of political flourishing (*eudaimonia*). Green was influential in bringing the notion of *eudaimonia* back into political thought, and although he fails to provide a convincing view of what flourishing is, the form of his argument is convincing, that being the role of government is to advance human goodness, and rights exist to support this goal.

Like Green, I argue it does not follow that a government which places the good before the right must be oppressive, and my theory remains committed to the harm principle as applied to criminal law and the importance of negative freedom. To maximize human flourishing no one should be criminalized unless they violate the rights of another by harming their body or property. This version of the harm principle is necessary for the protection of our inherent human right to moral independence from unjust state interference with our body and action. The conclusion this produces for the drug policy maker is that drug users should never be criminalized.

2 The importance of Negative Freedom

Democracy demands an equality of legal rights as all citizens share the political space and the legislation that protects it. Unlike tyrannical regimes, we are all equal and all have the same right to freedom of movement, association and opinion. Legal rights are built upon and reflect the core notion that because the democratic state is shared equally by all, the wellbeing and vision of the good life of all citizens should be supported equally. It may turn out the case that Catholicism, utilitarianism or Schopenhauerian idealism are true, but democracy should allow all these views

and corresponding lifestyles to exist under its umbrella without casting judgment as to which one is correct.

Ronald Dworkin suggests rights are best thought of as restrictions on what a democratic society can demand of its citizens in the name of the collective. They are protections given to each so that his or her way of life is not demeaned or prohibited by the collective or the aggression of others.[1] Because democracy is a collective of equals, it should not be used to undermine the freedom of a minority: for example, by voting in a regime that promises to execute all Muslims (assuming that Muslims are the minority). The liberal tradition holds there are certain things that cannot be done to promote the collective goals of the majority without undermining the spirit of democracy and the rights of its citizens.

Dworkin argues that one such right is the right of 'moral independence':

> Rights (I have argued elsewhere) are best understood as trumps over some background justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a whole. If someone has a right to moral independence, this means that it is for some reason wrong for officials to act in violation of that right, even if they (correctly) believe that the community as a whole would be better off if they did. Of course, there are many different theories in the field about what makes a community better off on the whole; many different theories, that is, about what the goal of political action should be.[2]

If accepted, the right to moral independence grants us the ability to frame our lives in any way we choose regardless of whether other people think what we are doing is immoral. It is the right to base a life on one's own values, not the centrally prescribed morality of a Church or ethical theory.[3] Dworkin follows John Stuart Mill in demanding the largest area of negative liberty possible: that is, the largest area of space in one's life to act freely without government coercion and construct a life in line with one's vision of the good life.[4]

Negative liberty derives from the absence of government control rather than the presence of human activity. People are free when they are left alone by external agents, not because they partake in any kind of activity such as voting or enjoying leisure time to read. Political theories that argue only negative liberty is important to the discussion do not believe governments should try to promote any kind of way of life, nor should they interfere in the activities and lifestyle choices of their citizens. Freedom comes from government not getting in the way: it is a conception of freedom unconcerned with whether people obtain the goals they set after, nor with what people's goals are.

Mill famously argued for the greatest degree of negative liberty for each person because to his mind this political structure best maximized utility across society.[5] According to Mill in his famous harm principle, people should be able to do what they want so long as they do not directly harm other people.[6] By allowing people to live in accordance with their own nature and values, society may find new avenues of happiness, and solutions to old problems. The protection of a large amount of negative liberty improves society as diversity begets innovative ideas which brings progress. Moreover, people reject and ultimately rebel against a lifestyle thrust on them against their will. Mill's view is optimistic: if people are left to live freely away

from the government enforcement of personal morality, society will progress, and citizens will be happier than if shaped into a centrally determined way of life by an external authority.[7] Diversity under this view is an asset to both individuals and society.

For Mill, each person has a private domain which government should not enter. This includes their opinions, their ability to express their opinions, and the freedom to choose a style of life that best suits their temperament and values. Mill tells us that, 'No society, in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its form of government: and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified.'[8] Mill establishes a strong right to the greatest area free from the hand of government as possible. Society may look down on what someone does in private, but governments do not have the right to enter someone's private domain and enforce a lifestyle it thinks better than the one the individual chooses so long as the behavior causes no direct harm to others or their property, such as assault, murder or burglary.

The stipulation that one must not cause direct harm to others is important for Mill's overall political philosophy. He differentiates indirect or contingent harm that comes from harm to one's self – or to use Mill's terminology 'self-regarding' actions – from direct harm resulting from 'other-regarding' actions. Mill states:

> with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself, the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom.[9]

Mills writes of a drunken person failing to meet his family obligations and argues he should not be restrained from drinking by the government even though people are harmed indirectly through his behavior. It is his choice to live that kind of life, and any potential social benefits from government intervention into that man's drinking are not worth the loss of liberty: a society offering a fuller version of liberty increases overall happiness in the long run.[10] Mill is not claiming that one can harm oneself severely without causing any harm to others – in any self-destruction, there will be emotions and even lives hurt at times.[11] Rather, Mill distinguishes self-harm as outside the realm of government interference as it is consented to by the person harmed and does not involve a victim with a claim that his or her rights have been breached.[12]

Turning to John Rawls we find a version of liberalism that attempts to ground rights in a social contract model instead of the utilitarianism of Mill. The right precedes the good for Rawls, as there is no end such as utility which rights promote. Rights for Rawls are what we can expect from others taking account of the fact we all have an equal standing in the collective. They establish the fundamental rules of society in which all can pursue their version of the good: 'In justice as fairness the priority of right means that the principle of political justice imposes limits on permissible ways of life…'[13]

Rawls argues that in the original position where everyone has no knowledge of what kind of person they would be (and their potential religious, ethical views and incentives were unknown)

yet had to set the governing principles of justice, they would choose a social arrangement where individuals had the equality of liberty and rights.[14] We would not choose to live in a society where everyone had to pray daily, because we could end up being persecuted once the veil is lifted.

Rawls tells us that 'respect for persons requires government not to take a stand on the truth of people's comprehensive doctrines one way or the other.'[15] If people want to smoke cannabis, or engage in homosexual activity, they should be able to. A conservative Catholic may not approve of homosexual behavior, but society and law exist equally for the atheist as for the Catholic, and each should be able to pursue their vision of the good life without governments claiming the truth or falsity of either.

Rawls compares his approach to comprehensive doctrines that contain broader religious or ethical believes that could not be accepted by reasonable people across diverse backgrounds. He argues that justice as fairness is a political not an ethical theory, so it exists within pre-existing limits, such as the fact democracy is the coming together of a multitude of people with differences of perspective that show no sign of resolution.[16] Rawls believes there are a group of 'primary' goods that are pursued by reasonable people across religious and ethical views, and rights protect people's pursuit of such goods. People may never agree on whether God exists, but all could agree on the necessity of religious worship or cultural practices not being persecuted arbitrarily. All would also agree to sanctions on violence towards others, because they would not want to be the target of such violence themselves.

Rawls argues that the absence of agreement as to 'the good life' means the state should coerce as little as possible, and negative liberty should be maximized by a range of options and markets. His political liberalism sees democracy as an equal grouping of people where the views of all should be respected by the state. He does not see the fundamental questions between ethical worldviews as resolving due to vastly divergent backgrounds, experiences and outlooks. Governments can however establish a set of social institutions where people can express their nature freely and hold opinions of dissent against organizational authority. This is not to say governments should be morally void: the political liberalism of Rawls is built upon the foundations of justice as determined in the 'original position' which is a thought experiment that attempts to capture whether a principle governing the structure of society could be accepted by all and thus fair. By entering a universal perspective, Rawls believes we come to equality of liberty and the difference principle (which allows unequal government interventions if they operate for the advantage of the least well off). These are the principles of justice, and they set the boundaries of behavior within which legally equal citizens can pursue freely chosen ends. The principles of justice lead automatically to a group of rights that cannot be violated to promote the greater good and demand the state must be neutral as to which view of the good life is true.[17]

Rawls joins Mill in strongly advancing the claim that people should be left free to choose how they live away from government or religious coercion. Within the liberal democratic framework, there is rich and profound support of Dworkin's argument that we have a right to moral independence. Moreover, the right to moral independence, combined with an appeal to self-

ownership (including the right to full control over one's body), offer a solid foundation for arguing that people should have the legal right to take any drug they choose if that is the style of life they want. The current criminal sanction on recreational drug use demands an explanation: a strong reason must be given to why liberty has been taken and our rights seemingly trampled.

3 Limitations on Negative Freedom

Running beside the liberal-democratic appeal to freedom is the acceptance that people cannot directly harm others. The harm principle has had a powerful influence in setting the boundaries of government coercion and the criminal jurisdiction. While thinkers give different accounts of why freedom is valuable, they all adhere to some variation of the harm principle, allowing the criminal prohibition of acts of direct harm towards other people.

The most common criticism of the harm principle is that no one can directly harm themselves without harming other people. The drug addict or the person who attempts suicide causes great emotional harm to their family, as well as health care costs and potential loss of employment. However, as noted earlier, in setting the limits of the criminal jurisdiction, Mill sought to differentiate such indirect harms to others from direct harms and argued that only direct harms were suitable for criminal enforcement.[18] Indirect harms may not eventuate, and often involve an appeal to risk rather than harm to any specific person, so sit in a different moral category.

If one agrees with Mill, then drug use and possession of any type should not be something which is the concern of the criminal jurisdiction: coercion and punishment is not the appropriate response here. Drug use taken as an act that does not cause direct harm to others should never involve the user or possessor entering the criminal jurisdiction. That is not to say that drug use cannot be regulated based on an appeal to community wellbeing or social harm, but one should never be criminalized for indirect-harm caused by direct self-harm. Drug use sits with other forms of potentially risky but subjectively pleasurable behavior such as gambling, judo, rugby, and prostitution.

The production of drugs is a different category of activity to use and possession. Like the production of pornography, one may argue that the production of some drugs should be banned because they cause direct harm to some users, such as a heroin overdose or a cannabis-induced psychosis. One might argue this constitutes direct harm to the user by the distributor who provides the drugs to the user; however, in reply one might assert that unlike an unprovoked assault it is not a wrong as it involves consent and it is mediated through the decision by the user to take the substance. Joel Feinberg argues this position is supported by a long intellectual lineage in arguing that where there is consent there is no wrong and where there is no wrong there is no justification for government involvement.[19]

Does the existence of consent end the argument? One may reply that consent is important, but there are cases where people want to engage in a behavior unquestionably to their detriment. Feinberg concedes this and notes there are examples of paternalistic interventions in place we would want to keep, such as prohibition on killing a healthy person even if they consent or allowing people to sell themselves into slavery.[20] Feinberg attempts to get around this by arguing

that in cases where the behavior seems unreasonable, a person must prove themselves to by acting in a fully informed and thus voluntary manner before they can proceed. He calls this 'weak paternalism', which he contrasts with 'strong paternalism'. The strong paternalist prohibits the seemingly irrational behavior (such as consenting to being shot), while the weak paternalist checks there is consent based on an informed decision-making process and will only prohibit the activity if a person fails to demonstrate this.[21]

In *Paternalism*, Gerald Dworkin argues in favor of a limited version of strong-paternalism. [22] The state, for Dworkin, does and should prevent people from committing suicide, disabling themselves, swimming in areas that might result in death, dueling, and driving without a seatbelt. He notes that Mill relaxed his harm principle when it came to selling-oneself into slavery, because if a person used their liberty to destroy itself, then that person is clearly acting against their interests.[23]

Like Rawls, Gerald Dworkin argues there is little agreement about what is good for our wellbeing, so paternalistic interventions need to be restricted to a small set of goods which he mentions at different points in his paper: health, staying alive, a basic education, pleasure, and maintaining our future liberty. However, his proviso is that paternalism should be available for actions that are 'far reaching, potentially dangerous and irreversible'; often involving a person irrationally discounting the potential damage of the activity and instead placing excessive weight on a negative such as inconvenience.[24] Paternalism is also justified in cases where someone is in a deep state of distress and not thinking straight but likely to see things differently once the dust settles, such as in cases of psychosis or deep depression. Dworkin argues that the future version of the coerced person would consent to the intervention even though at the time they did not.

Dworkin finished his essay by urging legislators to consider two rules when determining whether paternalism is warranted: firstly, there is a clear obligation on the state to prove the harm of the activity is real and not speculation or dogmatism, so there is a strong possibility that harm would be reduced by the intervention; and, secondly, that if the paternalistic path is chosen, the least restrictive intervention is taken.[25]

One might admit that such interventions occur and seem reasonable, but are they morally justified? Dworkin argues we restrict the liberty of children because in some sense we deem them not fully rational or capable of making decision in their best interests. He argues this is morally justified as we deem that in the future they would give us consent as they come to realize the proper ramifications of their actions. He calls this 'future-orientated consent'. As humans, we are full of weaknesses, and it is rational to consent to a society in which we take out 'social insurance' against our own weakness.[26]

Think for example of suicide: when someone is deep in depression, they might see the world in a significantly revised way once they rest and get treatment. Dworkin would argue that it is right to prevent the sale of a drug that leads to instant death, as in the future the suicidal person would recognize that this government interference of their behavior is justified, if we accept that staying alive is an objective moral good. This does not include cases of euthanasia as in this situation there is unlikely to be a future self that would consent to the prohibition if the illness is terminal and involves a large amount of pain.

In determining whether paternalism is warranted, Dworkin notes weight must also be given to whether the activity is pleasurable to a proportion of those who partake: this acts as a protection against the majority tyrannically preventing someone from doing something they enjoy due to custom or a negative emotional reaction. Rock climbing and cannabis smoking are claimed by some to provide pleasure or the absence of pain but consenting to be shot in the stomach or to amputate a limb seems to be beyond the realms of what someone could reasonably claim to be beneficial or pleasurable.[27]

Dworkin makes a convincing case that at certain times strong-paternalism is justified as there are potential actions that are so clearly against someone's interest. For example, if a drug had the effect that every time it was taken (or a sizeable proportion of times) it caused death, then is seems reasonable to prevent people from getting the drug. Also, in cases where swimming in an area of water is dangerous to the point death is a strong possibility, it seems reasonable for a government to prevent people from swimming in that water even if the hypothetical swimmers know the risks involved. The grounds being that people taking the 'death drug' or swimming in areas with vicious rips are making an objective miscalculation regarding what is to their benefit.

There are diverse kinds of interventions, and the state may prevent a person from doing something without recourse to the criminal jurisdiction.[28] The criminal court is unacceptable in cases of paternalism. Cases or serious direct harm to self (actual or potential) could involve civil warning letters and fines or enforced waiting periods that if broken lead to civil penalties. The civil jurisdiction does not involve the same level of stigma and the potential life-ruining impact of the criminal jurisdiction and associated criminal convictions. Even before making something a civil infringement, the state would want to know for sure the thing being prevented is an evil either due to its negative effects on life, health or liberty, and that what is being prohibited is without any clear benefits that might outweigh potential harms, such as pleasure.

Practically, the paternalism of Feinberg and Dworkin is not that different. Feinberg does not believe the state should ever coerce someone who voluntarily decides to engage in a risky or even life-ending activity. For him, consent is what is most important, but the state can intervene at times through the civil jurisdiction to determine whether someone is fully-informed. If a drug seemed dangerous enough Feinberg would insist a person is given full information and made aware of potential consequences before being allowed to consume it. Dworkin would prohibit the production of a 'death drug' potentially via the criminal jurisdiction but would not punish someone trying to acquire it via the criminal jurisdiction. One may attempt to broaden the types of drugs subjected to production and distribution prohibition or restrictions to those highly likely to cause damage to health or decision-making faculties: the cut off point is not entirely clear but must be determined by the careful weighing of essential human goods.

4 Atomism and Positive Freedom

In his compelling essay *Atomism*, Charles Taylor tells us that much recent political philosophy in the liberal-democratic tradition holds individual rights to be theoretically secured by an appeal to

our capacity to act autonomously: a being capable of setting ends for itself should not be prevented to do so unless there is a compelling reason. [29] For Taylor, within the "atomistic" liberal tradition from Mill to Ronald Dworkin, human beings have been conceptualized as ontologically separate and self-interested entities pursuing goals set for themselves after a the rational consideration of options. Think of the original position where people under the veil of ignorance must decide on what type of social arrangement they think would be best for them once the veil is lifted. The good of everyone in this thought experiment is separate from all others. The good of each atom is not that of the community but of the end-seeking subjectivity. [30]

Yet if policy makers accept a view of the world where humans are conceived as end-setting atoms, then the purpose of government must be in part to promote that type of excellence. Such a theory has no time for neutrality about the good; however, Taylor does not believe this is possible in any case. He points to the loss of religious freedom versus not being able to drive down a certain road, and argues we believe any loss of the first type to be a more significant blow to negative freedom because it is an affront to a more essential part of human life.[31]

Charles Taylor writes: 'The view that makes freedom of choice this absolute is one that exalts choice as a human capacity. It carries with it the demand that we become beings capable of choice'.[32] To concede this point is to accept a legitimate role of government not only as the protector of people from violence from others but also as one that legitimately advances a limited version of human flourishing centered around autonomy. In making this concession, we commit to advancing goodness equally across all society, with autonomy a key component of this vision of human flourishing, but not the only one.

Moving to practical affairs lets us see this more clearly what this all means. Taylor believes his views take us towards a society that impresses the importance of inquisitiveness and clear planning, whereby mindsets are wide enough for people to conceive the most suited course of life to pursue given the realities of their character. [33] The state at this point is clearly not neutral but is one that is legitimately structured to promote flourishing, or to use the ancient Greek term *eudaimonia*. We find a state that respects debate on political and religious truths, where people make important life decisions in line with ends they have set for themselves based on evidence and experience rather than direction by an authority figure; it is a vision of human nature and its advancement close to that described so eloquently by Mill.[34]

What does this all have to do with drugs? If negative freedom can be curtailed to promote future autonomy, then one may think this opens a case for legitimate government coercion of people away from using drugs with a high likelihood of impairing their future autonomy and thereby potentially preventing them from flourishing. If Jane becomes addicted to heroin, and her addiction heavily impairs her ability to make clear choices, or to achieve goals core to her sense of self, then following Taylor one could argue that society should assist her in quitting and getting her life back on track. Legislators with Taylor in mind would want to be certain that the intervention improved Jane's future autonomy and was not oppression disguised as acceptable paternalism. In this sense, the spirit of the argument is still with Mill, whereby the intelligence of law makers should be used to create the political conditions whereby humans can express their creative natures. Society should provide conditions for growth, not just the space to set ends.

Taylor brings the focus on the limitations of atomism foundational to liberal ideas such as the original position, where one considers the right from the perspective of an isolated individual striving towards goals in an abstract reality. However, the realization that the good has a foundational yet discrete place in the thought of Rawls does not take us any further than Gerald Dworkin in advancing legitimate types of strong paternalism. Taylor's focus on autonomy gives weight to Dworkin's belief that there are legitimate types of strong paternalism, such as those that are clearly autonomy enhancing, but offers nothing for us to amend Dworkin's restrictions on its practice. We should remember that Dworkin already provided for the importance of both future autonomy and health in his model of strong paternalism. As Taylor tells us, many theories that claim to be neutral have conceptions of the good concealed in their configuration of the right, and it seems a matter of degree as to how much the good should enter considerations of political justice rather than if it should.[35]

5 Thomas Hill Green and the social ideal

Gerald Dworkin broadened the liberal, democratic vision of human flourishing so negative freedom could be restricted in cases of serious risk of irrevocable damage to future autonomy, life and health, and where it was likely the coerced person would come to agree that his freedom was righty curtailed for the higher goal of their flourishing. The question is how many goods can we add to the catalogue of what is essential for human wellbeing without drifting into a place unacceptable from the perspective of a comprehensive background.

One essential good missing from Gerald Dworkin's catalogue is social connectedness. I touched on this issue during my discussion of Taylor, but the fullest modern elaboration of the idea came via British transcendentalist Thomas Hill Green, who sought to ground the purpose of legislation and political action in a view of human flourishing. While Green presents a stronger version of human flourishing than is possible to use as a foundation of a political theory, his approach to politics and his equivocation of the word freedom with human *eudaimonia* adds insight as to how Dworkin's limited strong paternalism should be construed.

Green envisioned a government fully committed to the advancement of human flourishing, where the liberal exaltation of negative freedom remains, but legislators also work to improve human excellence equally across society. The person reaching for the rope to end sorrow, the alcoholic muttering on the sofa, and the individual signing her life away to an inhumane working contract are all acting without external coercion, but, for Green, are acting against their interests as dictated by nature: 'he is not free, because the objects to which his actions are directed are objects in which, according to the law of his own being, satisfaction of himself is not to be found. His will to arrive at self-satisfaction not being adjusted to the law which determines where this self-satisfaction is to be found….'[36]

Green first connected the word "freedom" in liberal theory with the Aristotelian notion of *eudaimonia*, arguing one is only free to the extent that one is flourishing, or acting in accordance with one's nature.[37] To flourish is to perform one's core function well, so to function well as a human is to perform excellently the activities that constitute necessary elements of human life.[38]

Like Aristotle before him, Green argued human flourishing necessarily involves one acting in a pro social manner and being connected in an intricate range of positive ways with others.[39] Green argues true freedom is not something that 'can be enjoyed by one man or one set of men at the cost of a loss of freedom to others,' and 'we are free to use our powers but never against the common good'.[40]

Avital Simhony argues Green places a moral burden on individuals and the state with substantial ramifications for what kind of behavior and goods legislators should value.[41] She suggests for Green pleasure is not a suitable end of human and government actions, nor any private achievement that does not account for the wellbeing of other citizens. *Eudaimonia* is the extent to which one acts with the common good as the end of one's action, where individual excellence is equated with a rich consideration of the impact one's behavior on others. The pleasure seeker under this view is one of the types of self-absorbed characters society should seek to prune out, alongside the power-hungry and the vain.

This view not only clashes directly against utilitarianism, but with Gerald Dworkin's argument that the existence of pleasure is an important determining factor when considering when paternalism is acceptable. Dworkin argued that if pleasure is a common characteristic of an activity then governments should not seek to prevent people from engaging in that activity. In contrast, Green argues that pleasure is never an appropriate end of individual activity, as it is an end focused solely on the advancement of one person's interest instead of the positive advancement of the collective. Living one's life in accordance with goals that degrade the autonomy, health or education of other citizens, or that disrupts relationships in a negative way, entails living in a way that clashes against that social reality on one's being.[42]

For Green, it is the normative end of government to provide the optimal conditions for as many people to flourish within the citizenry as possible. This we can accept, but Green overemphasizes the virtue of justice to an unrealistic degree at the expense of the more selfish, pleasure and power-seeking aspects of our being. One may reply that government should promote the best rather than the worst. That may be true, but decisions must ultimately be built on a realistic vision of human flourishing that attends as much to the subjective experience of human beings as it does the collective function in the interpersonal creation of human character.[43]

The strongest argument Green provides for his strident vision of human flourishing is the Hegelian notion that the development of our personalities is inextricably bound to the communities we emerge from, and that we can only build careers and shape identities due to the interactions and support we have had with care givers, schools, friends and public institutions.[44] Green was influenced by Hegel's famous master and slave dialectic, whereby one's sense of subjectivity emerges from the complex range of social interactions and the customs, language and education systems that are readily available.[45] The calls for negative freedom continue to be essential for Green, but the human demanding his or her freedom from government coercion is only able to engage in pollical expression due to the political protections and institutions, and the language and system of ideas from which that person emerged. Hannah Arendt captured this point exquisitely stating, 'it seems safe to say that man would know nothing of inner freedom if

he had not first experienced a condition of being free as a worldly tangible reality. We first become aware of freedom or its opposite in our intercourse with others…'[46]

Green was also impressed by the Kantian moral ideal that we should never treat other people as means to our own ends, and good action is done for its own sake rather than for some external achievement, private glory or future reward.[47] While being prominent in Kant, this idea is central to the Aristotelian vision of flourishing where the good person is one who does excellent actions for their own sake. In contrast, we can imagine a person who performs duties to promote their career and image. The importance of these ideas becomes clear when we consider the moral futility for Green of using the criminal court to push an individual into activity deemed for their wellbeing but against their will. If the state criminalizes a behavior deemed against the interests of its citizens, it is putting pressure on people from the outside but not necessarily enhancing anyone's ability to make informed choices and build lives in line with human goodness. Their attitude and life become one of carrying out the work of another.

In his application to contractual law, Green used his theory of political *eudaimonia* to argue that the law should not allow people to willingly enter contracts that will get in the way of their flourishing. Freedom should not be used to place oneself into bondage.[48] We find here justification for legal restrictions on excessively long working hours or pay one is unable to live on, even if these contracts are entered with consent. Green explicitly overrides Feinberg's insistence that government should not involve itself in the affair if both parties consent freely to enter into such a contract: in doing so, he also dismissed the insistence of his friend Henry Sidgwick who shared the belief with Feinberg that contracts between consenting adults should be respected by governments no matter the content of the agreement.[49] Green was willing to accept restrictions on the sale drugs if a more relaxed approach to their sale and distribution got in the way of human flourishing throughout society. He argues that freedom to consume alcohol should be curtailed if solutions are found to reduce the damaging impact alcohol has on human flourishing.[50] Green did not present outright prohibition as a response, but proposed restrictions on opening hours and bottle shop locations.[51]

Consider the following situation. Michael only stays clear of heroin because of criminal repercussions. He is a pleasure seeker whose mind is mostly occupied by physical arousal, and even though heroin is illegal and at times hard to get, Michael still attempts to maximize his personal pleasure through eating fast food, alcohol and prostitution, and even heroin when possible in a prohibited market. If society is to provide the conditions in which people find their best available self, then it is futile to simply ban things if people continue to act for the wrong reasons or in the most destructive cases still go after ends even though they continuously meet the stiff fist of the law. For Green, legislators should aim to encourage the type of character that restrains from excessive drinking out of concern for hurting the feeling of others once drunk or because it is better to read and enjoy the sun rise than drink half a bottle of gin, vomit and sleep. To be a good person is to act for reasons within the gambit of the virtues, and for Green justice takes precedence as a ubiquitous and demanding virtue where our end is not the pursuit of private pleasure or any other gain that depletes the overall wellbeing of the collective.[52]

Green presents a compelling view of human flourishing; one that is inspirational and containing more than a grain of truth. It is the view of human *eudaimonia* that a conscientious person would like to be the truth. Unfortunately, if we are to ground politics in a notion of human flourishing, then it must be broad and realistic enough to be acceptable across all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In this case, the challenge is not met. The pursuit of pleasure and the desire to escape pain is inseparable from our nature and an end equally as important as autonomy, good health and conscientiousness. While we would not exist if not for other people and the universe itself, we experience the world as subjects that can never directly experience the pleasure and pain of others.

Green may argue our social nature is more fundamental in that we could not even come to be subjects in search of fame and jewels unless we first lived among a group of men and women who taught us how to behave in complicated social communities. However, this argument fails to account satisfactorily for the fact that politics is the art of individuals living together where everyone experiences life as a separate and distinct subjectivity, embodied in an imperfect vessel that often conflicts with social perfection. If we are to build a workable political ideology, we cannot exclude the body and subjectivity from having important argumentative force when deeming what type of activities or physical objects to value and maximize.

Notwithstanding my unwillingness to adopt Green wholly, his arguments forces attention towards a view of political society where legislator activity aims to advance the best elements of human nature, but where justice is a virtue that resides beside many others as required by our complex embodied subjectivity. This is a view implicit yet not fully realized in the work of Gerald Dworkin, who argues there are goods so essential to human life that at times government can override autonomy to protect their future occurrence and growth. To Dworkin's catalogue we can also add the social connectedness of each person, an element that is largely missing from his discussion. The social aspect of humanity is surely as important as health and autonomy, with all needed for *eudaimonia*. Green also reminds us that if we are concerned about human development, then there is more to it then acting out a socially approved role, as we want a society of good people not an assortment of actors torturously performing the scripts of another. Good people perform actions because they are good, not from fear of punishment or to secure some hidden benefit.

Take alcohol as an example. It can cause a certain level of social destruction and is known to cause aggression and unreflective sexual advances. Even with these potential harms known, we would not want to criminalize its use due to our commitment to the harm principle. We would also not want to criminalize production, due to a belief that we should use the least paternalistic aim to achieve our outcome: the reduction of harm to human flourishing across society. We might eventually land on a range of policies that reduce potential harm to social life and health, without creating excessive damage to autonomy such as policies leading to criminalization and exposure to black market products such as bathtub moonshine. Sensible legislation must weigh up the impact of social connectedness against the results of the intervention itself. Finally, all interventions must be conducted in the spirit of working towards the clear aim of human flourishing, and the trade-off between the essential human goods will continue to be as much of an art as it is a science.

6 Conclusion

The criminal court is not acceptable in cases of paternalism, because if the purpose of the intervention to improve the wellbeing of the self-harmer it makes little sense to punish him or her in a system reserved for violations of the rights of others. There are also grave risks involved in paternalism, including the use of the political law to repress a way of life authorities do not agree with, and the potential closing of new avenues of social advancement. Paternalism acts against the fundamental equality of individuals under democratic law, unless it is working in a way that favours no group or ideology above another and when it inarguably protects individuals from a clear and lasting evil.

The function of the criminal court is to deter but also to punish for the violation of rights so should not be used when the aim of the intervention is solely to promote a person's flourishing. It is difficult to make the argument that a criminal conviction can improve an individual's future autonomy, health or social embeddedness and that it is the least paternalistic intervention available to achieve our aims. Governments should implement policies that improve the lives of people in the fullest sense, by making individuals aware of their choices, and helping them learn from their mistakes. The policy repercussion of this argument is that we should treat drug production separate from drug use because in cases of drug use no other people are directly involved in the action. I follow Mill in placing self-regarding actions outside of the limits of the criminal law. There are good theoretical reasons for continuing to use the decriminalisation versus legalisation distinction and for placing the sale of drugs in a different moral category than use and possession.

Flourishing must be defined as something that all comprehensive doctrines within a liberal democratic society could accept. Green's utopian vision of humanity seems too distant from the people we encounter in society. While government should not be in the business of promoting harmful activities, law makers should not pretend that our world is inhabited by fully rational beings capable of acting in accordance with the metaphysical and sociological truth that humans are intricately connected. They should approach political theory from a perspective that takes account of how people experience the world, and that is as fundamentally and often insufferably separate from the universe. Finally, if an intervention is working against human flourishing by depleting an individual's autonomy, health or social connectedness without appropriately advancing other essential human goods to offset the harm, such an intervention should be replaced by something more conducive to human *eudaimonia*.

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Notes

[1] Ronald Dworkin, "Is There a Right to Pornography?" *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 1 (1989): p.200.

[2] Ronald Dworkin, "Is There a Right to Pornography?" p.200.

[3] Ronald Dworkin, "Is There a Right to Pornography?" p.205.

[4] Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in *Liberty*, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.203.

[5] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), p.122.

[6] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, p.139.

[7] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, pp.138-141.

[8] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, pp.82-83.

[9] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, p.145.

[10] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, p.145.

[11] Hobhouse, L.T., *Liberalism*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp.55-65. Hobhouse makes the argument that Mill's harm principle fails as one cannot harm oneself without harming others. However, he fails to address Mill's moral distinction between direct and indirect harms.

[12] I share this interpretation with C.L. Ten, "Mill on Self-Regarding Action," *Philosophy*, 43 (1968): p.30.

[13] John Rawls, *On Liberalism*, (United States: Columbia University Press, 2005), p.174.

[14] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.14-15.

[15] John Rawls, "The Priority of the Right," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 17 (1988): p.252.

[16] John Rawls, *On Liberalism*, p.3.

[17] Jeremy Waldron, "The Ideal of the Neutral State," in *Liberal Neutrality*, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Andrew Reeve, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp.74-75.

[18] Dudley Knowles, "A Reformulation of the Harm Principle," *Political Theory*, 6 (1978): p.235.

[19] Joel Feinberg, "Paternalism," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 1 (1971): pp.107-109.

[20] Joel Feinberg, "Paternalism," p.105.

[21] Joel Feinberg, "Paternalism," pp.111-120.

[22] Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," *The Monist*, 1 (1972): pp.78-83.

[23] Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," pp.76-78.

[24] Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," pp.78-80.

[25] Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," pp.83-84.

[26] Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," pp.76-78.

[27] Gerald Dworkin, "Paternalism," p.83.

[28] For an insightful analysis of the limits of the criminal jurisdiction and some of the difficulties in getting people to see the moral value of reducing its use, see Douglas Husak, 'The Criminal Law as Last Resort,' *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 24 (2004): pp.207-235.

[29] Charles Taylor, "Atomism," In *Social and Political Philosophy*, edited by Andrea Veltman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.339-340.

[30] Charles Taylor, "Atomism," pp.339-340.

[31] Charles Taylor, "What's Wrong with Negative Freedom," In *Liberty*, edited by David Miller, (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.150-160.

[32] Charles Taylor, "Atomism," pp.339-340.

[33] Charles Taylor, "Atomism," pp.339-340.

[34] Charles Taylor, "Atomism," pp.339-340.

[35] Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 181-203.

[36] T.H, Green, "On the Different Sense of 'Freedom' as Applied to Will and to the Moral Progress of Man," in *Lectures on the Principles of Moral Obligation*, (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1941), p.2.

[37] Ben Wempe, *T.H. Green's Theory of Positive Freedom*, (Oxford: Imprint Academic, 2004), pp. 49-55.

[38] Timothy Hinton, "The Perfectionist Liberalism of T.H. Green." *Social Theory and Practice*, 27, (2001): pp.473-499. Hinton argues, rightly I believe, that Green presents an Aristotelian theory of *eudaimonia* where justice takes the role of leading virtue.

[39] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by Roger Crisp, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.11. '…since a human being is by nature a social being.'

[40] T.H. Green, "Liberal Legislation," in *Lectures on the Principles of Moral Obligation*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p.200.

[41] Avital Simhony, "Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom: T. H. Green's View of Freedom," *Political Theory*, 21 (1993): p.32.

[42] Maria Dimova-Cookson, *T.H. Green's Moral and Political Philosophy: A Phenomenological Perspective*, (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), pp.81-102.

[43] T.H, Green, "On the Different Sense of 'Freedom," p.7.

[44] Timothy Hinton, "The Perfectionist Liberalism of T.H. Green," p.487. Hinton argues Green rejected the idea personal and political morality could be built on private ends, because he believed human beings cannot find their good outside of human communities due to sociological and even metaphysical necessities.

[45] Ben Wempe, *T.H. Green's Theory of Positive Freedom*, pp.32-33.

[46] Hannah Arendt, "What is Freedom?" in *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thoughts*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1961), p.148; Henry Sidgwick, "The Philosophy of T. H. Green," *Mind*, 10 (1901): pp.18-29. Sidgwick argues Green's focus on the social aspect of humanity was wedged to his Hegelian conception of reality where the subject and object can never be separated, and all conscious awareness is but an instance of a single, creative reality.

[47] H.D. Lewis, "Individualism and Collectivism: A Study of T. H. Green," *Ethics*, 63 (1952): p. 46.

[48] T.H. Green, "*Liberal Legislation*," p.209.

[49] Kenneth Hoover, "Liberalism and the Idealist Philosophy of Thomas Hill Green," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 26 (1973): p.560; Avital Simhony, "Beyond Negative and Positive Freedom," p.39.

[50] T.H. Green, "Liberal Legislation," pp.206-212.

[51] T.H. Green, "Liberal Legislation," pp.206-212.

[52] Timothy Hinton, "The Perfectionist Liberalism of T.H. Green," p.486.

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Introducing Regime Cluster Theory: Framing Regional Diffusion Dynamics of Democratization and Autocracy Promotion

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ABSTRACT

Recently the role of ideology and hegemony has received increased attention to explain varying dynamics of diffusion and autocratic cooperation. As a result, patterns of interaction in clusters from regions without hegemony or ideology have been overlooked because their autocracy-to-autocracy transitions are no threat to the global status of democracy, even when active regime promotion is very common. This article will apply insights from economic cluster theory to political regimes and introduce a typology to differentiate among clusters.

Regime Cluster Theory is the first framework that presents three ideal-types of ideological, hegemonic and biotopical regime clusters. With a new concept of 'biotopical clusters' the paper explains the dynamics of clusters in often omitted regions, like in Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America during the Cold War, or Central Asia during the 1990s. RCT offers a dynamic approach to recognize and assess patterns of forcible regime promotion per cluster as well as distinguish between their different diffusion patterns (coercive, voluntary, bounded learning, contagion) in four arenas: institutions, ideas, policy and administrative practices. RCT advances the comparative study of regime promotion and diffusion in various regions of the world and hopes to shed new light on related theories of alliance formation, regional institutionalization, and (conflict) spill-over effects.

Keywords: regime promotion, clusters, diffusion, linkage, leverage, autocratic cooperation

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1 Introduction

Democracies are visible grouped together. Monarchies currently reside predominantly in the Middle East. Many regions in Sub Saharan Africa were characterized for their large concentration of regimes with one-man rule. Latin America during the Cold War was infamous for its military

juntas. At various times, certain breeds of regimes seem to aggregate together. After the Color Revolutions and Arab Spring, with an assertive Russia looming over Europe's democratic cluster in the last years, the study of autocratic cooperation has received new impetus.

Despite their heterogeneity in actors, methods and aims, the Color Revolutions and the 'Arab' Spring uprisings were considered to bring change, if not democracy to key autocratic clusters in Eurasia and MENA. (Baev, 2011) The reaction of these targeted dictators to protect themselves from such shocks triggered studies to adapt existing democratization theories to create new frameworks autocracy promotion, cooperation and diffusion. (Ambrosio, 2010; Vanderhill, 2013) Nonetheless, the dichotomy between democracy and non-democracy remains and obscures other regional patterns of regime interactions far away from the frontlines of democratic clusters.

For example, repeated efforts of forced regime promotion in West Africa by Burkina Faso (under Compaoré) with support of Libya (Qaddafi) and the Ivory Coast (Houphouët-Boigny) were followed by The Gambia's democratic reversal by the coup of Jammeh in 1994, the ensuing state collapse in Liberia and Sierra Leone under Compaoré's proxy, Charles Taylor, and resulted in civil war in the Ivory Coast (under Gbagbo). (Annan, 2014; Cohen, 2014)

The list of forcible regime promotion in Central Africa is even longer: After Zaire became a platform for supporting operations in Angola and Sudan for the US, Angola launched two Shaba wars (1978-79) to overthrow Mobutu. After the Cold War, a Ugandan-Rwandan(-Angolan) front united against Mobutu in 1996, overthrowing him before the alliance turned onto itself, with Uganda and Rwanda fighting proxy wars on DRC territory after failing to overthrow Kabila Senior and Junior. Not to mention Uganda's continued interference in South Sudan, or Chad and the DRC's intermingling in the CAR civil war. (Cohen, 2014; Atzili, 2007) These patterns of recurrent regime promotion and foreign predation took place within autocratic clusters, and their dynamics cannot be explained by theories of hegemony or ideology.

This article will introduce a new framework: Regime Cluster Theory (RCT) and present three ideal types and criteria to identify clusters. 'Ideological' and 'hegemonic' clusters are based on the insights of the recent literature but 'biotopical' clusters embody a new approach to assess interaction dynamics among authoritarian regimes. After introducing each ideal-type with some short examples, I will apply the concept of biotopical clusters to some relevant, overlooked examples.

The first goal of RCT is to account for different patterns of forcible regime promotion. What are the motivations in different cluster types and what regimes do they target? Secondly, RCT allows for the comparison of (non-forcible) regional diffusion dynamics. The classification can be extended to historical examples and stretches beyond the democracy-autocracy dichotomy. RCT aims to predict in *what* arenas of state interactions, *which* modes of diffusion can be expected based on the cluster type of the region. But first, I will expand on the concept of clusters and introduce some necessary concepts. The article concludes by showing other applications of RCT.

2 Introducing Regime Cluster Theory

Many scholars intuitively use the word 'cluster' when referring to such groupings of political regimes, although very few actually define what a cluster means in this context. In economics cluster theory has been a basic concept since 1890. Originally developed by Alfred Marshall in his book *Principles of Economics*, clusters are defined as a "concentration of competing, collaborating and interdependent companies and institutions which are connected by a system of market and non-market links." (Kuah, 2002: 207, 210) Economic frameworks link the concept to an array of elements like externalities, innovation, (economic or infrastructure) linkages, positive feedback, productivity and growth, etc.

Besides geographical constraints, the agglomeration of firms and industries in economic clusters are driven by the need to locate close to customers or suppliers (proximity), to use the advantage of scale by being able to draw on a large labor pool, and thirdly, to facilitate the flow of ideas and innovation, both among workers and business leaders. (Ellison et al., 2010: 1200-1203) For regime clusters to emerge, the proximity of states, transnational networks of social groups and elites, as well as the power of ideas play an important role. In the same fashion, as various economic clusters have their own specializations and needs, so do regimes agglomerate for different reasons.

This article focuses on *political regimes*[1] or the ruling group inside states with their particular hierarchy, (informal) decision-making bodies, organizational structure and agenda. These elites control their state and gatekeep its foreign policy, and are thus responsible for influencing the existing patterns of interaction with other states (regimes) as well as their intensity. I distinguish between the following regime types, based on Barbara Geddes' (2012) categorization: military regimes, party-based regimes, monarchies, personalist regimes and democracies.

I define a *regime cluster* as a non-random, spatial concentration of interdependent political regimes connected by a regional political subsystem of linkages and interaction, sharing ideological and/or institutional characteristics. In all cases, regimes become part of clusters through coercive means, socialization, and/or evolve toward a similar regime type over time because of regional structures. However, in most cases there has to be a 'critical mass' of regimes (or one powerful regime) around which other regimes will cluster. In other cases, regime clusters are foremost shaped by their regional structures, which conform regimes to one-another. Such structures can be the legacy of a historical critical mass-build up like a former empire (cf. the

Soviet Union, the Ottoman empire), or they can be regional path dependencies from a colonial past. In each case, increased interdependency with other units has to yield some (positive) externalities for the cluster as a whole. Regimes either actively consolidate existing ties (linkages) with other units or indirectly strengthen the larger structures which sustain their cluster.

Not all regimes on this globe are part of a cluster at the moment, but many used to be or can be (once again) at a different point in time. For example, the Caribbean islands are considered a region; and the islands are connected through many linkages, but neither ideology, hegemony or regime type unites them as a cluster, nor do they operate as one. Similarly, not every regional hegemon has a cluster, if it doesn't extend its influence to proximate states. Of course, regimes outside clusters can take over administrative practices (from similar regimes), but seldom mirror their foreign policy, worldviews or institutions to others when they are not persuaded to do so ideologically, or coerced to do so by pressure. Hence, most diffusion will take place in clusters, and most forcible regime promotion can be traced back to them as well.

In this article, RCT shifts the usual focus on individual regime behavior to the dynamics of groups of regimes over time. The added value of RCT is to categorize the patterns of interdependency of its units, identify their opportunities and constraints for cooperation, and assess what are the (positive) externalities by being part of a cluster. In other words: In what ways do regimes cluster? Do all clusters need a 'critical mass' to emerge? What are their 'increasing returns?' How do clusters grow? How are such clusters sustained? What kind of innovation is the key to their survival? Under what conditions do they disappear? This set of questions heralds an innovative approach to think about regime promotion, cooperation and rivalry in the contained geographical spaces of the world's regions.

Clusters are spatially interconnected through linkages. I understand linkages in the same way as S. Levitsky & L. Way and J. Tolstrup. Linkages are the economic, cultural, social and political ties elites and societal groups build out over time with other groups in other states. Linkages work as multiplicator-effects for external influence: political, economic and ideological leverage. The denser the ties, the more intense the external pressure can be. Linkages are not carved in stone, and (unlike geographical proximity), ruling elites possess significant agency to assess the costs and benefits of maintaining such ties and whether or not to comply to external demands. Some elites are more successful than others in this respect. (Levitsky and Way, 2006, 2010; Way and Levitsky, 2007; Tolstrup, 2014)

Levitsky & Way have identified five forms of linkage, which have been updated by Tolstrup:

- economic linkage – credit, investment and assistance, patterns of export and import
- geopolitical linkage – ties to governments, alliances and organizations
- social linkage – tourism, migration, diaspora communities, and elite education abroad
- communication linkage – cross-border telecommunications, Internet connections and foreign media penetration

- transnational civil society linkage – ties to international NGOs, churches, party organizations, and other networks (2014: 33)

All these linkages are conductive to enhance leverage, but in this paper, I will mostly focus on only three forms: geopolitical, economic and social linkages, and in case of ideological clusters (see below), the relevant transnational civil society linkage. The role and impact of other forms of linkages are time-consuming to measure and describe, and are of secondary importance to analyze the interdependency of regime clusters. Nonetheless, they reinforce the consolidation of clusters. Leverage then is measured in the disparity of military, economic and ideological power between two states. In other words, hard power and soft power.[2] The latter is not an element of the original theory, but when dealing with the power of ideas, it is a necessary addition to classify and analyze regime promotion. This short overview of Linkage & Leverage theory (L&L) is necessary to explain the variation of clusters and their life-cycles (see below).

3 Ideological Regime Clusters

The first ideal-type are ideological regime clusters (IRCs). IRCs are created by actors guided by a set of universal ideas, a more-or-less comprehensive worldview that shapes policy-making, institutional reform and contains unit behavior. As a prime example Marxism-Leninism springs to mind, but not only utopian ideologies like Communism can create such clusters. Liberal Democracy[3] should be considered a political ideology as well - the same label applies to clusters propagating a state religion.

Despite the negative connotations linked with the concept of ideology, I propose the following definition: a political ideology is a set of shared values and norms, which structure and explain a rather coherent worldview and provide a platform for political action (both foreign and domestic) by being perceived as both socially desirable and politically feasible by ruling elites. (Kallis, 2000: 89; Linz, 2000: 75-78; Owen, 2010: 2) So consolidated democracies are also ideological regimes in the sense that they are guided by values and a normative worldview. Political ideologies do not need to be utopian to count as such; but they do need to be shared by the majority of the populace in order to be considered ‘consolidated’ ideologies. And only regimes possessing the latter can become promoters of ideological clusters.

The more comprehensive and universal this set of norms and values, like with Communism or Liberal Democracy, the more appealing they are to other regimes, even outside the region from where the cluster originates. The global spread (and clash) of Communism and Democracy are examples of rivalling, strong ideologies, and surpass the more regional scope of weaker ideologies like European Fascism or Pan-American Bolivarianism for instance. Although every ideology has limitations – and may not take hold in areas where radically different values dominate. Take for instance, the nominal spread of Communism to Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) and MENA: Both ‘African Socialism’ or ‘Arab Socialism’ were always more nationalist than international and neither of these blended ideologies could be exported well beyond their regions because of these nationalist limits.[4]

Kurt Weyland (2017) states that a "novel regime type may also claim inherent normative superiority while condemning alternatives as morally decadent and degrading of human dignity (…) or as inherently unfair." (1441) The 'success' of a novel regime type determines its attraction for emulation by others (soft power). Mussolini's initial spectacular success in Italy led to the swift spread of Fascism in and beyond Europe. (1245) However, this sword cuts both ways: after the fall of the Berlin Wall no state has adapted Marxism-Leninism, and with the current troubles in Venezuela, we cannot expect much continued appeal to implement Chávez' version of Bolivarianism. But even 'success' is hard to measure, and will depend on the comprehensive world views (*Weltanschauung*), which shapes target states' incentives, constraints, causal beliefs and principled beliefs of what is right and wrong – in other words, the appropriateness of the target audience *vis-à-vis* the promoted ideology. (Weyland, 2017: 1240; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993)

Of course, I do not intend to downplay the (local) power of such ideas. For instance, when assessing the spread of fundamentalist Islam, it is clear this radical ideology has found fertile soil even deep in the centers of many democratic clusters, but only in the hearts and minds of a very small (often discriminated) minority, and never to the degree to fear a jihadist coup d'état in the liberal West, unlike in MENA.

In other words, not all ideologies can be successfully promoted to create clusters anywhere. An ideology has to be sufficiently universal to appeal to other nations, and may not penetrate regions with deeply established alternative worldviews. This is illustrated by the work of Franziska Deutsch & Christian Welzel (2016), who assess the diffusion of emancipatory values – the psychological bedrock of a pro-democratic mass culture – and find even these universal democratic values spread at different speeds and intensities in free and unfree climates, with variations according to regime type.

Likewise, Apartheid South Africa's ideology could only be emulated in the short-lived separatist state of Katanga and Ian Smith's South Rhodesia. Also, Saudi Arabia never succeeded in widely promoting its state religion, despite their lavish use of economic leverage. The ideological appeal of Wahhabism has not found widespread following that could result in cluster formation, regardless of the vast sums spent by Riyadh to make it happen. The rest of the Islamic world refuses to subjugate to Saudi parochial religious traditions alien to their own culture. (Al-Rasheed, 2016) Notwithstanding, Riyadh possesses soft power and does have the ideological clout to sway and direct jihadist movements, but not at the level of direct regime promotion by suasion.

As the examples show, to be classified as an ideological cluster, a certain coherent ideological worldview of a (group of) regime(s) must be successfully exported to other states and endorsed by their elites and large segments of their populations. This is only possible if an ideology has been widely accepted and institutionally consolidated in the promoter state itself. Shared historical legacies, cross-border social groups and transnational network linkages resulting in matching worldviews, in combination with communication linkage, can all catalyze the spread of

ideology. Agency lies with the cluster as a whole, but peaks within its most active ideology promotors of course.

4 Hegemonic Regime Clusters

The second ideal-type are hegemonic regime clusters (HRCs) – in which the regime of a powerful state or a group of states can serve as an institutional, administrative boilerplate for other regimes in nearby weaker states once hegemony is established. In this case it is not so much the magnetic pull of soft power that make such hegemons the gravity center of such a cluster, but it is their (relative) predominance in terms of military and economic power. (Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2016: 775-776) These clusters are thus characterized by power asymmetry. Hegemons use their leverage over their neighbors to create a ring of allied regimes, reforming or promoting their preferred regime institutions *ex post* – after having established their dominance.

When lacking a comprehensive ideological worldview, these clusters remain regional in scope, and will not have much soft power, beside the attraction of geopolitical or economic status itself. (Brownlee, 2017) Putin's Russia is a clear example (and increasingly so China is becoming one). Russia's lack of ideology stands in stark contrast to its Soviet predecessor. Communism's soft power allured to many young intellectuals in the West in the mid-sixties (before Stalin's atrocities became public knowledge). Russia's soft power in western Europe today can only enchant some business sectors and fascist politicians. In both examples (Soviet) Russia is the regional hegemon, only in the former did it dominate an ideological-hegemonic cluster.

Today, few HRCs can counter the soft power of a strong ideology. Both Russia and China have developed schemes to block the encroachment of democratic values in their societies and have proposed alternatives like Russian "Sovereign Democracy" of "Democracy with Chinese characteristics" that may offer a cloak of regime legitimacy. Both are presented as versions of Democracy, none have the consistency and power of an alternative worldview. It is very illustrative that Russia and China have to band together and set up their own international organization (the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) in order to stop Western democratic norms from proliferating in their backyard. (Ambrosio, 2018)

The examples of Soviet Russia, Western Europe, the USA and Venezuela show that ideological-hegemonic hybrids are common and more successful since they combine all three forms of leverage: political, economic and ideological. However, a pure hegemonic cluster is characterized by its absence of ideological soft power, and must possess sufficient hard power to structurally alter target states' foreign policy and alliances, establishing patron-client relations with them. Agency within these clusters lies disproportionally with the hegemon, and the region's diffusion patterns emanates from it. Russia and Nigeria are good contemporary examples. Brazil on the other hand lacked the hard power and will to create a cluster.

5 Biotopical Regime Clusters

The third ideal-type is a group baptized as biotopical regime clusters (BRCs). These clusters are characterized first by the absence of ideology and hegemony, and secondly by the shared similarity of a certain regime type of the cluster units. Through the lens of L&L theory, these clusters can emerge in regions where a group of states have no regional hegemon and have low linkages to great powers outside their region. Similarly, its units only embrace (foreign) ideology to pursue narrow elite interests, but do not promote such worldviews to the population as a whole. The reason that they share a certain regime type is foremost an outcome of the region's shared geopolitical structures or historical legacy. Regimes in such clusters rarely cooperate with each other, but they do interact and learn from another, and subsequent regime turnovers can increase the size of this cluster.

Admittedly, BRCs are usually only temporary, and disappear when hegemony emerges or a pervasive ideology takes over. With increased globalization they seem to disappear in an ever interconnecting world, but may persist in agglomerations of so-called gap countries. A long-lasting example that withstood the Cold War would be the cluster of personalist regimes in Africa's Great Lakes region. Another one, which is slowly disappearing, is its West African personalist counterpart. Also, Central Asia between 1990-1999 was characterized by the low hegemony of Russia at that particular time and exhibited BRC behavior. But not all BRCs encompass personalist regimes, as the departed cluster of military *juntas* in Latin America during the 1980s indicates.

So, what do units in BRCs have in common? All BRCs contain a set of structures, which constrain and socialize regime behavior, making certain internal reforms more likely, and thereby create a regional path dependency pushing states in such clusters toward a certain regime type. Thus, in absence of agency by a group of (ideological) regimes or a hegemon, structural factors like shared forms of inequality, poverty, state weakness, neo-patrimonialism, ethnic strife, resource curses, (neo-)colonial trading patterns, etc. will dominate and shape unit regime behavior and form. The more regimes of a certain type in a cluster, the more they strengthen these formative structures, altering regime behavior in proximate units. Raul Caruso et al. (2014) found a robust and positive spatial autocorrelation for military despots in SSA from 1977 to 2007. The probability that a country in SSA resulted in despotic rule increased as the share of neighbors governed by such regimes gets larger.[5] Rajeev Goel & James Saunoris (2014) provide evidence for the spatial spillover of informal institutions, in this case corruption and shadow economies.

After decolonization, African regional structures of underdevelopment, its legacy of exclusive institutions and the centralization of power within the men who led the struggle for independence, made SSA especially conductive to personalist rule. By 1972 there were 14 such regimes in power, by 1984 they had reached a peak of 21. Other regime types, like monarchies almost went extinct in SSA. After the end the Cold War, a new democratization wave temporarily reduced the number to 15, climbing up to 18 due to forcible regime promotion in West Africa.

Since 2010 the current number is still around 14, indicating the strength of these regional structures, especially in the Great Lakes region.[6]

Table 1: A Typology of Regime Clusters

CLUSTER ELEMENTS		*Ideological*	*Hegemonic*	*Biotopical*
Main cluster driver:		Ideas & Agency	Agency	(-)
Spatial scope:		-Transregional -Regional	-Regional	-Regional -Sub-regional
Agency located at:		Cluster as a whole	Hegemon	Fragmented at unit-level
United by:		Values, norms, common interests	Patron-client relations (common elite interests)	External threat(s) to unit survival
Similar in:		-Ideology -Foreign policy -Form (regime type)	-Foreign policy -Form	-Form (regime type)
Regime promotion:		-Active -Ideologically motivated	-Reactionary -Defensive measure	-Opportunistic -Aimed at survival
CLUSTER LIFE CYCLES	***Emerge by:***	-Leverage and soft power of ideologue	-Leverage of the hegemon	-Historical legacies -Absence of ideology & hegemony
	Are sustained by:	-Innovation of ideas -Increasing linkages -Common goods	-Increasing linkages -Elite protection	-Enhancing existing formative structures
	Decline through:	-Ideological erosion	-Geopolitical or economic collapse of hegemon	-Altering regional structures
DRIVERS OF DIFFUSION		Cooperation & Competition	Domination	Rivalry & Survival

Source: *Author's own work.*

Since we are dealing with autocratic regimes here, some of these BRCs have been described as 'bad neighborhoods' and so – to follow the analogy – the regimes located in them are "socialized" differently than their peers in other parts of the international system. This affects their behavior in domestic and international politics. Since they recreate the structures of their own geopolitical ecologic climate, I labelled these clusters biotopical, because in a way they maintain their own biotope. In BRCs a study of the pervasive regime type's behavior is necessary to understand the cluster's dynamics. Personalist BRCs will reproduce their structures differently than monarchic or military BRCs. With unrestrained dictators they are less cooperative and more bellicose among one another.

Without ideology or hegemon, agency in BRCs is fragmented and dispersed at unit-level (regimes). Even while units are connected through various linkages, they do not have the synergy of an IRC; nor do any of its units possess the concentrated leverage of a hegemon. This means units only share the default regional formal outlook (regime type), which is not random, but reflects the formative structures of the region or sub-region as a whole. Without a hegemon to monopolize power, provide order and deter units from engaging in conflict these biotopes can be particularly hostile to the regimes that inhabit it, and so over time they have socialized and adapted to survival. In doing so, they strengthen the same structures that have driven them to maintain such a regime type in the first place. This is not a 'chicken-or-the-egg' question of course, and the formative structures are usually shared legacies from other historical geopolitical groupings like colonial empires or imperial conquests.[7]

All three cluster types are (sub-)regional and connected by linkages. Regime clusters are a radial category (Collier and Mahon, 1993),[8] and its subtypes either characterized by ideology, a hegemon, or merely similarity in form (regime type) in case the first two elements are absent. Hybrids are possible and ideological-hegemonic clusters are common. Diffusion takes place in all types of clusters, but the dynamics differ. In IRCs diffusion vectors emerge mostly from ideology promotors, their magnitude depends on the universality of that political worldview and its reception on the 'cultural' match of its targets. In HRCs, diffusion vectors are centered around hegemons, and magnitude depends on their disparity of power (leverage) *vis-à-vis* targets who can gatekeep such influence to counter it. In contrast, BRCs do not have a clear identified center from which vectors emerge. Diffusion takes place across changing interaction dyads by interlinked units (linkages) motivated by rivalry and their own survival. Shared regional structural factors shape these interaction dyads, and such structures will persist until they are replaced by hegemony or the successful spread of an ideology in the region, potentially altering the cluster type.

After this overview of RCT's ideal types, I will now compare these clusters' respective methods of regime promotion and geographic scope (part 6), cluster life-cycles (part 7), the location and nature of conflicts in clusters (8), before showing how these above elements shape their diverging regional diffusion dynamics (9) and future avenues for applying RCT (10). More attention will be given to examples of BRCs since this cluster type is the innovation to the well-established studies of diffusion and autocratic cooperation, which literature has already provided many in-depth examples of IRCs and HRCs. Table 1 presents the defining elements of each cluster type.

6 Regime Promotion & Cluster Scope

When states are able, they engage in regime promotion. Some regimes resort to violent means to achieve this, but even then regime change is often an *ex-post* outcome since the initial attack was for other reasons. Owen (2010: 2-4) presents ample data that (ideological) regime promotion has been as old as international relations themselves, identifying three waves when forcible regime promotion peaked in world history.[9] But this is only the tip of the iceberg, for non-forcible

promotion has been even more common. Rachel Vanderhill (2013) offers some examples on how states use their leverage to such purposes:

> States can alter the strategies of the political elite and increase the capabilities of different elite factions. States can offer positive incentives, such as trade agreements or cheap supplies of energy, to alter elites' calculations about the costs and benefits of various strategies. States may also offer negative incentives, such as denial of important energy supplies, to change elite strategies. External actors can also provide additional financial resources that enable authoritarian leaders to purchase support and increase their repressive capacity. (8)

Systematizing all the above: governments use their leverage to (a) forcefully remove regimes, (b) promote new elites, (c) alter elites' capabilities, (d) change elites' strategies, or (e) integrate elites in their sphere of influence; all with the self-regarding aim to make the international system more friendly, starting with those states in their vicinity or with high strategic potential.

Broadly speaking, regime interactions encompass conductive or disruptive leverage. ***Conductive leverage*** aims to support the target incumbent and its hold on power; raise its capabilities to do so; and bind the target more tightly to the promoting state by expanding linkage ties and increasing the benefits for the elites to stay on such course (aims: c, d, e). ***Disruptive leverage*** is the opposite: Here the promoter is dissatisfied with the current policy of the target state and takes action to blackmail or coerce it back in line by polarizing elites and raising domestic audience costs (Weeks, 2008) for incumbents; forcefully removing the leadership by direct military action or indirectly by weakening its capabilities in face of challengers or popular protests, sometimes enabled and strengthened by the promoter itself (aims: a, b, c, d).

It is necessary to distinguish between different functions (or roles) of certain actors regarding cluster dynamics and regime promotion. Regime ***promoters*** can be both states *within* or *outside* the cluster. They actively pursue subversive activities and intervene in domestic affairs to oust an incumbent elite to establish a regime which is more similar ideologically, loyal (foreign policy), or at least less hostile. The second role is that of ***guardians***, or those foreign actors *outside* clusters that sustain and protect elite incumbents in clusters for strategic or economic reasons. They can do so by countering foreign pressure, devise policies to circumvent imposed economic sanctions or pull a target allied regime out of diplomatic isolation. Guardians have leverage, but not sufficient linkage to target states to really control policy-making. The difference with regime promotors is that they are always conductive since they do not possess the linkage to act against the will of the incumbents in a target state, which often proactively manipulate their guardians to support them. Within L&L theory, this process of counterbalancing leverage or eroding linkages to insulate one's state and diminish foreign intermingling in domestic affairs has been labeled 'gatekeeping' by Jakob Tolstrup (2014).

The existing literature contains terms like 'black knights'[10] and 'spoilers' which overlap in meaning with regime promoters and guardians, but I hesitate to use the former in this context, since both terms are biased and framed from the point of view of democracies. Only in juxtaposition to democratic clusters can autocratic promoters and guardians be labeled spoilers or

black knights. Doing so obscures the differences among autocracies like the republican-monarchist struggle in the Middle East, but also the fact that democracies themselves can be black knights or spoilers when pursuing strategic (hegemonic) interests. The violent CIA-provoked coup in Chile in 1973, which ousted democratically elected S. Allende is an example of a democracy destabilizing a democracy. Or the USSR switching guardianship from their erstwhile protégé in Somalia to Ethiopia for geopolitical gain, after the latter attacked the former in the Ogaden war (1977-78). Regime promoters and guardians are more neutral terms, can be used for all (ideological) regime types and can be either disruptive or conductive in relation to the type of cluster under analysis.

Only ideological regime promoters push for regime change far abroad by applying their hard and soft power to elites using geopolitical and economic linkage, and to foreign nations through transnational civil society linkages. An example are the past military activities of Communist Cuba in Latin America and on the African continent (Angola, Congo, Eritrea and Ethiopia). Such missionary zeal by a small state clearly shows that a popular, universal ideology can lead to regime promotion far beyond the location of the promoter.

Likewise, the ideological-hegemonic hybrid of Hugo Chávez exported its ideology beyond its cluster. As the article by Carlos de la Torre (2017) on the spread of Bolivarianism shows, Caracas did promote a comprehensive alternative worldview to counter Liberal Democracy – branded by Chávez as a corrupt system with savage liberalism. Still the strength of the hegemon matters, and Venezuela's economic mismanagement, oil curse, and the sudden death of Chávez, its main ideologue, have (for now) annihilated the cluster's prospects for expansion. Nonetheless, Bolivarian populist ideas have crossed the Atlantic and were embraced by the leftist political party in Spain, PODEMOS. (Vanderhill, 2014*;* Weyland, 2017; Reid, 2017: 165-192) Depending on their success, IRCs thus can have a regional or global scope.

HRCs in contrast, only engage in regime promotion in proximate neighbors where their hard power is most effective, limiting their cluster to regional phenomena. For instance, the illiberal turn in Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's populist FIDESZ party is not a case of authoritarian diffusion radiating from Russia's hegemonic cluster. Budapest's renewed "Eastern Opening" policy is the result of gatekeeping the EU's influence through rapprochement with Russia based on mutual interests. (Buzogány, 2017: 1319-1320) Also Jason Brownlee confirms that Russia and China have not been catalyzing autocracy far afield, but act more as powerful guardians to support target leaders and policies that will benefit their countries. (Brownlee, 2017: 1340-1341)

BRCs mostly pursue regime change within their most proximate neighbors to make their immediate environment less hostile, thereby inadvertently strengthening the existing regional structures. Regime promotion is opportunistic, based on narrow elite interest, and often defensive. These clusters are characterized by the absence of hegemony that can prevent such breaches of sovereignty.

Take Central Asia in the 1990s. Under Yeltsin, Moscow had all but nominally withdrawn its direct influence in the region. Political turmoil and ethnic clashes followed.[11] In Tajikistan in 1992, conflict between the incumbent former communists and united opposition (containing disparate nationalist, Islamist and democratic parties) spiraled into a protracted civil war along regional clan lines. Already targeting Islamists at home, the Karimov regime in Uzbekistan first acted as a guardian to the side of Rahmon Nabiyev (former Communists) during the early phase of the war, providing weapons and armored personnel carriers. When the opposition camp gained the upper hand with Akbarsho Iskanderov ousting Nabiyev, Tashkent launched a (failed) coup with help of Safarali Kenjayev, the former Tajik KGB deputy chief. Later, during the final stage in the war, when Prime Minister Rahmon(ov) (former Communist camp) was pressured by mediators to include Islamists in a government of national unity, Karimov overplayed his hand and decided to derail the reconciliation process by attempting another coup. In early November 1998, Mahmud Khudaiberdiyev, a former Tajik army colonel, and Abdumalik Abdullajanov, a former Tajik premier – both ethnic Uzbeks – captured the northern industrial city of Khojand and its airport with some 1000 insurgents, demanding a say in the provisional council. After six days of heavy fighting, claiming 300 lives, the coup-leaders fled back to Uzbekistan. (Hiro, 2009: 331, 325, 333, 334-346) Only in July 2018 did Tashkent admit that Khudaiberdiyev had indeed been residing in Uzbekistan and had left the country after the death of Karimov. (Pannier, 2018ab)

This example shows that Tashkent engaged in stealthy attempts at regime promotion without possessing the leverage to merely impose its preferred faction. The predatory behavior by other states in West and Central Africa presented in the introduction, likewise stresses the opportunistic nature of regime promotion in BRCs. Devoid from a guiding ideology, these interferences into the domestic affairs of other states (in crisis) is purely motivated by the survival logic of the promotor regime, in pursuit of direct economic gains or longer-term geopolitical ambitions. Nonetheless, when they succeed, they install regimes that end up as copies of their own (personalist) regime type because regime formation is firmly molded by the region's structural factors.

7 Cluster Life-cycles

The different nature of each type determines the longevity and robustness of its cluster of course. IRCs will use leverage and soft power to promote a certain regime type abroad. These clusters thus tend to expand once they are ideologically consolidated. HRCs can only rely on their predominant leverage to steer neighbors into its orbit. As in the original L&L theory, linkages interact with leverage: so the more (historic) linkages exist among units the more efficient their leverage. Nonetheless, the power of the hegemon determines the cluster's sustainability. In BRCs then, geopolitical structures and historical linkages are all that unites their units. Units thus will be pushed to rival each other or ally with similar units against common threats. In their purest form, only regional structures dictate their behavior, and the path dependency they strengthen will in turn affect other regimes located in or near the cluster.

Theoretically, cluster type thus affects cluster and unit behavior, in other words, their external and internal dynamics, and logically so their defining characteristics should influence their robustness as well as their path to demise. Since IRCs are driven by ideas, HRCs by the power of their dominant unit(s), and BRCs marked by the absence of these elements, their respective life cycles should be linked with these characteristics.

Once established, IRCs sustain themselves by increasing linkages, providing more common goods for the common (ideological) agenda, and by innovating the dominant set of ideas. Just like technology clusters in economics, pitfalls can emerge over time:

> The competitiveness of firms in clusters, through their synergies, innovation and strategies tend to converge with firms that are not clustered, over time. This may be due to clustered firms' restricted collective behavior as they define their own field of competition from within, resulting in competitive blind spots which limit their innovation, strategic positioning to the extent of reducing their ability to react to industry-wide shock like governmental policy changes. Non-clustered firms, on the other hand, tend to be less constrained and more adaptable to sudden industry-wide changes. (Kuah, 2002: 233)

These insights from economic clusters regarding innovation seem to apply to IRCs. The 'industry-wide shock' brings up memories of the failure of Communist ideology in the late 1970s. Ideological deterioration is a killer for ideocratic regimes: For instance, for Communist single-party regimes, the party's claims of legitimacy were purely ideological, and derived from the belief that the party had special access to historical truth and therefore enjoys infallibility. When ideologies de-radicalized or restored 'betrayed values' of the original project (e.g. de-Stalinization in the USSR) – such episodes presented enormous crises in Communist regimes, from which none recovered in the end. (Tismaneanu, 2013) Ideological innovation is the key, even if this means replacing Communism with a more nationalist version (like in Vietnam or Laos), or with anti-Americanism (Cuba) (Dimitrov, 2013: 25), or with a personality cult like *juche* in North Korea (Van den Bosch, 2017: 57-62). But even Democracy today has its ideological struggles like the ongoing challenge of populism in Europe and the USA shows.

HRCs sustain themselves by creating more linkages in order to reinforce the client-patron relations which they obtained with their leverage. The more linkages, the more (elite) interests are entwined, and the more effective the hegemon's leverage. HRCs collapse when the hegemon does no longer have the leverage to keep target regimes in orbit. This can be due to domestic crises, as well as through (great) power rivalry leading to a drain of the available resources to maintain clusters. Usually it is a mix of both issues, as the decolonization of the French empire, as well as Gorbachev's fatal reforms indicate.

BRCs are sustained by regional structures, often themselves in turn a result of common historical legacies. BRCs appear after sudden global geopolitical rifts in combination with a roll-back of hegemony. Such pivotal moments were the collapse of European colonialism in Africa and Asia, or the implosion of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. During such times shared transition pathways cement regional structural factors and shape regime behavior over time.

Regimes in BRCs per definition lack the agency to change these structures themselves (otherwise the cluster would be a HRC), therefore BRCs only disappear under the following conditions: If an external hegemon extends its influence and creates order (example one below); if one of the cluster units obtains the status of hegemon and alters the regional structures (example two), or if global changes alter the geopolitical climate and transform the regional structures (example three). In any case the predominant structures have to be transformed or replaced in order for the BRC to dissolve. To study the demise of BRCs, the focus thus has to be on regime transitions and the role of other actors in supporting and promoting regimes.

The first example would be the reemergence of Russia in Central Asia (CA) after Putin came to power in 1999. Yeltsin did sporadically play a more active role after 1993 to pursue Russian interests when he was under pressure by the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. (Hiro, 2009: 255) But until the late 1990s, CA had slid back to a level of unmitigated personal rule and isolationist policies reminiscent of the time of the khanates. With Putin at the helm, the sudden large US presence in the region during *Operation Enduring Freedom* after 9/11, catalyzed Moscow to step up its engagement with its former Soviet republics. Moscow put pressure on Bishkek to close the US transit center at Manas, while extending Russia's own matching military pressure in Kant. By 2012 Putin started mediating in the protracted water conflicts between downstream states (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) and upstream energy-poor Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with their hydropower dam projects, which block the much needed water flow for harvests downstream. After the death of independent Karimov in 2016, Putin could extend Russia's influence to Uzbekistan as well.[12] In a border trade dispute with Kazakhstan in the Fall of 2017, Kyrgyz president Atambayev openly called upon Russia to mediate.[13] With US troops gone or departing, Russian geopolitical hegemony is fairly undisputed in the region, although it still cannot rival China's economic leverage.[14] Nonetheless, interstate conflict in CA seems unlikely, and actions like Karimov's foreign predation in Tajikistan during the 1990s seem a distant memory.

The second example is the BRC in West Africa since the late 1960s; encompassing multiple personalist regimes in twelve countries.[15] This BRC however has been shrinking with the rise of Nigeria. After the sudden death of Sani Abacha 1998, a personalist dictator himself, Nigeria returned to electoral politics. Since then, Nigeria-led ECOWAS has obtained increasing influence as a regional conflict manager. After gaining experience in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars in the late 1990s other ECOWAS members became more committed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy. Its adherence to democracy was strengthened in 2001 with the *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*. A pro-democratic council of ECOWAS members started to enforce norm-abiding behavior in the region at a time of many regime transitions from personalist rule. Many countries would have relapsed into renewed despotism without the pressure of ECOWAS. (Hartmann, 2016: 94) So, the emergence of hegemony altered the structures for some units in this BRC. After peace-keeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and Guinea-Bissau, the ouster of dictator Jammeh in The Gambia in 2017 has been the most recent illustration of ECOWAS' geopolitical leverage. While its peacekeeping record itself has been mixed (Obi, 2009), Nigeria's hegemony cannot be denied. This is not the case for the

personalist BRC in Central Africa, which is still without hegemony and still experiences unbridled foreign predation.

A third example would be Latin America: its deeply embedded regional structures of anti-imperialism (anti-Americanism), (agrarian) inequality, and loose political control over modernizing militaries came to the fore at the moment that US relative hegemony in the region became directly challenged after the Cuban revolution in 1959, leading to the rise of an unchecked BRC of military *golpes* in the early 1960s. Hal Brands (2012) put this most aptly:

> For Moscow, Havana, and Washington [the 1960s were] a decade in which grand ambitions proved not simply unrealistic, but self-defeating as well. Each power sought to expand its own influence and check that of its competitors, but did so in ways that were thoroughly counterproductive. Castro's clumsy interventionism ensured his diplomatic isolation, and the [strategy of armed struggle] did the Left more harm than good. Khrushchev sought to spread socialism in Latin America, but his methods frightened and repelled the very audience he meant to woo. Washington avoided a "second Cuba" but its military interventions provoked a powerful backlash that more than canceled the limited gains accrued by sending in the Marines. (…) [The great powers] attempted to contain one another, but ended up containing themselves. (64)

In other words, both camps neutralized each other's leverage at a time that the oscillating pendulum between military rule and elections had left the Latin American political landscape in the late 1950s more fragile and polarized than ever. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, a vengeful Castro galvanized and radicalized the Leftist and Rightist forces by fueling guerrillas, while his fallout with the USSR after the missile crisis lowered Cuba's available support for them. The American two-pronged approach of half-heartedly forcing land reforms on unwilling, paranoid Latin American elites afraid of losing their grasp on power (and wealth), while at the same time doling out military support to them did not result in more influence.[16] American lenient policy toward the region's military coup cascade owed not simply to anti-Communism, but also to a frank recognition of the limits of US leverage. (Brands, 2012: 57)

The modernized Latin American militaries took over the steering wheel to root out all traces of insurgency and subversion, activating home-bred, national security doctrines from the 1930s and 1940s, but expanding the definition of subversion to all groups remotely connected to the Left. They embarked on internal wars with the same urgency and methods as traditional military conflicts, trampling human rights and clamping down on free speech. (Brands, 2012: 68) Unlike in Central America, the professional armies of South America were no longer vehicles for personalist rule as during the days of the *caudillo*. Pinochet in Chile was an exception, but still had less personalist power than his African counterparts. (Gandhi et al. 2014: 4) Stroessner's Paraguay was a premodern relic from a colonial past. (Reid, 2017: 124) All of them embraced a siege mentality to ride out the storm of insurrections. A common foe however did not always lead to rapprochement, and old rivalries lingered alongside the anti-Communist struggle. (Darnton, 2014: 111)

By 1977 only Columbia, Costa Rica and Venezuela had democratic regimes, by 1990, only Cuba and Mexico were still unopposed dictatorships. (Reid, 2017: 129) The swift "third wave" of democratization can be attributed to a change of many regional structural factors and the predominant regime type of the BRC. The main systemic changes were sudden and profound. The state-led, protectionist regimes lost their last inches of legitimacy in light of rising petrol prices, debt crises and commodity busts. The land-owning elites and industrials saw that the uniformed tyrants remained hostile to a much-needed free market. Human rights gained new impetus in US foreign policy under Jimmy Carter cold-shouldering the dictators, at a time when the Leftist forces started abandoning their technique of armed struggle in South America. Without funds to co-opt or repress, military regimes *do* have one other exit-option, and so they started negotiating their return to the barracks. In contrast, without this option, the personalist regimes of Central America slid into civil war. (Reid, 2017: 123-164; Brands, 2012: 204-247) Crippled by debt a new economic paradigm was introduced to the BRC and negotiated transitions to unstable democracy followed.

So, the disappearance of the common threat (Communist insurrections), the ability to gatekeep support for their suppression, together with the resurface of Democracy and Liberalism, reshaped regional structural factors in Latin America, leading to the collapse of the military BRC, which these factors had pushed into power in the first place.

8 Cluster Conflicts and Contagions

RCT can explain the potential location of conflicts in clusters and the uncontrolled results of cluster dynamics. Regime promotors in IRCs are better at connecting with networks far beyond their borders, especially when their ideology is culturally attractive for the target, and can be used as soft power. Linkages can be established *ex ante* or *ex post* regime transformation in the target state, and the decision to militarily intervene will depend on a mix of strategy and opportunism. Ideologically contested "lame duck" incumbents are primary targets: when there is a profound crisis in the target country and its elites are polarized on what kind of (ideological) regime is best for its future. In such cases elites reach out for support through their transnational ideological networks, presenting opportunities for foreign ideology promoters or regional hegemons. (Owen, 2010: 34-36) Beside the well-known series of proxy-wars between IRCs like between the Democratic West and the Communist bloc, another main danger is that regime promotion can lure out defensive reactions from other non-ideological clusters.

The most powerful ideology of contemporary times, Liberal Democracy, has and continues to make inroads far beyond its original cluster, especially after the collapse of its major ideological contestant, the USSR and the Communist bloc. Despite a short, uncontested honeymoon between 1985 and 1995 – the "third wave" – this spread is now being contested. (von Soest, 2015; Tansey, 2016)

However, RCT is not limited to analyze the dichotomous democracy-autocracy struggle that dominates contemporary politics, because it distinguishes between autocratic regime types. The

Sino-Soviet split (1956-1966) is also a prime example of two I-HRCs that clashed globally and vied for influence far beyond their borders in the Third World with rivaling development models that were both attractive for recipients. Beyond the scope of this paper, other older historical ideological clashes like the rivalry between absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy and republicanism can also be studied using RCT.

The lack of ideological countermeasures in HRCs explains the location of their conflicts. HRCs are most vulnerable at the fringes of their cluster, where linkages to the hegemon tend to be less dense and exposure to foreign linkages is stronger. Logically, this is where hegemons will put up resistance to block the further spread of rivalling influence, but if it is too weak to stop challenging norms from diffusing in its civil society or pressuring incumbent elites in a client-state, HRCs will tolerate conflict in their periphery if this protects or insulates the hegemon and key allies from unwanted trends. Weyland came to a similar conclusion and stresses the defensive goal of immunization against Western democracy promotion efforts. (Weyland, 2017)

The HRC dominated by Russia has experienced a significant learning curve after the Cold War: After lessons learnt with smoldering conflicts like in Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria, the hegemon has exported conflict to Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) to avert the encroachment of NATO and the EU in these countries respectively. Similarly, Apartheid South Africa used its dominant leverage to export conflict and terror to Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia in order to protect White-minority rule at home.

The above examples illustrate that hegemons will tolerate peripheral conflict if it can protect them. Especially if they do not have the resources to maintain all their patron-client relations. This also means that one does not have to fear Russian tanks in Berlin or Prague anytime soon, since Russia is rather creating a ring of instability in order to insulate its HRC from the ideological inroads of Europe's democratic IRC and is not devising a diabolical plan to invade. Brownlee (2017) confirms that the authoritarian regimes have indeed regionally shored up client-states in the last decade, but are not able to subvert democracy globally.

Many authors found that the resilience of the Arab monarchies during the Arab Spring had nothing to do with some inherent regime characteristic monarchies possess. (Josua, 2016; Yom and Gause, 2012; Bank and Edel, 2015) The HRC led by Saudi Arabia explains why they stayed afloat during the Arab Spring: The resource endowments of the richest were used to aid and help stabilize fellow Gulf Cooperation Council members. In addition, these petroleum riches allow them to harness a series of powerful foreign patrons. (Yom and Gause, 2012: 83-84) Kingdoms in MENA rival with non-monarchies in the same region, and this has now resulted in the post-Arab Spring bipolar rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in which both have instrumentalized their state religion in order to consolidate their camps. (Hinnebusch, 2015) The contagion of proxy-wars between two regional HRCs is thus possible as well (e.g. the civil war in Yemen), albeit in a much smaller geographical scope than IRCs.

Conflicts dynamics in BRCs are different and depend much more on regime-type dynamics, but are mostly located in or near the cluster. These are conflicts aimed at unit survival and (beside

foreign predation) can sometimes manifest themselves as interstate wars, even if they are pursued only to serve domestic regime interests. Such international armed conflicts are in line with the theoretical framework of 'gambling to survive' or 'fighting to survive' as devised by Giacomo Chiozza & Hein Goemans (2011: 12-32). In the former, the victory matters and will contribute to regime stability, in the latter, dictatorships are usually already in deep crisis at the moment of conflict initiation, and acts like sending untrustworthy troops to the front or implementing martial law by themselves are usually desperate measures to prolong regime survival.

The danger of BRCs is the contagion of civil wars or rebellions, which halt development, uproot populations and engrain grievances and societal conflict. In the Great Lakes personalist BRC every country has experienced prolonged civil war, save for Zambia, Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania. Many regimes fell as a result of such insurrections, and ended in conflict traps, from which they are yet to emerge today. Structural factors like state fragility, a legacy of exclusive institutions, colonial structural underdevelopment, etc. have led to the emergence of personalist rule in many states by the early 1970s. Without a regional hegemon to restrain these regimes, foreign-sponsored rebel groups (attempting regime promotion) have been a key element in the list of civil wars, (as they were in the Latin American BRC), and the resulting conflict traps have often led to more personalist regimes coming to power, entrenching and repeating these vicious circles. These rebel armies are not a random symptom. Most are trained, armed and guided by regimes within the cluster who have copied this model from others to counter (foreign) threats or gather rents (smuggling, illegal mining), contributing to regime longevity.

9 Comparing Diffusion Dynamics in Cluster Types

Diffusion is a vast, over-theorized concept, difficult to apply and measure. Based on the integrative efforts of M. Kneuer & T. Demmelhuber, K. Weyland and others, I here present my own interpretation of how the various interactions in cluster types could be differentiated. I likewise distinguish between intentional and unintentional modes of external influence, which lead to diffusion of norms, ideas, behavior patterns, institutions and practices. **Intentional** modes can be ***coercive*** (using conductive or disruptive leverage towards the target state); or based on ***voluntary*** cooperation in various spheres. **Unintentional** modes are related to ***bounded learning*** or the unmitigated spread (***contagion***) of phenomena (like proxy wars or foreign predation) as a result of cluster behavior. This classification is not normative nor exhaustive, but a first attempt to capture various diffusion dynamics from the perspective of cluster typology.

Before comparing cluster types, a few remarks on my choice of framework: I follow Kneuer & Demmelhuber's original contribution regarding four '**arenas of interaction**' on which various modes of diffusion are manifested. As shown in table 2, I differentiate between changes in the ***institutional arena***, that is, the (formal) political regime structures or the constitutional level, encompassing both horizontal and vertical power divisions. Secondly, the ***policy arena*** refers to the regime's vision (policy goals, policy content and policy instruments). Thirdly, the ***ideational arena*** is linked with norms, values and worldviews. Finally, ***administrative techniques*** can

likewise be promoted, shared or copied, since these are (informal) practices aimed at regime control or regime power-sharing. (Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2016: 787-789) Table 2 indicates the expected arenas of diffusion for each cluster type.

I find that intentional or actor-driven modes of diffusion encompass a clear set of behaviors ranging from full control over the target, the use of active leverage to alter target behavior within an asymmetric relationship, to the more consensual socialization, in which targets voluntarily comply to external incentives based on their own (elite) strategic calculations or due to normative persuasion by what is considered a superior model or practice. The level of leverage and available linkages determine the intensity of the coercion.

Table 2: Diffusion Dynamics of Regime Clusters

MODES OF DIFFUSION		**ARENAS OF INTERACTION**		
		Ideological	***Hegemonic***	***Biotopical***
Intentional	***Coercive:*** *(Conductive)*	-Ideational -Institutional	-Policy	-Administrative *(survival)*
	Coercive: *(Disruptive)*	-Ideational -Institutional **[active]**	-Institutional -Policy **[reactionary]**	-Institutional **[opportunistic]**
	Voluntary: *(Cooperation)*	-Administrative -Institutional **[normative suasion]**	-Institutional *(survival)* -Policy *(competition)* -Administrative **[strategic calculation]**	-Administrative *(survival)* **[strategic calculation]**
Unintentional	***(Bounded) Learning:***	Ideational *(competition)* Policy *(competition)*	-Administrative *(survival)*	-Institutional *(survival)* -Policy *(competition)* -Administrative *(survival)*
	Contagion:	-Global ideological rivalry -Proxy conflicts	-Great power rivalry -Peripheral conflicts	-Civil war -Foreign predation
LEVEL OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION		-Multilateral -Institutionalized -Ideological **[high]**	-Bilateral -Institutionalized **[medium]**	-'Shadow governance' **[low]**

Source: *Author's own work based on: Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2016; Weyland, 2017.*

The second set of interactions is unintentional, in the sense that no norms, ideas, behavior patterns, institutions and practices are being actively promoted. Nonetheless, receptive actors take over elements from other units. Many scholars find the nuances between adoption, emulation, learning by example or demonstration more confusing than illuminating, and I as well prefer to follow the approach by Fabrizio Gilardi (2003) and Covadonga Meseguer (2005:1), who bundle the concepts under 'learning' and stress the unifying problem-solving and goal-oriented rationale behind the receptors' behavior. Personally, I lean toward 'bounded' learning as

opposed to 'rational' learning, thereby acknowledging the limited potential for learning by governments, the costs of information gathering, the socio-cultural outlook bias of elites in search for models, and the importance of geographical proximity for adopting available and relevant models. I posit that bounded learning is more related with the (urgent) need for problem-solving and regime survival, related to institutions and administrative practices, while rational learning might be more long-term, goal-oriented, related to policy, norms and practices, and aimed at becoming more competitive. For example, the emulation of liberal trade practices in Latin America, based on East Asian cases. (Meseguer, 2005: 30, 32)

The three cluster types have different dynamics of diffusion. IRCs are driven by cooperation and competition, HRCs by domination, and BRCs by rivalry and survival at unit-level. As presented higher, IRCs actively engage in regime promotion, do so outside their neighborhood and are mostly preoccupied by altering the ideational and institutional arenas of their target states to match theirs. IRCs will both act long-term and opportunistic to obtain their goal, and will cooperate with other cluster-units to spread their ideology (or defend it).[17] Once elite or transnational network linkages are established, targets become more susceptible to normative suasion to conform their administrative and institutional arenas (normative isomorphism). Learning also takes place, but will be more limited to the ideational and policy arenas, with the long-term goals to become more competitive and successful within the (sub-)region (competitive emulation). The risks of contagion have been described in the previous part.

For example, the Cuban promotion activities in Africa during the Cold War encompass various of these elements. After an early disruptive attempt to have Che Guevara start a rebellion in Congo, they applied disruptive coercive leverage in Angola during the anti-colonial struggle and conductive leverage to keep the MPLA in power during the civil war after independence, by offering troops, weapons and training, and suppressing a coup in 1977. In the 1980s they switched to voluntary cooperation. In exchange for oil revenues, Cubans lent enormous support to transform Angola's military state structures into a Communist party model (institutional), training medical personal, administrators and offering scholarships to students (administrative). Bounded learning however did have an adverse effect in the case of Angola, and after assessing how the Communist economic policies had failed, they soon switched to a market economy by the 1990s.

HRCs operate in a context of dependency, due to the asymmetric distribution of leverage (hard power). Driven by domination, HRCs are in it for the long haul, and will use coercive means to force new linkages in order to make their leverage more effective. Incentives and socialization are the norm, until control becomes possible. Their foremost aim is the alter policy to get targets into their orbit. Disruptive leverage, as with the example of Russia exporting conflict, is rather a reactionary, defensive move to ward of threats to the cluster as a whole. Such moves trigger resentment in targets, and complicate the integration into the hegemon's sphere of influence. The targets in the HRC also engage in voluntary cooperation, but this is mostly at elite level and according to strategic calculations within the limits of a dependency setting. As cluster units become more similar over time (coercive isomorphism) they increasingly learn more

administrative techniques, like shared practices to implement electoral fraud, control media, divide opposition, erode linkages to the West (gatekeeping), etc. They learn to consolidate authoritarianism and entrench national elite interests. (Hall, 2014) Autocratic cooperation and learning in the post-Soviet space is well documented.

BRCs are the effect of structural isomorphism caused by the absence of hegemony and ideology. These units are driven foremost by survival and rivalry, and can only temporarily cooperate due to personal ties between regimes or rally forces in light of common threats. As the above examples of Uganda, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Libya, Chad, Uzbekistan have shown BRCs engage in opportunistic institutional (regime) change (disruptive coercive leverage). When supporting an ally, they may use their limited leverage to promote some administrative techniques (providing mercenaries, weapons, or funding) to allies in trouble, with the aim to safeguard their own survival when they face a crisis themselves at a later time. For instance, after having assisted João Bernardo Vieira militarily in Guinea-Bissau (1998-99), the former returned the favor to Lansana Conté in Guinea during the debilitating 2007 nationwide strikes. There are also examples of where such conductive administrative leverage has backfired; for instance, when Kabila Senior turned on his former sponsors, Museveni (Uganda) and Kagame (Rwanda) in order to maintain his hold on power in the DRC and balance domestic elite support groups.

An example of voluntary cooperation (administrative), would be the hiring of North Korean security advisors in Africa during the Cold War. In contrast to China, Cuba and the USSR, North Korean assistance was not seen as a threat to a regime's independence. And soliciting expertise was thus a strategic calculation by Ratsiraka (Madagascar), Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Conté (Guinea) and other dictators to improve the workings of their security apparatus and protect them against coup d'états.

Most diffusion in BRCs happens through bounded learning. This phenomenon needs more research, but below are some examples: For instance, Soviet incumbents-turned-presidential-candidates in CA during the breakup of the USSR learnt from each other how to consolidate their regimes. Even Akaev in Kyrgyzstan, siding with the opposition against the Communist Party, used similar administrative techniques to run unopposed as presidential candidate. In the first years of the transition, all CA autocrats eliminated opposition formation by fast-tracking election dates, creating obnoxiously high thresholds to party registration, outlawing those challengers that did manage to register, and resulting to violence when needed. After getting into office, they rewrote their respective constitutions to their advantage and pushed them through with dodgy referenda. These are strong indications for institutional and administrative bounded learning.

In Africa, the current juggling with constitutional term-limits or age limits for autocrats has a long track record: Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Zimbabwe established presidencies for life, Uganda abolished terms in 2005, followed by Burkina Faso (2014 – failed), Congo-Brazzaville (2015 – no age limit), Burundi and Rwanda (2015, 2017 – illegal third terms), and now Congo-Kinshasa (2015-2019 – postponed and rigged election). Beside this institutional learning, similar administrative techniques were adopted to counter opposition protests.[18] It is true this form of learning can also be found in other regions.

More work has to be done on the diffusion of policy by bounded learning. But an indicative example would be the sudden widespread adoption of electoral politics in Sub Saharan Africa at the end of the Cold War. Such policy changes came hand in hand with other reforms, for instance the proliferation of national sovereign conferences in Francophone Africa. Mirrored on the successful example of Benin, various battled autocrats (Congo-Brazzaville, Niger, Mali) copied the practice to get the pressure off the kettle (tactical retreat) and solicit aid from the West, others were confident in their ability to manipulate 'their' conference and prolong their reign (Zaire, Togo, Gabon) in a multiparty setting. (Nugent, 2004: 387-395)

The formative regional structures in BRCs (structural isomorphism), the absence of hegemony, ideological boilerplates, or strong guardians push cluster units to prolong their regime survival through learning. The similarity of proximate units and shared threats provide a fertile framework for bounded learning. However, learning in this case is reactionary, described by Bank as "counter-diffusion." Pointing to the revolutions in Cuba in 1959, Nicaragua in 1979 and Iran in 1978-79, Bank found that proximate regimes "did not seek to emulate the revolutionary precedent; instead, they pushed their countries in a reactionary direction, 'away' from this precedent. Thus [learning] not via imitation, but via immunization – against the revolutionary 'virus' itself." (Bank, 2017: 1353)

10 Conclusion and Future Avenues for Research

This article is the first attempt to transplant economic cluster frameworks to political regimes, even if many scholars intuitively have been referring to such autocratic groupings as clusters. Of course, there remain notable differences between economic clusters and regime clusters: unlike the former, regime clusters do not just attract new units (only IRCs can do this), but have to resort to linkage and leverage to expand. Moreover, in regime clusters the drive for survival is greater than the drive for growth – meaning some units will actively harm proximate units in order to ensure their own survival. Also, their life cycles are different: while economic clusters combine elements of innovation, technology lifespans, size advantages, etc. in each cluster – each of the described regime clusters depends on a separate element for survival: ideology, the power of the hegemon, or the structures that reproduce the regime types in said clusters.

RCT complements the latest findings in authoritarian diffusion by acknowledging the role of political ideology, hegemony and structures in shaping diffusion dynamics in each cluster type and linking them to certain arenas of interaction. (Kailitz, 2013; Weyland, 2017; Kneuer and Demmelhuber, 2016) RCT fits Elman's (2005) criteria for constructing typologies and is both descriptive and explanatory. RCT does not exclude any regime types like other theoretical frameworks. The three presented ideal cluster types are distinctive enough and the one possible hybrid (ideological-hegemonic clusters) is fairly common. RCT is innovative because it covers a theoretical blind spot by integrating cases where structures trump agency (BRCs).

RCT is in line with current research on the spread of authoritarianism, distinguishing between regime promotion and diffusion. (Vanderhill, 2013; Tansey, 2016; Chou et al. 2017) RCT finds

that forcible regime promotion can take place in the absence of hegemony or ideology. Moreover, different cluster types have varying diffusion dynamics. Also, RCT is not limited to analyze these phenomena solely through the dichotomous lens of democracy-autocracy, but distinguishes among non-democratic regime types and their different behavior patterns. Therefore RCT can account for autocratic rivalry like the Sino-Soviet split, or for older historical examples of ideological competition (monarchy-republicanism in Europe). It does not imply that Liberal Democracy is the 'end of history' and can account for the diffusion patterns of both past and future ideologies.

Regarding the potential risk for global democracy, RCT indicates that only an alternative ideology can truly threaten Liberal Democracy, and as long as this political ideology is consolidated and innovating this cluster is relatively safe from autocracy promoters. I hope that RCT can deepen our understanding of current democratization policies and their prospects in different target regions.

RCT likewise overlaps with some of the older findings of 'bad neighborhoods' first developed by Myron Weiner in 1996 – which are in essence clusters (often BRCs), whose pervasive structures prevent ideological (democratic) regime promotion beyond Europe's borders (Warkotsch, 2006; Börzel, 2011) or in the Middle East (Hinnebusch, 2015).

The theory of 'Authoritarian Gravity Centers' (AGC) conceived by Kneuer and Demmelhuber, is framed in the dichotomous approach of contemporary democracy-autocracy diffusion and accounts for black knight behavior (regional autocratic pushback against democratization). The concept bundles ideological and geopolitical power, and instead focuses on the actor (state) exerting such influence actively (push-factors) and passively (pull-factors). While conceptually useful, AGCs cannot account for autocratic rivalry or historical analyses.

RCT could provide new impetus to studies working on the spillover effects when targeting states in such clusters, like for instance, Peksen & Lounsbery (2012) examining whether large-scale armed operations affect the likelihood of civil conflict onset in countries neighboring the target of intervention. RCT can also consolidate findings on ideological intra-cluster cooperation, like the 'bar fight theory,' concluding that democracies tend to win interstate conflicts more often than dictatorships because they can rally more allies. (Graham et al. 2015)

Another future avenue for RCT would be to account for the variation of the level of institutionalization in various regions across the globe. (Kneuer et al. 2018) Without falling into cultural relativism or becoming Western-centered, it can be argued that only established IRCs can maintain regional organizations, which over time do not evolve into "talking clubs" (mere consultation platforms) or "zombies" (lacking any bureaucratic agency), and which functions can go beyond sovereignty boosting. In Western Europe, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the EU all have their formative roots deeply embedded in the cluster's Liberal Democratic ideology. (Acharya and Johnston, 2007: 255; Hopmann, 2003: 95-98) No different were the USSR, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, which all were active organizations, despite being dominated by Moscow.

In contrast, pure-type HRCs tend to create umbrella organizations with bilateral dynamics, which are active as long as they serve the purpose of the hegemon and the latter has the resources to maintain its activities. The evolution of the CIS and its smaller Russian-dominated offspring is a case in point. These organizations are meant to increase linkages and keep neighbors in Russia's influence sphere. BRCs then are characterized by very low levels of international institutionalization, reflecting F. Söderbaum's (2012) sovereignty-boosting governance or regional shadow governance, when certain state elites and rentier classes actively seek to preserve existing boundary disparities, murky transparency, weak territorial control and even the continued failure of regional organizations in order to further their own private interests.

Very welcome would be studies that could differentiate cluster variation regarding authoritarian learning and cooperation, and a detailed study of their diffusion patterns: For example, which clusters can create durable international norms?

This article is only one of the first attempts to systematize cluster frameworks and RCT presents a dynamic model in which regime behavior can be evaluated *vis-à-vis* their environment while taking into account historical legacies and changes over time (rise or decline of ideology and hegemony).[19] Clusters can reemerge of course. For instance, the recent personalist turn in China (with Xi Jinping becoming president-for-life) makes the regime much more compatible with its biotope. Before, China was not considered a regime promotor, but rather a guardian. (Vanderhill, 2013: 6) With its historical ties to neighbors and extensive economic linkage, there is now strong potential for creating a personalist hegemonic cluster (as before under Mao Zedong). This regime change might have far-reaching consequences for the neighborhood.

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Notes

[1] I define a political regime as a group of people in a state behaving according to an institutionalized set of fundamental formal and informal rules identifying the political power holders, regulating the appointments to the main political posts, the extension of civil liberties to the population as a whole, as well as the limitations on the exercise of their political power within state structures. (Skaaning 2006)

[2] As the various nuances and dimensions of power are beyond the scope of this paper, I stick to J. Nye's definition: Soft power is "the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes" (Nye, 2011: 20-21). Without carrots you need a bigger stick; and without soft power it would be very difficult to convince or expand transnational ideological networks (social and civil society linkage), which are so crucial for regime promotion. Sustainable integration is impossible without attraction. Of course, soft power alone does not suffice: Norm diffusion is not a virus, it is "facilitated by "intensive and long-term contacts," which are rooted in networks of communication and flows of people and resources" (Bostrom, 1994: 192; Levitsky and Way, 2010: 44).

[3] Throughout this paper I write 'Democracy' with a capital when referring to the political ideology of 'Liberal Democracy' in contrast to the system of governance or regime type, written without capital letter.

[4] Despite the rhetoric, African Socialist countries were preoccupied with nationalist self-reliance, breaking the ties with the former colonizer. They differed from their capitalist counterparts in the degree they were willing to cooperate with former imperial powers and to the role attributed for private property and (foreign) capital when it came to pursuing development. African states on both sides of the ideological divide were foremost nationalist, which at the time of decolonization was the ideology of the oppressed and not the oppressor. The ideology therefore only had a regional scope. (Nugent, 2004: 138-140; Hyden, 2006: 29).

[5] In this article such autocrats are labelled as 'military' regimes since they use the dataset of Hadenius and Teorell, 2007 and Wahman et al. 2013. In the dataset of Geddes et al. 2012, 2013 these same regimes are labeled 'personalist.'

[6] Based on data of Geddes et al. 2012, 2013. Data only include independent countries with over a million inhabitants (for instance, excluding personalist Equatorial-Guinea or Djibouti). The later independence of former Portuguese or South African colonies did not affect these numbers, since none were personalist, save for Guinea-Bissau (1980-99).

[7] A nice example are the former French African colonies. Despite France's military bases in many of these states, they could only prevent coups (conductive leverage) and aid rival successors (disruptive), but they never changed the 'nature' of these regimes. Most of them were personalist and remained so for decades, even long after French leverage evaporated.

[8] With 'radial categories' it is possible that no two members share all of the defining attributes, since the overall meaning of a category is locked in its subtypes, which may differ from one-another, and during the process of cognition this bundle of traits must be learned together and understood together. (Collier and Mahon, 1993: 848) In this case the central subcategory shared by all is the 'cluster' itself, measured trough L&L, and its pure subtypes do not share any defining attributes.

[9] Between 1520 and 1650 Catholic and Protestant princes struggled to establish or maintain regimes of their own type in other polities. During the second wave (1770–1850), governments imposed republican (non-monarchical), constitutional-monarchical, and absolute-monarchical regimes. While the third wave between Liberal Democracy and countervailing ideologies like Communism, Fascism and Islamism started in 1919 and is still going on. (Owen, 2010: 2-4, 20-21)

[10] Originally, black knights were defined as "counter-hegemonic powers whose economic, military, and/or diplomatic support helps blunt the impact of U.S. or EU democratizing pressure." (Hufbauer et al. 2007)

[11] Like deadly clashes targeting Meskhetian Turkish, Armenian or Uzbek minorities in Uzbekistan in June 1989, Tajikistan in January 1990 and Kyrgyzstan in June 1990 respectively. (Hiro, 2009: 136, 319, 285)

[12] *The conversation*, September 9, 2016.

[13] *Xinhua*, November 21, 2017.

[14] *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 19, 2018.

[15] Benin (1972-1990), Burkina Faso (1982-2014), Guinea (1984-), Guinea-Bissau (1981-2003), the Ivory Coast (2000-today), Mali (1969-1991), Niger (1997-1999), Nigeria (1994-1999), Liberia (1981-2003), Sierra Leone (1993-1998), Togo (1967-today), The Gambia (1994-2017) and regime promoter and guardian Libya (1969-2011).

[16] Cf. 'competing foreign policy interests' in the L&L literature.

[17] This seems to be in line with the findings of the 'bar-fight' theory, where democracies are more likely to win international conflicts by mustering a larger number of allies than the coalition of their non-democratic adversaries. (Graham et al. 2015)

[18] "Africa's Softer, Gentler Coups d'Etat." *Foreign Policy*, November 3, 2015.

[19] Other attempts are: Nisnevich and Ryabov, 2017 and: Houle et al. 2016.

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The Science of Fascism within a Democratic Framework: Part 1: Delinearized History of US Presidency

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ABSTRACT

No USA president in history has received as much opposition as Donald Trump has from all three components of the Establishment, namely the financial establishment, the political establishment and the corporate media establishment. The election of Donald Trump to the office of presidency is marked with dozens of historical first events that are anything but lackluster, yet a bleak picture of Fascism has been painted to describe Trump. This is an extraordinary piece of disinformation, as no modern president has been more consistent in plainly saying what he will do regarding US military and geopolitical goals, both outside and in office. This, even though his stated position is clearly opposite to the wishes of the dominant cabal, supported by both parties, and to US foreign policy since WWII. USA history is not very long, but Trump presidency and his inaugural speech marked a historic starting point for this 'democracy'. Every sentence of Donald J. Trump's inaugural speech was a departure from diplomacy. Knowing what diplomacy actually means, it's a great step toward transparency. It is the best thing that happened in US political history. It is no surprise the Media established completely flipped, the political establishment gasped, and the financial establishment started to conspire a different strategy (George Soros declaring he wants Trump presidency to fail). In the mean time, the typically apolitical science and technology establishment declared Trump completely unfit for the office that he has just been elected to. Trump's inaugural speech that contained phrases like, "It's time to remember that old wisdom our soldiers will never forget, that whether we are black or brown or white, we all bleed the same red blood of patriots", was in

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sharp contrast to how Abraham Lincoln viewed America, when he said, "I, as much as any other man, stand in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race… I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races." Trump's embrace of humanity and righteousness was reminiscent of Prophet Muhammad's last sermon at the pilgrimage, where he said over 1400 years, "An Arab is no better than a non-Arab, and a non-Arab is no better than an Arab; a red man is no better than a black man and a black man is no better than a red man – except if it is in terms of piety." Yet, Trump took oath of office swearing on the bible used by Abraham Lincoln.

In this two-part paper, the key research question answered is what Trump presidency stands for. In answering this question, the first part deconstructs some of the dominant theories of Fascism. Then, a delinearized history is constructed in order to understand how democracy, as applied in USA, has an inevitable outcome of achieving the same goals as a Fascist regime. The concept of religious extremism, including "Islamic terrorism" or "radical Islam" is also discussed with relevance to 'war on terror'. The history of US presidency then shows that the office of presidency is used as a tool to advance a Fascist agenda, albeit being packaged as USA exceptionalism. The ground is set for part 2 that analyses the rise of Trump and the demise of DNC integrity, followed by deconstruction of various allegations against Trump.

Keywords: Donald Trump, US Presidency, Fascism, Technocracy

1 Introduction

The 2116 US presidential election cycle has been unprecedented by even US standards. Various forms of cognitive dissonance have been invoked to come up with conclusions. First, thanks to various levels of disclosures by WikiLeaks, it was concluded that Senator Bernie Sanders supporters cost Hillary Clinton the election. The same fact regarding WikiLeaks disclosure was used to put the blame on the Russians and Putin, who were accused of 'interfering with the US election process'. Of course, this comical suggestion[1] had to imply that Donald Trump's campaign team must have collaborated with the Russians, hence must have been involved what could form a ground for serious charges, such as treason, spying and others. In the mean time, a new mantra was also brewing - Trump's mental health mandate a coup or impeachment, even before Trump took office on January 20, 2017. Former president Obama, whose track record in every issues of contention is far worse than what Trump was even proposing, is elevated to the level of a Saint, with the CIA and NSA and mainstream press suddenly becoming liberal's saviours. The same Liberal entity that once treated President G W Bush with contempt and called him a 'war criminal' are now cuddling up to Bush[2], his former speech writer, David Frum calling Donald Trump worse than 'a slaveholder' and the 'worst human being ever to enter the presidency'. Liberals who seemed more angry at Hillary Clinton and DNC only a few weeks ago are now railing against Trump with a strident chorus of hate and vitriol.[3] Even soft-spoken Senator Bernie Sanders is calling Trump a liar, often making comments such as, "President

Trump cannot continue to lie, lie, lie. It diminishes the office of the president and our standing in the world." Yet, other narrative is about Trump setting the clock back to a fascist agenda. It is no small irony when one is reminded of Secretary Hillary Clinton, who previously told in Ohio that Trump's refusal to accept defeat was unprecedented and lectured the entire USA with such statements as, "Now make no mistake: by doing that, he is threatening our democracy," "But we know in our country the difference between leadership and dictatorship, right? And the peaceful transition of power is one of the things that sets us apart."

At present, Liberals, both mainstream and 'Bernie bro' group are talking Trump in the same vein as fascism. More interestingly, even the mainstream Republic party members as well as typically apolitical entities, such as scientist or financial communities are raising 'concern's about the direction the country is going. Even neoconservatives, such as columnist Robert Kagan posited Trump as a fascist, declaring, "This is how fascism comes to America, not with jackboots and salutes (although there have been salutes, and a whiff of violence) but with a television huckster, a phony billionaire, a textbook egomaniac 'tapping into' popular resentments and insecurities, and with an entire national political party — out of ambition or blind party loyalty, or simply out of fear — falling into line behind him."[4]

In this paper, we briefly summarize what fascism stands for in scholarly terms. We then offer a delinearized history of US presidency and examine the agenda that got Donald Trump elected to the office of presidency. These facts are tallied against the accusations made against Trump in order assess the real motive of the accusations.

2 Fascism and modern political history

Fascism is a term that became familiar with the rise of Hitler's nationalist party. However, until now, the origin of fascism remains a matter of debate. Few recognized the link between nationalism and fascism, while many took shot at left or right to attribute fascism as the inevitable outcome of fringe movements from both left and right[5]. However, it is widely recognized that fascism cannot adapt to democracy[6]. It is important to understand the relationship between nationalism and fascism.

Fascism is commonly understood as a nation-wide belief that a particular nation is superior. Originally, this notion of 'nation' was bound by ethnicity, then it became comingled with race, culture, and finally religion. Germans and Italians are examples of nations that relate to an ethnic group(s). Israel and Pakistan (that ceded from British India in 1947), and South Sudan are examples of nations based on religion. There could be other denominations of a nation, such as language (e.g. Bengali nationalism, German nationalism), but most of modern countries are not formed on a clear basis of such concept of nation, including USA and Canada. However, fascism requires a sense of national superiority that is through the state.[7] For instance, for the Italian Fascist Party and the German Nazi Party, they both sought out national superiority. Italy led by Mussolini had the expressed intention to "guide the material and moral progress of the [Italian] community."[8] When Hitler wrote his vision as to reinstate Germany as the "the culture-founder

of this earth", there was nothing more than a fundamental assumption of inherent supremacy of the Germans[9]. The camaraderie formed in the common hubris of a superior nation in Fascism trumps every other considerations of civic society[10].

At least at the outset, a Fascist state is anti-democratic and totalitarian. It doesn't allow democratic institutions, including multiparty systems to flourish. However, one must be weary of the fact that multiparty system itself doesn't guarantee democracy in its scientific system as it is quite possible to have a multi-party system that all serve the same interest of the Establishment that is not erected by a democratic process, even though people are involved in elections. A Fascist state is totalitarian because the decision making process is controlled by the dictator, albeit often packaged as the 'will of the people'. As pointed out by Carsten[11], Hitler referred to Parliament as a "twaddling shop", meaning it was a worthless exercise in practical sense. Here, one should note that in western parliamentary democracy, where parliamentarians are bound to vote along the party line (e.g. Canada), the parliament has little significance over a 'twaddling shop' status. A fascist state is considered to be totalitarian because its citizens cede all controls to the state[12]. Once again, we see that any democratic state that controls its citizens through media, education, consumerism, and religions is susceptible to becoming a totalitarian regime[13].

2.1. Religious extremism and Fascism

European version of Christianity in its various form has been anti-Conscience and as such has failed to reflect the will of the people as well as any definitive will of God[14]. It is no surprise that the mindset of crusaders is reflected among extreme right parties in Europe. They both share ideological aspects of fascism[15]. They promote the same agenda as the Fascists in terms of immigration policies[16] and overall notion of superiority of respective nations[17]. It is to be noted here that European version of extreme right doesn't have the 'nation of immigrants' aura around them and the anti-immigration slogans do not distinguish legal immigrants from illegal immigrants. In fact, none of them even recognizes people of non-European origin as a citizen that is entitled to all privileges of the citizen. So, when Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the FN (Front National) in France, said, "1 million unemployed- this means 1 million foreigners too many,[18] she wouldn't count citizens of North African origin as French, lumping them to 'immigrants', even when they were citizens for generations. Excuses for holding such condescending beliefs are also further proof that fascism has to accompany some sort of racism. One such justification is that "immigrants" would ruin national culture by preserving their own customs, which are presumably inferior to those of the host country[19]. This mindset eventually leads to fear in the form of xenophobia and soon national resentment toward immigrant in particular and 'others' in general become the driver of the political agenda. Various misinformation, such as, welfare benefits going preferentially to immigrants or minority groups and immigrants are more prone to be violent and commit crimes, etc. fan mass hysteria, and the nation as a whole start to follow what Islam et al. called the 'fear model'[20] at a personal level. With this fear model, a national state of self deceit and depression sets in increasing vulnerability to form a fascist state. It is often stated that a weak democracy is required for fascism to rise under such culture of fear and resentment[21]. As we shall see in this paper, this statement is not

accurate and in fact, ultimately the 'fear model' can only lead to fascism in true scientific sense, often disguised as democracy.

For instance, Mackel[22] argues,

> "The democratic conditions within which these parties operate ultimately do not allow fascism to flourish. Democracy is more deeply entrenched during the contemporary era than it was in the post-World War One era. While Nazis and Fascists managed to overthrow the democratic regimes in their countries, there are now supranational and national barriers that discourage this from happening."

The problem with this narration is, Nazis didn't 'overthrow' any democratic regime. They did nothing outside of the democratic forum. The second problem is that today with the Establishment firmly in control of all political parties, the mainstream media, and financial institutions, a fascist regime is hardly needed. In fact, the level of government control that is quite clearly in place today is far more stringent than the Nazi era control. The fact that the extreme right parties[23] operate in countries that are part of the European Union is no solace because as Brexit has taught us the lesson that belonging to EU is not something that guarantees anything. Also fallacious is the notion that the mindset of modern democracy is such that the right wing parties have to citizens' expectation and thus remain democratic. Whatever fascism aspires to accomplish, including control of the general public, forced indoctrination, thought control and others can all be accomplished within the framework of democracy. Fascism in Germany didn't collapse because of democracy, but indeed it was democracy that set the stage for Fascism. Today, the scenario hasn't changed as it is perfectly legal within a democratic perimeter to pass any law, however obtuse and oppressive, to pass without the threat of judicial intervention, which is part of the democratic establishment. Religious extremism plays a peculiar role because religion enjoys the 'freedom of religion' protection but there is no standard to determine if a group is acting as per the religious right. In fact, this standard is entirely arbitrary in Christianity due to the fact that there is no religious scripture that can be considered to be universal[24].

However, it is true that democracy changes the nature of the expressed goals of extremist parties. The new modus operandi avoid focusing on a populist leader who embodies the will of the people. Instead, new parties with fascist aspirations obscure the agenda behind 'will of the people'. In essence, the only thing that changes from a typical fascist approach is how Fascism is packaged. This form of fascism can indeed survive quite well under the guise of democracy and share power with other parties with similar agenda. In summary, they emerge as Fascists in disguise.

2.2. 'Radical Islam' and Fascism

Even/though 9 11 is synonymous with "islamic terrorism",this narration is older in the context of Israel . Terrorism has long been the chief demonizing marker that Israel and the United States have used in their wars against Arab states and peoples who have stood in the path of their imperial ambitions.

"While it may be true–and probably is–that not all Muslims are terrorists, it also happens to be true that nearly all terrorists are Muslim." - Dan Gillerman, Israeli Ambassador to the UN, March

7, 2006

Israel has led the way in charting this course. With massive propaganda, the Zionists succeeded in equating the Palestinian resistance with terrorism. In no Western country did this propaganda encounter greater success–including Israel itself–than in the United States. Most liberal Americans–and a few leftists–argued that Palestinian terrorists threatened Israel's existence.

After the capitulation of Egypt at Camp David, Israel pursued more lofty ambitions. The original dream of a Pax Israelica, stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, now seemed within reach. Only the newly emerging Islamist forces in the region–notably, in Iran–now stood in its way.

Islam[25] pointed out that in every epoch, political elites have controlled major avenues of the legal and political arena, redefining fundamental values and rights. During Palestinian-Israel conflict,anyforce of resistance was equated with "Islamic terrorism". This word gained great traction after9 11 terror attack. Jihad that is understood as legitimate resistance against oppressive regime was equated with terrorism and 'Islamic terrorism' and 'Islamic fascism' became the buzzword of the decades that would follow 9/11. After terror attacks and other "excitement inducing" information found on the media, the observers—we in the west—consider reiterating our stance on toleration and views on whether or not Islam is really a "peaceful" religion. This has been a source of great deal of confusion. As Mackel[26] points out, the conditions within which the extreme right national-populist parties operate are deemed comparable with Islamic movements, radical Islamic movements being cosndered to be identitical to fascist movements. Although the Nazi Party's extermination of Jewish people appears to be religious persecution, being Jewish was considered a racial, rather than a religious, trait. To determine whether radical Islam is a manifestation of fascism, one must analyze its ideology,and that analogy is made available in ample proportions, albeit with a great deal of disinformation.

Islam[27] pointed out that liberal narration of Islam often conflate true Islam with right-wing Christian demagogues and thus with fascism. This conflation is rooted in the fact true Islam, as in prophet Mushammad's time seek out absolute control of the state, albeit within the confine of Islam. Here, absolute refers to strict adherence to the rights and privileges offered by the Qur'an. As such, an Islamic state is anti-Democratic because mere fact that a majority supports a policy doesn't get any brownie point unless the first criterion of righteousness is fulfilled. As such, the state imposes *sharia*, or Islamic law, rather than democratic laws. Also, these laws are not negotiable but their applicability can be determined by the head of state (Caliph), who himself assumes leadership by virtue of his righteousness or divine authority as opposed to receiving mandate through public majority. Theoretically, the two sets of laws can overlap, in that sharia principles are also democratic principles. However, that doesn't make them equivalent, as has been pointed out by Islam[28] as well as Sardar[29], who wrote, "Power within the framework of the Qur'an is trust, an amana. It is both a trust from God as 'God grants His authority to whoever He pleases' (2:247) and from people who have been consulted and entrusted the role of leadership to a particular individual. The leader is thus responsible for this trust to both: to God in the

Hereafter; and to the people in this world. If this trust is not handled properly, it should be handed back diligently and without violence: God commands you [people] to return things entrusted to you to their rightful owners, and, if you judge between people, do so with justice' (4:58)."

This observation changes the entire paradigm. At a personal level, this amounts to what Aristotle called 'ideal life' with more thrust toward honor, and intellectual reflection than to seeking pleasure, in order to reach some sort of superiority. While modern philosophers recognized that this notion is in conformance with Plato's, few if any have sought out consistency in this approach. For instance, if the purpose of life is determined a priori, which would then turn intellectual reflection into conscientious participation within a society. Plato as well as Aristotle understood this 'vice' as something driven by desire, which is inherent. It's not because of the propensity to sin (similar to what is stated as 'original sin'), it is rather because humans have this inherent weakness to take the short cut, which leads to deciding on a short-term approach. Qur'anic principles describe this notion as being a test, which is inherent to the purpose of life for all humans[30]. Every such test has both individual and political component in it. Figure 1 shows how the balance between individual liberty and regulatory control is made. At the end, what we have is optimization of two contrasting trends. If regulatory control is increased, one is not expected to have any accountability and a test loses its meaning. On the other hand, if individual liberty is excessive, then it leads to anarchy and, at the same time, accountability skyrockets, making it impractical for humans to survive the tests with their limited ability. The intersection of these two graphs represents the optimum that in Aristotle's word is the 'middle of the extremes' and '*Ummatul wassata'* (the group of middle path) in the Qur'an.



Figure 1. Good behaviors in humans lie within optimum regime of individual liberty.

Human behaviors, therefore, are subject to conscious awareness of individual liberty and social responsibility, both being governed by an external standard, which is known as divine injunction. Not withstanding false claims of divinity, this standard is essential to human good behavior and without such standards, there is no ground for any discussion of the purpose of life, morality or even consistent set of ethics. According to Aristotle, political science is the science that studies the good for humans. This leads us to Aristotle's conception of government and society. In brief, Aristotle believed that societies can only survive and flourish if there is some basic agreement about issues of private morality. This notion, however, cannot move further without clarifying what standard must be applied to define morality[31]. European post Thomas Aquinas philosophers showed little interest in determining what standard applies to define morality. Instead, they have moved toward putting themselves as the standard, irrespective of their non-secular (e.g. John Locke) or secular (e.g. Thomas Hobbes) stand[32]. This notion has permeated through US socio-political culture that presented such paradoxes as allowing individual moral and religious pluralism while claiming that US was founded on certain Judeo-Christian values. Islam et al.[33] have demonstrated that none of these notions has any scientific footing and is not amenable to historical accuracy.

Table 1: Comparison of Islamic state and a fascist state

Points	Fascist state	Islamic state
1	Absolute power to dictator	Absolute power to Creator
2	Dictator's manifesto the source of laws and policies	Qur'an the source of laws and policies
3	Power concentrated to the most corrupt	Power concentrated to most righteous
4	Pragmatism dictates motivation	Long-term success dictates motivation
5	Supreme authority to the Establishment	Supreme authority to the most righteous
6	No individual liberty	Optimum individual liberty
7	Accountability in this world	Accountability in hereafter
8	Totalitarian state	Minimum Intervention of state
9	Most popular rises to power	Most righteous rises to power
10	Leader cannot be removed	Leader can be removed in case non-compliance with *shariah*

11	Controls all aspects of life, such as the social, cultural, economic, and political in order to gain control over people.	Takes holistic approach, providing guideline over all aspects of life, but giving personal freedom to privacy. Qur'an (49:12) prohibits spying on fellow citizens.
12	Goal of world dominance achieved through aggression	Casus belli is strictly related to self defence of the Islamic state
13	National identity is the prime consideration	Righteousness is the prime consideration

Table 1, which draws upon recent research findings of Islam,[34] shows how Islamic state is diametrically opposite to a fascist state. In fact, the optimum point (intersection of the two curves) is Islam, whereas the fake version of it is Fascism. This observation is starkly different from mainstream Eurocentric writers that fail to cognize with deductive logic[35]. It turns out that Fascism is just deregulated corporatism, which itself is a regurgitated form of Dogma that once unleashed waves of Crusades, whose agenda fits perfectly the agenda of dreaded Fascist manifesto. As for democracy itself, it's absurd and tragic that it's taken people 40 years just to start realising what their elected governments have given them. As such, Islam is simultaneously undemocratic and anti-Fascist[36]. Islam is submission to the will of Allah, who is the only entity that is both external and universal simultaneously, whereas Democracy is allegedly submission to the will of the majority. The former one is a true claim[37], backed with Qur'an and book of hadith, whereas the latter is a false claim. For instance, at no time Democracy represented the will of the majority, it's the small minority that sets up the show and the majority rubber stamp it. Nothing has changed from the Imperial era.

3 Delinearized history of US presidency and government control

Plato said, "Strange times are these in which we live when old and young are taught falsehoods. And the one man that dares to tell the truth is called at once a lunatic and fool." Few question the notion that this 'strange times' is now when it comes to politics. Fewer understand the meta data that go behind these 'strange times', even fewer appreciate how this 'strange times' have pervaded all aspects of our civilization for centuries, and practically no one sees this as a problem has a non-Pragmatic solution.
Many dislike the current system but few see the big picture and the direction that our civilization is moving and none can tell us how to fix the system.

According to former U.S. President George W. Bush, the Department of Homeland Security in Washington, DC and many others, the maintenance of beliefs by any individual that counter officially accepted views is a personality disorder of such toxicity as to mandate deployment of an entire system for attacking the psyche of such individuals until they "crack" or are destroyed. As a 2006 article in the Sunday New York Times Magazine disclosed, this was indeed the object of an elaborate and carefully-planned program of government-funded research. As part of this

research, an entire regime of randomized psychological "torturetesting" of people was launched and justified as an effort to catch lies and liars in general on the basis of refining and overcoming the defects
of polygraph technology in particular. To grasp the decadence implicit in this proposition, consider the underlying logic of this matter launched during the Bush Administration and continuing to date:

Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists (MAJOR PREMISE)
Those who are with us never lie (MINOR PREMISE); therefore
All liars must be terrorists and all terrorists must be liars (CONCLUSION)

This Bush model is contextually important for this paper as with Trump the entire Bush clan, including GW Bush has unleashed a series of unflattering commentary on Donald Trump, making GW Bush particularly praiseworthy by the liberal media[38]. We argue that the infamous Bush model has been operation throughout US presidency. In our recent work, we analyzed the modus operandi used by all US presidents and concluded that the systematic disinformation by the government has become progressively more toxic, albeit less transparent.[39,40]

Islam et al.[41] argued that the modern day United States government is involved deeply and Extensively, covering all sectors of entities, namely the financial establishment, the political establishment, and the media establishment — sometimes as director, other times as financier and guarantor. Such a state of affairs has come about one of the most important results of a congressional-military-industrial complex of seemingly infinite plasticity over the last seven decades following the Second World War. The corporate façade of this set of structures seems very new. On delinearizing the actual history, however, it becomes apparent that this vast complex sits atop the post-colonial foundations on which the United States of America was erected in the last quarter of the 18th century. It was in this period following the American colonists' victory over the British occupier that the true corporatization of politics was completed.
The monarch was replaced by a "The president" who would essentially still possess all the essential executive powers run the show, that is to control the military, determine foreign policy, command the "executive departments," and making lifetime appointments to the all powerful federal courts. Using chicanery, bribery, and other ruses, along with propaganda, the Federalists were able to induce specially created state conventions to ratify the Constitution. Little did the people know at the time that once their state joined the New Order it could be blocked from a thousand directions should it ever attempt to never leave. We have examples of such system starting from George Washington. As soon as he was elected president and assumed power of the presidency, he and his éminence grise, Alex Hamilton, began to establish a national bank, taxes, tariffs, a standing army, and all the other impositions the colonists had rebelled against under George III. In the conditions of the war for independence and its aftermath, however, the popular memory of the British colonizers' treatment of its American subjects was generally tolerant whereas punishments meted out by the Washington junta against those who fell afoul of its laws were widely resisted. Thus for example, when a revolt broke out in Pennsylvania

against the national tax on whiskey — the "Whiskey Rebellion" of 1794 — George Washington responded by leading 13,000 troops into the state to crush it. The army of the Second Republic enabled the new regime to put down dissent far more effectively than could the British in 1775 or Taxachusetts in 1786. Moreover, the American people had been propagandized into believing that, whatever happened, they were simply governing themselves. This was the Big Lie that took root sufficiently that the populace allowed the imposition of a far worse tyranny almost anything imposed by the British outsider. Of course, the likelihood of being hanged as a traitor to the state has served as a means of dampening the spark of Liberty down the ages.

A delinearized history makes it clear that George Washington was a rich man — not unlike Silvio Berlusconi today — whose wealth enabled him to construct an ongoing international role as an important statesman to reckon with, not unlike Silvio Berlusconi today. Gardner[42] described the financial status of George Washington whose real worth at time of death was $25.9 billion, taking fourth place in the Forbes list of seriously wealthy Americans. Bill Gates is in first place at $59 billion, Warren Buffett in second at $39 billion, and Larry Ellison of Oracle fame gets the bronze medal with a $36 billion stash. Washington's $25.9 billion sneaks him in just ahead of Christy Walton of the Wal-Mart chain. The first president is in rich company. There, unlike what he claimed to be the case[43], George Washington's success came through his half-brother, 14 year older Army officer, membership in the Masonic lodge, engineered marriage with a rich widow, and numerous shady deals that have all the hallmarks of a mafia-like entity.

The next figure to approach Washington's iconic standing, Abraham Lincoln, was the person that said, "I, as much as any other man, stand in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race... I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races (still a backwoods Illinois politician and lawyer but married to Mary Todd, daughter of a wealthy & politically highly-connected family of slaveowners, 1858). These were not the saviors of human rights and civic dignity, they were simply the new Crusaders, obsessed with Money, Sex, and Control. So, why did they ever do anything that could touted as 'positive'? Abraham Lincoln gave the answer by himself. He wrote:

> My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. (Letter to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862)

As Thomas DiLorenzo[44] and a number of non-court historians have conclusively established, Lincoln did not invade the Confederacy in order to free the slaves. The Emancipation Proclamation did not occur until 1863, by which time opposition in the North to the war was rising despite Lincoln's police state measures to silence opponents and newspapers. The Emancipation Proclamation was a war measure issued under Lincoln's war powers. The

proclamation provided for the emancipated slaves to be enrolled in the Union army replenishing its losses. It was also hoped that the proclamation would spread slave revolts in the South while southern white men were away at war and draw soldiers away from the fronts in order to protect their women and children. The intent was to hasten the defeat of the South before political opposition to Lincoln in the North grew stronger. DiLorenzo (2002) points out: "Lincoln spent his entire political career attempting to use the powers of the state for the benefit of the moneyed corporate elite (the 'one-percenters' of his day), first in Illinois, and then in the North in general, through protectionist tariffs, corporate welfare for road, canal, and railroad corporations, and a national bank controlled by politicians like himself to fund it all."

Lincoln was a man of empire. As soon as the South was conquered, ravaged, and looted, his collection of war criminal generals, such as Sherman and Sheridan, set about exterminating the Plains Indians in one of the worst acts of genocide in human history. Even today Israeli Zionists point to Washington's extermination of the Plains Indians as the model for Israel's theft of Palestine[45].

The trend of luring US Presidents to control the general public continues today,[46] when Donald Trump tops the list with a net worth of $3.7 billion. However, Donald Trump's exception is, he had never held a public office prior to being elected the President.
In all, USA was created primarily and essentially as a business, an ongoing and expanding corporate enterprise with windfall profit. At present, it has become a wonderful profitable entertainment industry. It is no surprise that the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Pentagon and all of the armed forces have large and active sales organizations to promote their latest war. The industry offers guaranteed growth, excellent return on your investment - and an ongoing narrative. This most amazing 'war business', coupled with the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, has become the most profitable business for which in investment or real capital is required. Thanks to the democratic government institutions, the taxpayers foot the bill and provide the bodies.

So, amass all the wealth? It is clearly to gain more and more control over the public, then in turn repeating the accumulation cycle. In this process, both the media and the religious institutions have played a great instrumental role and been able to operate without interference owing to freedom of expression and religious freedom provisions in the constitution. With the media, the primary method of social control had been through the creation of narratives delivered to the public through newspapers, then radio, then TV, and now through computers, cell phones and any other gadget that can convey information. This reality has given rise to an obsession among the power elite to control as much of this messaging as possible. The information age has given previously unthinkable access to the general public. The media establishment takes the various narratives pushed by the State Department, the White House, Pentagon, NATO and other agencies pushing various narratives to sell the American people and other populations on how they should view U.S. policies, rivals and allies and process them as 'facts', thereby turning propaganda into reality.

While such modus operandi has been in place for the longest time, the Reagan era took this obsession to a new low. In the early 1980s when the Reagan administration sought to override "the Vietnam Syndrome," a public aversion to foreign military interventions that followed the Vietnam War. To get Americans to "kick" this syndrome, Reagan's team developed "themes" about overseas events that would push American "hot buttons." The Information age had just dawned on us.[47] Equally significant has been the spying[48] on US nationals, both overseas and in USA[49].

This process has created a society of conformists, including the mainstream media and activist groups. The very survival of any of these entities depends on their conformity to the official narration of every event of significance. This conformity has been costly to the American national interests.. For instance, the disastrous Iraq War, which has cost the U.S. taxpayers over $1 trillion, led to the deaths of some 4,500 American soldiers, killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, and unleashed chaos across the strategic Middle East and now into Europe. Most Americans now agree that the Iraq War "wasn't worth it." But it turns out that Official Washington's catastrophic "group thinks" don't just die, they simply morph into something more sinister. well-deserved deaths.

So, when the public caught on to the Iraq War deceptions, the neocon/liberal-hawk pundits just came up with a new theme to justify their catastrophic Iraq strategy, i.e., "the successful surge," the dispatch of 30,000 more U.S. troops to the war zone. This theme was as bogus as the WMD lies but the upbeat storyline was embraced as the new "group think" in 2007-2008.

Then we entered the Obama era.

3.1. The Nadir of Democracy

On the last of his presidency, President Obama was briefed on the impending war in African, involving Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, and others. It's pathetically tragic final act of the First "son of a Muslim" Nobel Peace Laureate US President, who didn't know Islam or Peace. On his last day in office, there was a regime change in Africa[50].

When George Soros picked up Obama, then a 1st time Junior Senator of Illinois to lead the 'most powerful nation', some were surprised. After all, this son of an African "Muslim" was known as friend of Palestine. His empathy for Palestine paralleled that of Nelson Mandela's and his contempt for Zionist oppressors was something like Desmond Tutu's. More remarkably, unlike Mandela or Tutu, he didn't have a Christian heritage. By both scientific and cultural definitions (in Islam every child is born Muslim and in Muslim culture, son of a Muslim man is a Muslim, no matter who the mother is), Obama would be a Muslim. This would mean he would know what Islam is, at least anyone even remotely familiar with the Arabic word knows, one of the two meanings of the word "Islam" is 'peace'. Of course, this Obama knew about the Peace, just like Ariel Sharon knew about peace making. It was no small irony that Obama shared another trait with Mandela and Tutu, he did win a Nobel Peace Prize. Also first was the fact that he received the Nobel Prize entirely based on the promise of 'hope'.

But, why did Soros want him to be the President?

A Canadian author and social scientist, Gary Zatzman said to the author at that time when everyone thought Obama was far less likely to be the nominee than Jesse Jackson, "You see, they have ravaged all the Middle East, now it's Africa's turn and what better person to do the killing than a son of Africa". Hindsight is 20/20, but this was 2006.

If history should remember Obama, it should remember him as the son of Africa that ravaged Africa[51]. Never before there was such sustained attack against civilians as there was in Yemen. Never before democracy was so savagely massacred as was in Egypt. Never before in history, the weakest and the most vulnerable of all were so extremely brutalized as in Somalia.

Never before in history, a peaceful country was turned into a civil war hotspot as done in Libya. Libya is a special kind of cruelty. Gaddafi was one of the most faithful and useful stooges of USA. Nothing mattered and for that matter even Ambassador Stevens had to go, just like the United States Ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Raphel as well as General Herbert M. Wassom, the chief of the U.S. military mission in Pakistan had to disappear. In the mean time, no one took notice that the estranged former wife of Ambassador Raphel was still active in US covert operation strategies.

How ironic that all countries invaded during Obama were African and all countries that suffered savage killings of innocent civilians were also Muslim. Indeed, Obama's brand of Peace of Islam is the same brand that sees Ariel Sharon as the man of peace and prophet Muhammad as the terrorist. The time to call Israel the fountain of Democracy and USA the defender of truth has arrived.

In summary, US political system has been all about money and the bank,[52] in which presidents have been used as a tool. Whenever there was any non-conformance, the financial establishment cracked down on the president until submission. The case in point is Andrew Jackson. During his administration (1829–1837), Anti-Bank Democrats were mobilized in opposition to the national bank's re-authorization on the grounds that the institution conferred economic privileges on financial elites, violating U.S. constitutional principles of social equality. They considered the Second Bank of the United States to be an illegitimate corporation whose charter violated state sovereignty, posing an implicit threat to the agriculture-based economy dependent upon the Southern states' widely practiced institution of slavery. With the Bank charter due to expire in 1836, the President of the Bank of the United States, Nicholas Biddle, in alliance with the National Republicans under Senator Henry Clay (KY) and Senator Daniel Webster (MA), decided to make rechartering a referendum on the legitimacy of the institution in the elections of 1832. When Congress voted to reauthorize the Bank, Andrew Jackson vetoed the bill. This was the first move by a president that took side of the "farmers, mechanics and laborers" against the interest of the financial establishment. In the presidential campaigns of 1832, this 'bank war' was the central issue in mobilizing the opposing anti-Bank Democrats and National Republicans.

Jackson and Biddle personified the positions on each side. Jacksonians successfully concealed the incompatibility of their "hard money" and "paper money" factions in the anti-Bank campaign, allowing Jackson to score an overwhelming victory against Henry Clay. Such success by a president is unprecedented. It would turn out that such move stood right up until the Democratic Woodrow Wilson corruptly sold out to get himself elected and in 1913 signed the Federal Reserve Act, which he regretted to his dying day. Of course, it is claimed that Woodrow Wilson received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in establishing the League of Nations but one would have to be very naive not to realize that awarding him the prize was almost certainly far more connected with his much earlier corrupt support for the Federal Reserve Act than with his support for the short lived League of Nations.

It is no surprise that the same pro-Establishment politicians that treat President Donald Trump with utmost contempt see President Andrew Jackson as a villain. Former Secretary, Robert Reich wrote:

> "Last night in Nashville, Trump laid a wreath on Andrew Jackson's tomb. One of Trump's first decisions as president was to move a portrait of Jackson into the Oval Office. He has opposed replacing Jackson's image on the $20 bill with Harriet Tubman. Jackson was a populist but he was also a racist. He forced Native Americans out of the South, explaining to Congress that "Established in the midst of another and a superior race, and without appreciating the causes of their inferiority or seeking to control them, they must necessarily yield to the force of circumstances and ere long disappear."
>
> Jackson doesn't belong on the $20 bill or on the wall of the Oval Office. Nor should he be honored and emulated by a president of the United States."

Reference to Jackson as being racist is rich. All US presidents were racist, including Abraham Lincoln, as we have established earlier on in this paper. Moreover, no President is more deserving of a place on US paper money than Jackson because he stood for nothing if not opposition to ceding control of the currency to private, largely foreign interests and to ensuring that it was backed by more than a hope and a prayer.Robert Reich represents the Nadir of hypocrisy of the left.

3.2. The role of media

Possibly the most toxic legacy of President Obama would go down in history is his administration completely incapacitated investigative journalism and turned MSM into a propaganda machine of the left. President Obama and his administration have been the driving force in this manipulation of public opinion with the MSM marching at the Whitehouse drum beat. Instead of the transparent government that Obama promised, he has ran one of the most opaque, if not the most secretive, administrations in American history.

Besides refusing to release the U.S. government's evidence on pivotal events in these international crises, Obama has prosecuted more national security whistleblowers than all past presidents combined.

That repression, including a 35-year prison term for Pvt. Bradley/Chelsea Manning and the forced exile of indicted National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, has intimidated current intelligence analysts who know about the manipulation of public opinion but don't dare tell the truth to reporters for fear of imprisonment.

Yet numerous "leaks" were routinely published by MSM and they were all vetted, approved, or actually planted by the Obama administration. These "leaks" were part of the propaganda, made to seem more trustworthy because they're coming from an unidentified "source" rather than a named government spokesman.

From NATO's Gen. Philip Breedlove to the State Department's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Richard Stengel, the manipulation of information is viewed as a potent "soft power" weapon. It's a way to isolate and damage an "enemy," especially Russia and Putin.

Putin also assisted Obama on another front with another demonized "enemy," Iran. In late 2013, the two leaders collaborated in getting Iran to make significant concessions on its nuclear program, clearing the way for negotiations that eventually led to stringent international controls.

These two diplomatic initiatives alarmed the neocons and their right-wing Israeli friends. Since the mid-1990s, the neocons had worked closely with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in plotting a "regime change" strategy for countries that were viewed as troublesome to Israel, with Iraq, Syria and Iran topping the list.

Putin's interference with that agenda – by preventing U.S. bombing campaigns against Syria and Iran – was viewed as a threat to this longstanding Israeli/neocon strategy. There was also fear that the Obama-Putin teamwork could lead to renewed pressure on Israel to recognize a Palestinian state. So, that relationship had to be blown up.

The detonation occurred in early 2014 when a neocon-orchestrated coup overthrew elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and replaced him with a fiercely anti-Russian regime which included neo-Nazi and other ultra-nationalist elements as well as free-market extremists.

Ukraine had been on the neocon radar at least since September 2013, just after Putin undercut plans for bombing Syria. Neocon Carl Gershman, president of the U.S.-government-funded National Endowment for Democracy, wrote a Washington Post op-ed deeming Ukraine "the biggest prize" and a key steppingstone toward another regime change in Moscow, removing the troublesome Putin.

Yet, during the Ukrainian coup, The New York Times and most other mainstream media outlets played a role similar to what they had done prior to the Iraq War when they hyped false and misleading stories about WMD. By 2014, the U.S. press corps no longer seemed to even pause before undertaking its expected propaganda role.

So, after Yanukovych's ouster, when ethnic Russians in Crimea and eastern Ukraine rose up against the new anti-Russian order in Kiev, the only acceptable frame for the U.S. media was to blame the resistance on Putin. It must be "Russian aggression" or a "Russian invasion."

When a referendum in Crimea overwhelmingly favored secession from Ukraine and rejoining Russia, the U.S. media denounced the 96 percent vote as a "sham" imposed by Russian guns. Similarly, resistance in eastern Ukraine could not have reflected popular sentiment unless it came from mass delusions induced by "Russian propaganda."

As early as 2012, the Corbett report revealed the way the media has become a part of the US government propaganda scheme[53]. The report stated:

> To understand this seeming paradox, we must first understand the centuries-long history of how media has been used to whip the nation into wartime frenzy, dehumanize the supposed enemies, and even to manipulate the public into believing in causes for war that, decades later, were admitted to be completely fictitious.

3.3. The role of technology

The technology is facilitating government control is undeniable. At the same time as the internet was put in place decades ago, the digital integrated circuit (IC) was introduced as a highly engineered commodity, the end-result of a process requiring enormous capital investment in highly specialized technical means. At the same time, this process can produce countless billions of components: only other monopolies can compete against such infinitesimal unit costs of production, the result of vast economies of scale.



Figure 2: Charting the evolution of integrated-circuit technologies and applications(From Zatzman and Islam[54])

Figure 2 illustrates some of how the integrated circuit (IC), as the central technology that made possible the transition from what looked originally like an "age of information technologies" into what is widely called the "Information Age", came to be applied in political-economic reality. All items with a diagonally-shaded background are technologies, not necessarily, or confined to, specific products; the double-bordered items indicate actual commodities and technologies in the marketplace, the former displayed in a horizontal shading pattern; arrowheads point to actual applications of the technology; diamond-heads indicate seminal ideas for an entire genus of applications of the technology; the "military" as a branch-point to start a further, entirely separate chart is marked with a circular dot. A point in common among the technical applications charted above is that, at the point where a user engages the technology, a programmable interface had been inserted in which either a human user would select from a range of preset options and combinations, or – in a more industrialised context – an operator could select another program that does this selecting.

This chart documents where and how IC technologies can be applied to provide programmable switching capabilities across a wide spectrum of applications, starting with industrial process control, certain consumer appliances, microprocessors (the central processing units, or CPUs, of "thinking", "intelligent" or otherwise "smart" machines), and very-large-scale ICs. The latter was crucial for the development of "smart" weapons. Microprocessors, as CPUs for computing devices, enabled the production and marketing of entire computers as portable units.
Thus, from the chart, it emerges that the essence of this technological development and its evolution was not that machines in general became "smart", but that, as workers creating all this technology and its applications, people's economic relations to one another became more social. The significance of this chart is therefore manifold. It immediately smashes two very widespread myths to smithereens: first, nothing inherently "post-industrial" is taking place, and second, production of goods is not being displaced by provision, or provisioning, of services. Behind the notion that the spread of digital information technologies marks the dawn of a "post-industrial" era in which production of services prevails over production of goods, is something else. The underlying idea is that the nature of this era in history has changed such that

Today, it is well known that US military has been developing software that will let it secretly manipulate social media sites by using fake online personas to influence internet conversations and spread pro-American propaganda. Recently, a Californian corporation has been awarded a contract with United States Central Command (Centcom), which oversees US armed operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, to develop what is described as an "online persona management service" that will allow one US serviceman or woman to control up to 10 separate identities based all over the world.

The project has been likened by web experts to China's attempts to control and restrict free speech on the internet. Critics are likely to complain that it will allow the US military to create a false consensus in online conversations, crowd out unwelcome opinions and smother commentaries or reports that do not correspond with its own objectives.

It also calls for "traffic mixing", blending the persona controllers' internet usage with the usage of people outside Centcom in a manner that must offer "excellent cover and powerful deniability".

The multiple persona contract is thought to have been awarded as part of a programme called Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which was first developed in Iraq as a psychological warfare weapon against the online presence of al-Qaida supporters and others ranged against coalition forces. Since then, OEV is reported to have expanded into a $200m program and is thought to have been used against jihadists across Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Middle East.

Recently, Petraeus's successor, General James Mattis, told the same committee that OEV "supports all activities associated with degrading the enemy narrative, including web engagement and web-based product distribution capabilities". Centcom confirmed that the

$2.76m contract was awarded to Ntrepid, a newly formed corporation registered in Los Angeles. It would not disclose whether the multiple persona project is already in operation or discuss any related contracts.

In his evidence to the Senate committee, Gen Mattis said: "OEV seeks to disrupt recruitment and training of suicide bombers; deny safe havens for our adversaries; and counter extremist ideology and propaganda." He added that Centcom was working with "our coalition partners" to develop new techniques and tactics the US could use "to counter the adversary in the cyber domain".

3.4. The aphenomenal model for decision making and absolute control

The process of aphenomenal or prejudice-based decision-making is illustrated by the inverted triangle, proceeding from the top down (Figure 3). The inverted representation stresses the inherent instability and unsustainability of the model.

The source data from which a decision eventually emerges already incorporates their own justifications, which are then massaged by layers of opacity and disinformation. It is a top-down model designed to produce decisions based on self-interest and short-term gains, entailing an inevitable resort to planted stories, cover-ups, and justification. On an institutional scale, this model starts off with a set of policies that are designed to produce filters that transform ‘facts’ into a series of disinformation, which can only prove the effectiveness of the original policy. French psychiatrist, philosopher, and visionary, Frantz Fanon (1925–1961) wrote in *Black Skin, White Masks*, “Sometimes people hold a core belief that is very strong. When they are presented with evidence that works against that belief, the new evidence cannot be accepted. It would create a feeling that is extremely uncomfortable, called cognitive dissonance. And because it is so important to protect the core belief, they will rationalize, ignore and even deny anything that doesn’t fit in with the core belief.”



Figure 3. Aphenomenal modeling process[55] (from Islam et al., 2015).

The disinformation referred to here is what results when information is presented or recapitulated in the service of unstated or unacknowledged ulterior intentions. The *methods* of this disinformation achieve their effect by presenting evidence or raw data selectively, without disclosing either the fact of such selection or the criteria guiding the selection. This process of selection obscures any distinctions between the data coming from nature or from any all-natural pathway, on the one hand, and data from unverified or untested observations on the other.

4 Conclusions

Based on the analysis offered in this first part of a two-part paper, the following conclusions can be reached.

1. Fascism is an ideology that strives to establish superiority of a nation, irrespective of the standard or justification used to assert superiority.
2. Goals of fascism and US-style democracy are the same in terms of gaining government control over public life.
3. All but one US presidents conformed to the 'policy taker' role of the president.
4. 'Radical Islam', a dysphemism of true Islam, is the only ideology that opposes Fascism and is simultaneously anti-Fascism and anti-democratic.
5. US politics in particular and democracy in general are built on an aphenomenal model that is simultaneously anti-knowledge and anti-conscience.

Notes

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[13] Cit op 6

[14] See M.R. Islam, G.M Zatzman and Jaan S. Islam, *Reconstituting the Curriculum*, New York: Scrivener-Wiley, pp. 44-55 for a detailed discussion.

[15] Cit op. 6

[16] Cit op. 7, 132

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[22] Cit op 6

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[25] ibid

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Sovereignty vs Globalization: Indispensable Discourse due to Relationship

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ABSTRACT

Over the decades, scholarly discourses on sovereignty and globalization have been produced following various theories and numerous debates about the strength and weakness of the sovereign nation-state and globalization. In this paper, the various theories on the discourse of sovereignty and globalization are traced and placed into four categories as: contending paradigm, globalization paradigm, transformation paradigm and complementary paradigm. Both concepts, sovereignty and globalization, are explored by adopting the methodological framework, sources of explanation. The argument is that there is an intricate relationship between these concepts. To determine the relationship between sovereignty and globalization, three world systems were examined and it revealed that, globalization is born of the sovereign nation-state and that globalization can only be assert in the current sovereign world system and not the ones preceding it. The overall conclusion is that globalization emerged as a result of sovereignty and since the discourse of sovereignty and globalization is about the same space and its inhabitants, they are bound to be discursively set against each other if the discourse focusses solely on the phenomena seen as globalization. The forces of globalization and sovereignty need to be further researched into to be able to tell where they are leading us.

Keywords: Sovereignty, globalization, sovereign nation-state, relationship, suzerain world, world without borders.

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Introduction and Background

The question, what a sovereign nation-state is, remains a dispute in political discourse, however, the debate regarding the strength and weakness of the sovereign nation-state in relation to globalization continues unabated. Numerous books, papers and articles have been produced over the past decades on the sovereign nation-state's position and strength in an age that is deemed unprecedentedly globalizing. In this paper, the various debates about the sovereign nation-state and globalization are traced and categorised into four paradigms as: **Globalization paradigm**: which claims the demise of the sovereign nation-state due to globalization. **Contending paradigm:** this contends that the sovereign nation-state remains as strong as before. **Transformation paradigm**: this argues that globalisation is transforming the current world political order. **Complementary paradigm**: which maintains that globalization is a complement to the sovereign nation-state.

The discourse of sovereignty and globalisation has become very important in international relations (IR) studies over the past decades due to the growing anxiety of a contingent "post new world order" – a transformation that may furnish "the citizen" with multiple sources of authority or as some anticipate, a shift of authority. Nonetheless, a close look at the sovereignty and globalization discourse shows that very important aspects that generate better understanding of the discourse have gained little or no attention. One of these aspects is the relationship between sovereignty and globalization. While the debates on sovereignty and globalization are centred on the normative – general acceptance and practice of the phenomena – little attention has been given to the relationship between sovereignty and globalization. Overlooking the relationship between sovereignty and globalization has led to the aggravation of the debate and the resultant diverse paths over the past decades. Hence it is imperative to generate a different understanding of the sovereignty and globalization discourse. Thus, the aim of this paper is to generate a different understanding of how the sovereign nation-state and globalization are related to each other and as such contribute to the ongoing discourse on sovereignty and globalization in international relations and politics. This different understanding is how sovereignty and globalization are related. By giving careful attention to this aspect, a batter understanding is generated in the discourse and useful results reached, paving the way forward for the discourse of sovereignty and globalization.

For the analysis, the following hypotheses will lead and guide the discussion.

1. The relationship between the sovereign nation-state and globalization is that, globalization is intricately encapsulated in the very composition of the sovereign nation-state.
2. Sovereignty and globalization emerged as indispensable discourse due to the relationship between them.

Globalization

Numerous theories exist on state sovereignty and globalization. However, as introduced above, the prevailing theories classified into four major categories as paradigms are vital to this paper. The first is the ***globalisation*** paradigm, which claims the demise of sovereignty of the nation-

state by globalisation due to the state's inability to control its own economy. According to the globalization paradigm, this implies, lost of ownership over vital national sources of the economy like, national companies transforming into multi-national companies and further into transnational companies (Reich 1991). The revolution in communication, the so-called global culture, the homogeneity among world societies – that is, differences between the various world societies are reducing, hence shrinking the space between them through the speed of technology and as such giving way to a cosmopolitan society, and the globalization of politics. Regarding the control of the national economy, this paradigm claims that, governments are at the mercy of Multinational corporations (MNCs) and Transnational Corporations (TNCs) since they play a critical role in the economy through the decision they make about investment, employment and trade. (Beck 1999; Ohmae 1995; Castells 1996, 1998; Scholte 2000). Globalization has been enhanced by borders (Carpenter 2019)

The second is the ***contending*** paradigm, this contends that; the sovereign nation-state remains the main actor in world politics and that the present international economy is not unprecedented but rather it is a long historical process. This paradigm also argues that, international economy was more opened in the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century than in the globalizing age. Globalization effects are very concentrated within the developed world and the flow of finance from the developed to the undeveloped world is not really taking place but instead, direct investment is mainly among the developed world. The contending theory claims that, national economies have not been lost due to globalization, since most companies remain multinational and that the transition from multinational to transnational companies is not the greatest interest of existing companies. Accordingly, world economy is not global, if global entails the whole world. Thus, the state is as powerful as before (Hirts and Thompson 1996, Hilleiner 1996, 1999).

The third is ***transformation*** paradigm. This paradigm deems globalization as a challenge to the nation-state. Though it conceives globalization as a reality of the contemporary world, it does not claim demise of sovereignty by the nation-state, but rather globalization of politics where the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs loses its value. The transformation paradigm is rather new compare to the first two but challenges both of them by postulating that, both the globalization and contending paradigms misconstrue the contemporary world through their reading of the phenomena of globalization. According to the transformation paradigm, globalisation can be placed on a continuum of local, national and regional. On one end of the continuum, the social and economic relations and networks organized on local and/or national bases are located and on the other end, social and economic relations and networks, which are organized on the wider scale of regional and global, interact.

In an attempt to make sense of global phenomena, the transformation paradigm introduced the terminology; "spacio-temporal" as the means by which globalization is to be understood. Spacio-temparal implies four things, first: *stretching* of social, political and economic activities across frontiers in a manner that they would have significant effect on individuals and communities in distance places. Second: it means *intensification* or growing magnitude of interconnectedness in

almost every sphere of social existence from the economic to the ecological. Third: it means, *accelerating pace* of global interactions and processes as the evolution of worldwide system of transport and communication increases the velocity with which specific phenomena move. Forth: it means, the *growing extensity, intensity*, and *velocity* of global interactions are associated with a deepening of the local and global enmeshment. According to the transformation paradigm, these are the four ways globalization can be viewed and any historical measurement of the phenomena must involve extensity, intensity, velocity and impact.

In the view of this paradigm, globalization of politics has deflated the cushions that protect the internal against the external rendering the formal distinction of the two rather void, thus global politics needs to be reread. In this respect contemporary globalization sets the condition and determines the open doors for governing the nation-state. Leaning towards a more liberal position, this paradigm argues that the contending paradigm's reading of *globalization* as *universal* is misconception, since the phenomena are rather asymmetrical[1] and implies inclusion and exclusion (Held and McGrew 2000, McGraw 2005).

The fourth, ***complementary*** paradigm presents globalization as a complement rather than a contending force to the sovereign state. According to this paradigm, the global and national are interdependent principles of organization and not antinomies and the two strengthen each other through national and international institutions (Weiss 1999, Sassen 1999, Hobson and Ramesh 2002). This paradigm came from two separate theories. The first is that of Hobson and Ramesh, which is partly built on Wendt's view[2] of the relationship between state and social organization of any given society. Hobson and Ramesh place the emphasis on the content of global society, which they express as a complement to the state. As they put it, "States are purposeful agents that shape and determine the global system in which they reside and, conversely, that the global system shapes states" (Hobson and Ramesh 2002). Accordingly, the global realm is not just a realm of constrain but also a realm of resources which the nation-state as agent exploits or be constrained by.

The second is by Weiss and Sassen who share a similar view but from different angles. They conclude that, global networks have been strengthened on the bases of national and international institutions rather than they weakening or displacing national and international institutions and that, global networks and national and international institutions sustain each other as they coexist. For example, the strategic space in which global processes are embedded and the mechanism through which new legal forms viable for implementation of globalisation are often national or part of the national state institution. According to them, globalization is a partial and limited process and does not so much undermine national capacity of wealth creation than has increased the need for it. In this, Weiss and Sassen mean, the infrastructure that makes possible hypermobility of financial capital at the global scale is embedded in various national territories. Admitting that political interdependence is growing, they deem it not as elimination of the territorial principle but rather the taming of territorial organization. In a similar vein, they argue that global dynamics are partially embedded in national territories in the context of exclusive territorial authority. Diversity has increased they claim, during the Cold War regime as a result of

countries and regions accepting and strengthening one another and as such, international cooperation has flourished at the expense of homogeneity and imposing uniformity. Their conclusion is thus, globalisation and the sovereign nation-state cannot be conceptualised as antinomies but rather as complement to each other.

Sovereignty, State and Nation

These concepts, Sovereignty, State and Nation are part of the core discussion of this paper. Hence, an overview of them is warranted in order for the reader to follow and comprehend the analysis and discussion of this work. Given that sovereignty is the concept that gives meaning to nation and state in the discourse of political theory as well as legal and political philosophy, and further that sovereignty as a concept has evolved and has been defined differently, a thorough presentation of the concept and its use over time is warranted. After this State and Nation are presented.

Sovereignty

Tracing the concept sovereignty back to its origin, Christendom, the rudimentary meaning of sovereignty is to have absolute right, control, rule, authority, and power to do as pleased. In Christendom God is sovereign for He is the creator of all things. He decides the times and the seasons, He has the destiny of all things in His hand, and He determines the beginning and the end when He chooses. He takes council with no one. He has absolute rule over all creation. He seeks not and needs not recognition from anyone to confirm His sovereignty since He has no coequal. The degree of His sovereignty is immutable. Finally, God is sovereign *over* all and not *among* other Powers and principalities. In a work "*Genealogy of Sovereignty*"[3] Bartelson (1993), traces in a chronological series the source and locus of sovereign authority ranging from God to king and from king to man. He further notes, "The very term sovereignty was not present within political discourse until Beaumanoir introduced it in the thirteenth century".[4] Thus, the root of sovereignty as a concept introduced and adopted into political and legal philosophy stems from Christendom, the prevailing knowledge during the middle ages. As Bartelson notes,

> The ultimate source of medieval authority was laid down in the Petrine commission, according to which Christ had instituted the universal body of the faithful and handed it over to St Peter and his successors, who-according to the doctrine- were designated to rule over as well as to represent and personalize this mystical reality. The source of all authority, were in term of papal *plenitudo potestatis* or lay *imperium, gubernaculum* or *majestas,* was divine; all legitimate power descended from God downwards. According to Matthew[5],
>
> > Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my church…And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatever thou shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatever thou shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.[6]

In an earlier work by Ernst Kantorowicz *The King's Two Bodies,* (1957) a description of a profound transformation in the concept of political authority over the course of the Middle Ages is made. In this, the concept of the body of Christ evolved into a notion of two bodies, where one is the *corpus naturale*, the consecrated host of the altar and the other, the *corpus mysticum*, the

social body of the church with its attendant administrative structure. This latter notion about collective social organization is that which has transformed political entities and the body of politic.[7]

Historically, the term *sovereignty* and similar terms were used in ancient times by Aristotle to identify the supreme authority within a community. During the late middle ages, the term became a political slogan used by territorial princes as an attempt to free themselves from the bondage of universal and temporal overlapping jurisdictions made by the Pope or emperor. The term became a tool to reduce overlapping personal jurisdiction and exclusive territorial jurisdiction, dispensing rivalling powers of nobility and estates with a relationship of immediate obedience between ruler and individual subjects.[8]

During the middle ages, sovereignty became a dominant concept whereby ideologies by Bodin and Hobbes acknowledge one supreme authority regardless of the existence of divine authority and natural law. However, Bodin sees the sovereign bound by the *law of God, the law of nature, and custom,* since natural law demands that promises ought to be kept and the sovereign must honour treaties. Hobbes on the other hand, put the sovereign above the law in that he is the only one who can interpret the law of God and the law of nature. Thus, at the very beginning of theorising sovereignty outside Christendom, the fathers of the theory that form the bases for the various definitions in political and legal philosophy view the practicality or empirical function of the concept differently. With time, the theory evolved from supreme and law of nature perspectives to the theory of the state of nature in order to transfer it from the hands of the sovereign kings and Pope into that of the **State** or **Nation**. Austin J. for example, postulates that the law properly understood emanated from one single source of authority untrammelled by any constraints. Bentham argues that natural law was a nonsensical concept. Thus, in Britain, the strife of the 17th century led to a political system in which authority was divided between king and parliament.[9]

Current use and definition of the concept sovereignty in political and legal philosophy stems from the theories of Bodin and Hobbes, deduced from the Christendom definition as can be seen above. It is vital however to note that all of the attributes ascribe to the "Sovereign God" are impossible to ascribe to a state, nation, powers and authorities or any other principality. Hence, the varying definitions and the contending discourse of sovereignty. In the encyclopaedia of philosophy for example, sovereignty is defined within the framework of legal and political philosophy as the attribute by which a person or institution exercises ultimate authority over every other person or institution in its domain.[10] Very important to note in this definition is "**ultimate**", and not absolute as ascribe to the Sovereign God in Christendom. Hence, the sovereign nation-state lacks all the attributes of sovereignty. The attributes that lay the foundation for sovereignty are very vital for the discussions of the concept, given that all of the Christendom's attributes of sovereignty are not realizable in political or any human society or context. However, the notion of the presence of all of these attributes in the discourse of sovereignty is vivid implicitly. For example, the attribute, "no equal" may apply to political organs, e.g. "a state, nation" only internally, given that a state has no other higher authority over

its own realms, but it is externally equal with other states. “Absolute” is another attribute that perplexes the discourse of sovereignty in political and legal philosophy. Note that in Christendom, God’s absolute sovereignty is in every way and manner, since the realm has no internal or external and as such no equal. States or nations have definitely no external absolute power and even total internal absoluteness of states and nations is debatable and this debate rests at the heart of the “sovereignty globalization” discourse. The overwhelming perplexity of the concept sovereignty has led some researchers to raise the question if the concept should continue to have a place in political vocabulary and if the concept is still suitable for classifying and describing political and legal developments and making them understandable (Volk 2019). Others have called it Organized Hypocrisy[11]

Nonetheless, modern states or nation-states have been enshrined with sovereignty since Westphalia and they operate within the realms of the various definitions. The new question that the concept sovereignty encounters in current political and IR theories is; how to define it in the era of globalization when applied to the nation-state. New attempts to define sovereignty in the era of globalization have led to concepts such as, “post-Westphalian sovereignty,” “late sovereignty,” “pooled sovereignty,” “divisible sovereignty” “multiple sovereignty” and “disaggregated sovereignty” (Volk 2019).

State

State as a concept ranges back to antiquity and the formation of states – though historical narratives slightly differ from one another like, the shift from scattered society to gathered society – can be viewed as have followed a ***natural***[12] cause being it rough or smooth (Spruyt 1996, Buzan and Little 2000). As far back as Plato’s time, “state” was advocated maybe with a different conception or perhaps a notion meant for the Greek communities. "State" etymologically originates from the medieval “state” or (regal chair) upon which the head of state (usually a monarch) would seat. In modern usage state, as a concept, also denotes the government, the ruling body of a country, e.g. state apparatus or matters of state as terminologies (Willetts 2005:428).

States as geographical entities were associated with cities or what is normally call city-states. City-states as a new unit of world social structure emerged as a result of societies settling down at specific areas. In this, a dominant structure of human society, based on kinship was ceded by a new development whereby people broke kinship ties and moved to urban areas and as a result, centralized societies that could be considered as states emerged (Buzan and Little 2000: Ch. 8). City-states could stand as autonomous units or be the centre from which broader spectrums of units are managed. The problem city-states had faced in the course of world history is that they suffered lost to empires from time to time but at the collapse of empires city-states revive again. They had the tendency to survive even during the rise and reign of lager units. Spurred on by the political structure they form, city-states prevailed even in an era dominated by empires. Mann’s estimation of the early city-states of Sumeria is a population of about 10,000 – 20,000 controlling a zone of about 10 – 3 km in diameter.[13] Continuous warfare was a common

experience of city-state and they had the capacity to take on empires as was in the case of the Greek city-states against the Persians.

The structure and nature of city-states is that they were politically autonomous, not isolated as single units but were part of a system of states and mostly found in a civilization area. The best-known city-state systems are those of the classical Greece whiles those of the urban cities of Africa during the period 1500 AD are less known (Buzan and Little 2000:174). However, there are features that distinguish states and their relationship with one another over time. A classical work on state systems identifies two types of relationships: first, the Suzerain state system, which is marked by permanent relationship and more or less autonomy to some degree in terms of unique claims. Notwithstanding, there is a hegemonic authority among them which asserts unique and overall claim that the others formally or tacitly accept. The early Chinese states of about 335 B.C. and even the Roman Empire with its universal claim of authority and the duty to protect and disseminate the universal religion of Christianity are some examples. Second, the international state system characterised by full autonomy with no external authority or hegemon. The relationship among the states here is based on full assertion of sovereignty and recognition of each other. It is only the modern state system that falls within the second category (Wight 1977. ch.1).

Nation

Like state, nation is a controversial concept as well. Researchers on nation have not come to any common agreement as to what a nation is. The etymology shows that, the term “nation”, derived from the Latin word *natio* and originally describes the colleagues in a college or students, for example students at the University of Paris who were all born within a pays, spoke the same language and expected to be ruled by their own familiar law. Thus, the notion of ethnic groups as a term is also synonymously used in association with the original word. As far as records are concerned, the concept was first used in 968 to refer to a “Land” by Liutprand, bishop of Cremona, stated as follows: "The Land": I answered, "which you say belongs to your empire belongs, as the nationality and language of the people proves, to the kingdom of Italy"(Mayr-Harting 2001). With time nation became a synonym for states, as can been seen in most of the social science literature.

Since the dawn of modernity state and nation has been normatively conceptualised as sovereign – land of people with a particular origin – albeit the disagreement in the discourse. Yet, the concept nation has attained stronger forces as a political identity through ***ism*** – that is, nationalism. Nationalism as a political identity is perhaps the strongest political force in the world today. Even in its state of the ***ism,*** the notion of sovereignty is not devoid but rather articulated as the backbone of the true identity of the people. However, a colloquial European expression cognises the concept as follows:

> “A Nation”, so goes a rueful European saying, “is a group of people united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours” (Deutsch 1969:3).

This section presents the analytical tools for the analysis and in the analysis, exploration and critical analysis are employed. A basic concept of analysis in IR theory: **sources of explanation** is adopted as a guide for the exploration. The basic idea is by Buzan and Little (2000 Ch. 4), but used in a different perspective in this work. Buzan and Little used sources of explanation as a framework to link IR theory to world history, but these are used in this work to link sovereignty to globalization. The notion behind this approach is to be able to create a vivid picture of how the main concepts of this paper – sovereignty and globalization – relate to each other, and to pave a way for overarching the two concepts. As will be discussed later, finding the relationship and overarching both concepts is the key to understanding how sovereignty and globalization are related. **Sources of explanation** encompass variables that explain behaviour and in IR study, **process, interaction capacity** and **structure** are the three sources of explanation commonly found in the discourse. Process, interaction capacity and structure form the key to theory on any level of analysis. Globalization theories mostly operate at the system level using process and interaction capacity to explain the effects of global phenomena (Buzan and Little 2000: 77-8).

Process: In a system the dynamics of interactions – that is, the interaction capacity among units produces evidence of the pattern of processes. Processes provide the archetype of action and reactions that can be observed among units that form the system. Those observable in the international system range from: fighting, political recognition, organizing, identity formation, trading, negotiating, signalling and cooperating. Processes are applicable at all levels of analysis as a source of explanation. An aspect positive in process formation is the work of units to try to overcome the negative effects of anarchy through international arrangements that enable them to sick joint gains by means of political stability and peace or trade, resource management and welfare (Buzan and Little 2000: 79). Interaction capacity: In general, it involves organization capabilities, transportation and communication – that is, the amount of goods and information that can be sent over any distance, innovation, technology and institutions governed by rule and norms between units and within a system. The speed at which these can be done is a determining factor especially when discussing globalization. For example, the core argument of globalization theory against the notion that globalization is nothing new is that; the rate and intensity of global phenomena are currently unprecedented. Interaction capacity captures both the physical and social aspects of capabilities that are system or unit-wide. (Buzan and Little 2000:80). Structure: Structure in this sense follows the IR wider spectrum from the understanding that, systems are more than the sum of their parts. To a high degree, structure shows that, units are not only formed by their internal processes and interactions, but also by the shape of their environment. The focal point of structure is on units and it involves how they stand in relation to each other, how they are arranged in a system and thus different from each other (Waltz 1997). Buzan and Little argue that a high degree of understanding is gained by considering structure in the economic and social sector when studying international systems (Buzan and Little 2000: 84).

Reasons for the Sovereignty Globalisation Discourse

Possible reasons that call for the discourse of globalization and sovereignty are analysed in order to generate understanding of the contention about these concepts. **Sources of explanation,** as explained above, specifically: **interaction capacity, process** and **structure** will be employed to

guide the analysis. Both the theoretical and empirical aspects will be discussed. The empirical discusses how the forces of globalization are manifested in diverse ways. The theoretical departs from the hypotheses of this paper as:

> *The relationship between the sovereign nation-state and globalization is that, globalization is intricately encapsulated in the very composition of the sovereign nation-state.*
>
> *Sovereignty and globalization emerged as indispensable discourse due to the relationship between them.*

These Hypotheses are based on the notions that can be deduced from the discourse of sovereignty and globalization this far. For the concern of this paper, the concentration is on the four paradigms introduced above.

To say that globalization is encapsulated in the sovereign nation-state, means, it is intricately embedded in the sovereign nation-state. As an active force, globalization is manifested in the sovereign nation-state, depending on the position and nature of the sovereign nation-state at a specific time. In order to paint a clear picture throughout this analysis, the theoretical part explores three different worlds over time in human history.

Three Worlds

As can be seen from the short overview of both **State** and **Nation**, both concepts came into use as the world develops and take different forms and structures. Going back to the hypotheses above, the question now is; how did globalization come into the picture? To test the hypotheses and answer this question, let us look at three different worlds. First: a world without borders; second: a world with borders but without sovereign rights – the **suzerain** state system. Third: a world with borders and sovereign rights – the sovereign state system.

The World without Borders

According to the theory of state formation, before the emergence of states, the world was without fixed borders and movement was without human hindrances (Buzan and Little 2000). Taking this first world as the departing point, it is logical to conclude that this world was global, since it was opened and without human hindrances to movements or flows. However, the first challenge that a conclusion as this would face especially by the **globalization** paradigm[14] is that, an open world without boundaries does not mean globalization. This challenge, to the conclusion that globalization does not only mean openness holds. Given that globalization theory defines globalization as not just openness, but also, the interaction that is taking place in the world at large and how the interaction is being intensified and affecting space and time, in that, a cause at a geographical point on the globe has effect on other places in the world and as a result, opening up the borders of the world. Accordingly, globalization theory denies us any departure from a world antecedent a state system and specifically the sovereign state system.

The denial to assert globalization in the world without borders can be explained by applying **sources of explanation** presented above. Interaction capacity, process and structure are the three main sources of explanation applied in this work. Although this first world was a world with no

borders and was all opened, interaction capacity – that is, transportation, communication and organization – was lacking. Due to the lack of interaction capacity, processes – that is, the pattern of actions and reactions that can be observed among the units that make up a system – was absent as well. Since there was no "system", structure, cannot be discussed in the sense that structure is applied in this work. As we can see, the only concept in the definition of globalization that applies in the world without borders is openness.

As can be understood form the following definitions of globalization: *Deterritorialization or a spread of supraterritoriality – reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distance and territorial borders* (Scholte 2000); *The intensity of global flows such that states and societies become increasingly enmeshed in a world wide system and network of interaction* (Held & McGrew 2000, McGrew 2005)*;* openness is one of the core arguments of the globalization paradigm. Although a world prior to any state system, especially, the sovereign state system, does not have the problem of openness, it is not able to assert globalization. As have been explained above, interaction capacity and processes must be present to be able to assert globalization. Given that this first world is already opened, the question of openness is not the problem for the world without borders but rather interaction capacity and process. A concept that describes this world best is, **open world**.

The Suzerain States World

Taking a step further, to look at a different world with borders but without sovereign rights; a system that Martin Wight (1977:24) calls suzerain state system, openness was the ideal situation as well. Though there were boundaries to some degree in the suzerain state system, the boundaries were weak and sovereign right or independence was not the bases on which the boundaries operated, however autonomous they were. What classifies suzerain state system is the hegemonic authority, that is, one state is able to claim unique and overall rule to which all other states willingly or forcefully bow. Citizenship was emphasized on the bases of empire or kingdom than that of a specific state. For example, within the Roman Empire all were Roman citizens. Movement and communication were open within and even to the outside world. The system of rule was different in character whereby; one judicial authority overlaps the other in most cases. There were no real boundaries in the suzerain state system and the question of sovereignty was at best disputable. The logic of organization even in cases where jurisdiction might be claimed over a given area, territory was not the means of defining a society (Spruyt 1994:35). Kingdom or empire borders and state borders were not that fixed geographically but based on concurring and claim over areas.

In the suzerain world, interaction capacity was much higher than the first world discussed above. As Wight (1977:25) notes, "during the latter half of the second millennium B.C., the revolution in communication and invention of cuneiform writing seems to have produced a state system…." Processes like; war, Babylonian becoming the *lingua franca,* treaties of commerce and dynastic alliance were also in progress by this time. However, the ability to intensify the interaction capacity was lacking – that is, the means of communicating over long distances within the

shortest possible time. The structure of the system, which will be discussed later, as already explained above, was different compare to the sovereign state system.

Thus, a description that better befits the suzerain world is cosmopolitan society. Given that; one: the suzerain world lacks a true territorial identity. Two: it was not really closed and movement and communication were less controlled. Although it was opened and to some degree has the interaction capacity, the suzerain world lacked the intensification abilities such as, extensity, velocity and impact due to factors like technology and geography. These limitations deny the suzerain state system as well of being really qualified as a proper globalized world. In a world such as the suzerain, causes and their effects may be known within but their spread was at a lower pace. Knowledge of the world was very much limited to the kingdoms and empires.

The Sovereign Nation-states World

Finally, looking at the sovereign "nation-states world", this emerged by closing up the open worlds discussed above and yet, it is only at this time that we can asserts globalization in full-fledged according to the theory of globalization. Globalization theory does not start with openness but rather ends with it. Once again, taking a close look at some of the definitions of globalization makes clear the postulation that, globalization theory does not start with openness but rather ends with it. Modelski (1972) defines globalization as, a process of bringing historical societies together. Deterritorialization or a spread of supraterritoriality, that is reconfiguration of geography so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances and territorial borders (Scholte 2000). Held and McGrew (2000), whose definition is one of the corner stones of the globalization paradigm states: "…it is intensity of global flows such that states and societies become increasingly enmeshed in a worldwide system and network of interaction". Borders have become partially liberated from territory (Carpenter 2019). All of these definitions presuppose a closed world, a world that is divided and has taken a new course in a direction different from the open worlds discussed above.

Again, turning to sources of explanation, **structure**, shows that, the organization of the sovereign state system, whether states, regimes, institutions, corporations or agencies, call for processes. **Processes** that can be observed in the sovereign state system are, for example: trading, fighting, negotiating, treaties, threatening etc. Though these processes are visible to some degree in the suzerain state system, the **interaction capacity** was law, compare to the sovereign state system. In the sovereign state system, the intensity and the acceleration of the interaction capacity opens up the system and the observed phenomenon is globalization. Thus, as globalization comes forth and partake in the system, the direction of the sovereign state changed to a reversing process or take diverse paths which "may lead" to cosmopolitan society as some argue. Arguments of this sort envisage not a cosmopolitan society as was in the suzerain state system but rather an open world with no hegemony. By applying sources of explanation, is it vivid that globalization is better assert in the sovereign state system than the first two worlds above. Nonetheless, sources of explanation do not give the whole explanation as to why globalization is embedded in the sovereign nation-state.

The other aspect of the explanation is that, sovereign nation-states as entities are at distance to each other. Not just geographical distance, as is the case of a country in relation to other countries but distances that can solely attain meaning through sovereignty. Physical borders of every nation-state show where the dividing line is, but it is sovereignty that gives meaning to any geographical territory called nation-state that is part of the international system. Sovereignty creates the necessary distance that allows for the discourse of globalization especially the aspect of being brought together. The key words in Held and McGrew (2000): *brought together and increasingly enmeshed,* can only be actualised if there are both spatial and geographical distances between the entities that are being brought together or enmeshed. Other definitions that keepsalive the globalization discourse is: Deterritorialization or a spread of supraterritoriality – reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distance and territorial borders (Scholte 2000). Borders have become partially liberated from territory (Carpenter 2019). These definitions are impossible to be applied to the world without borders and the suzerain world, since the social space in terms of territorial places, territorial borders did not exist and as such, no territorial distances. But, to the world of sovereign nation-sates, these mappings and liberation from territory make possible the phenomena of globalization.

Accordingly, it is impossible to assert globalization without the sovereign nation-state system. The departure is not from an open world to a closed world and reversing to its starting point. But rather globalization departs from a world closed by sovereignty. Thus, a careful reading of the globalization theory would be: *the forces of sovereignty are no longer able to fully fortify the nation-state since an inner force, namely globalization, is erupting and interfering with the nation-state's forces of sovereignty, hence generating diversions in the manner nation-states operate.* This implies that the two-way discussion of the concepts, such as the sovereign state is made weak by globalization as seen in the literature is unable to capture a good overarching understanding of sovereignty and globalization. As Volk (2019) notes, the discourse has been reproduction of the same conceptual structure and these are rigid binary separation into internal/ external, national/global, a container theory of space, and the need to search for supreme. A new understanding as discussed here is that; how the sovereign nation-state and globalization are related must be part the main source of the analysis. Given that it is this relationship that generates the diversion and the new modes of operations and functions in the nation-state and at the same time globally. This close relation between state sovereignty and globalization needs in-depth examination. However, it suffices now to justify the hypotheses of this paper as stated above that globalization is encapsulated in the sovereign nation-state and that Sovereignty and globalization emerged as indispensable discourse.

In conclusion, if globalization departs from sovereignty, then it is logical to conclude that sovereignty has given birth to globalization, which is a force from within and not outside. It is like a process where that which is born is carried on the inside of the one that gives birth to it, and in the fully ripe time it is born. That which comes forth can only be born if and only if, there is an organ to nurture it and bring it forth both by the force of the organ and the force of that which is to be born. This inner force opens up the sovereign nation-state to whatever the future

holds for the sovereign nation-state. Whatever this is, we can at the moment only speculate, nonetheless we can deduce from our understanding of the three world systems discussed in this paper that, this openness will not lead to the open worlds that preceded the closed world of sovereign nation-states.

It will take a careful research in order to draw any conclusion that may give a clear picture of the destination to which this new (but inner) force "*globalization"* is leading. As rightly stated in a recent study, more research is needed: *In the absence of Weberian, let alone Hobbesian state, we are compelled to rethink the structural form of the global. This is not a well-charted territory"* (Cerny and Prichard 2017). The international system, the international society and the world society (see Buzan 2004; Bull 1977; Wight 1977) of the sovereign nation-states' world and new analysis of "**high**" and "**low**" politics (Cerny & Prichard 2017), need to be included in the research when determining the destination. To researchers like Bull, it would take both state and non-state actors to bring about any transformation. As he put it: the mere presence of actors in the international system other than states does not provide any indication of a trend towards a new medievalism (Bull 1977; 2002: 254). But researchers, who adhere to globalization, seem to argue that the presence of non-state actors only could bring about the change.

The Forces of Globalization

Having concluded that it would take careful research to tell where the forces of globalization are leading, there are enough manifestations of globalization forces that allow for the ongoing discourse on the subject. Globalization forces are not only opening up the sovereign nation-state but they are also restructuring domestic and external structures (Cerny and Prichard 2017; Ku and Yoo 2013; Sassen 1999). The processes of production in most cases have transgressed the contours of national borders over to arrays of relationships operating at different geographical points and organizational scales (Carpenter 2019; Dicken 1998). As a result, networks of accelerated transnational exchanges, new identities units and values are generated leading to new universes that share access to the same symbols, markets and commodities (Luke 1993:240). One of such universes is global technology and information. Innovation centres at this universe are being forced to bring out their innovation through the movement of scientists, engineers and managers among organisations and production systems (Castells 1996). However, the forces of globalization bear the dynamics that are beneficial to, or can be to the advantage of the sovereign nation-state as well. As can be observed, the presence of national governments and their use of economy as political tool generate regional differences in the global economy (Castells 1996). The dynamics of globalization forces are shown in two ways. First the openness as discussed above brings unity, by bringing the world together. Dividing forces of society that emanated through sovereignty are being taking away in certain realms while social links across sovereign borders are being created. One such realm is communication. As technology aids the advancement in communication, means of reaching other countries do not only increase but also becomes faster and for that mater cheaper. Within the economic sector for example, large segments of national economies have become much more exposed to global trade and capital flows than they have ever been and sovereign forces are vulnerable to these exposures (Baker,

Epstein and Pollin 1999; Rodrik 1997:9). However, the aspect of the exposure is ambiguous due to its positive and negative effects (Cerny and Prichard 2017; Root 2013).

The positive is that, through trade social contacts are widened across national borders with different societies having direct or indirect contacts with one another across the globe. Trade takes place outside the formal national and institutional arraignments in accordance with the possibilities that technology provides. For example, buying and selling via Internet opens up a country's market to greater diversities even down to the individual level. The effects of this generate new dynamics in the national structure of governance and policy. This is further discussed under the second way.

The second is globalization divides. By this, it means bringing conflicts concerning elementary beliefs regarding social organization in any given society and as a result forces that may stand to resolve the conflicts are weakened. As mention above trade dynamism that elevates new structures would call for new policies and structures to either regulate or contain the new moves. As trade or business in general opens the door to new opportunities in a country, social dimensions are recomposed. Consequently, in some cases, safety networks provided by ruling governments could be strengthened and in others weakened. Some social fabrics would gain new economic opportunities and some would seek to retain and strengthen their economic position by taking advantage of the opportunities that new technologies offer. In advanced industrial countries for example, the division is manifested in the widening gap between low skilled workers and the highly educated. Thus, in an all-increasing cost of maintaining welfare systems due to other causes such as the second demographic transition, social safety nets are made weak. As a result, national policies are revised and new dynamics generated in the structures of governance.

One of the forces that accounts for the process of the conflict as mentioned above is, the economic effect illustrated by Rodrik (1997). As he explains, "*An increase in openness makes domestic capital more responsive to change in international prices and correspondingly manifest the amplitude of the fluctuation in real wages at home. Hence labour becomes worse off due to increased exposure to risk, even if the main (expected) real wage remains unchanged"* (Rodrik 1997:89). In this sense the question of legitimacy is at stake as far as domestic markets are concerned, owing to the view that *"Markets are a social institution, and their continued existence is predicted on the perception that their process and outcomes are legitimate"* (Rodrik 1997:71). In the presence of globalization segments of the domestic market have the potential to break away while other areas of sovereign governance become fragile, which results to divides of domestic legitimacy (Barkawi and Laffey 2002; Cerny and Prichard 2017; Jara 2018). When this happens, those that benefit from globalization would work in favour of it while the losers would want something else. Tension is exacerbated among groups regarding fundamental believes with respect to social organisation, this weakens the forces that would under normal circumstances mitigate and perhaps resolve the conflict through national debates and deliberation. A living example is the BREXIT, British effort to exit the European Union given

that the fraction that calls for exit sees globalization and regionalization as the threat to progress and economic development.

The tension is also played out at the international level, where global economy in some areas has shifted or is shifting from countries that use to dominate the economy to new emerging countries (Jara 2018). The new authority of international organizations like the World Trade Organization WTO also generates tension (Ku & Yoo 2013) As a result, tension mounts up in international cooperation given that countries that experience decline in their economy may turn to have less influential power on the international stage while emerging economies gain more influence. In cases where the magnitude of the reduction in economy is huge, the effects turn to bear on domestic economy where welfare and employment become victims. Hence, domestic tension and legitimacy as discussed above come to the fore of the internal debate. The forces of globalization are also manifested in the national policies and rules. As some argue, globalization has weakened the domestic decision-making process of ruling governments. As the argument goes, politicians are not able to make the type decision that is in line with their political views or the promises they make during political campaign due to globalization.

Conclusion

This paper has analysed the relationship between sovereignty and globalization and how the two concepts discursively are set against each other. The first part of the discussion took the theoretical assumption that globalization is encapsulated in the sovereign nation-state and therefore the discourse of both concepts is indispensable. The main argument is that globalization can only be realised through sovereignty. It is only through the geographical divide of the world that the postulations such as: the world is being brought together and enmeshed, and borders have become partially liberated from territory (Castells 1996, 1998; Carpenter 2019) can be asserted. Further discussed is; through processes and interaction capacity within the sovereign state system, forces are generated and the forces in their turn opens up the nation-states and the results are that which is called globalisation. The positive effect globalization has is that the world is brought together and new ways of organizing and operating domestically are generated. Albeit, negative effects could be generated internally regarding elementary believes of social organisation in a society. The overall conclusion is that globalization is born of sovereignty and since the discourse of sovereignty and globalization is about the same space and its inhabitants, they are bound to be set against each other discursively if only the trends of development are the focus of the discussion. The forces of globalization and sovereignty need to be further researched into to be able to tell where they are leading us.

The findings of this paper contribute chiefly to the sovereignty and globalization discourse in political and IR theory and generally to other areas like sociology, legal philosophy globalization studies and most of the social sciences where globalization is employed. What is new about this study is the notion that globalization is born out of sovereignty and they both have forces that interrupt each other and when the forces of globalization interfere with the nation-state's forces of sovereignty new paths are generated in the operations of the nation-state. These new paths in the operations of the nation-state can be seen at national and individual levels. At the national

level, networks of accelerated transnational exchanges at a rate faster than before and new means of organizing take place. For example, states can today implement border crossings at the source of movement and new local and global border appearing in regulatory systems (Carpenter 2019). At the individual level, new identities, units and values are generated leading to new universes that share access to the same symbols, markets and commodities. Technology and global information are some of such universes.

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Notes

[1] The asymmetric position hold by the transformation theory, leads us to a domain of political theory, namely, the world system theory where the world is rather structured into classes determined by wealth

[2] In Wendt's view, there are two ways in which society is organized. First: "human beings and their organization [e.g. the state] are powerful actors whose actions help to reproduce or transform the [domestic and global] society in which they live; and second: society [global/ domestic] is made up of social relationships, which structure the interaction between these purposeful actors" (Wendt, 1984).

[3] See Bartelson Jans, *Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Stockholm 1993) p. 3

[4] Bartelson Jans, p. 78

[5] See Matthew chapter 16:18-19, the King James version of the Bible

[6] Bartelson, p. 82.

[7]See Philpott, Daniel, "Sovereignty", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/ sovereignty/s.

[8] See Encyclopaedia of Public and International Law p. 503

[9] See International Encyclopedia of the social and Behavioral science p. 14707

[10] See Encyclopaedia of philosophy 1998, article by Ford D.J

[11] See Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999)

[12] Natural cause here implies that, people were not coerced to move from their scattered society to more populous areas but rather the change in society at the time was the attraction to moving.

[13] See Buzan and Little (2000:147)

[14] See above under theory, for the view of this paradigm